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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0, as
amended.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented to this Court for review:
ISSUE NO. 1:

Did the district court err in ruling that appellants' complaint

failed to state a claim for breach of implied contractual duties? This issue was addressed
below in connection with the defendants' motion to dismiss. (R. 16-29, 33-85, 119-135).
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: A trial court's ruling on a motion to
dismiss is reviewed for correctness by the Court. Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, % 9, 99
P.3d842.
ISSUE NO. 2:

Did the district court err in ruling that appellants' complaint

failed to state a tort cause of action against the defendants (including breach of
confidentiality, breach of fiduciary duty, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and negligence)? This issue was addressed below in connection with the
defendants' motion to dismiss. (R. 16-29, 33-85, 119-135).
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: A trial court's ruling on a motion to
dismiss is reviewed for correctness by the Court. Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, ^ 9, 99
P.3d842.
ISSUE NO. 3:

Did the district court err in ruling that the complaint failed to

state a cause of action because damages had not been sufficiently alleged? This issue was

1

addressed below in connection with defendants' motion to dismiss. (R. 16-29, 33-85, 119135).
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: A trial court's dismissal for failure to
state a claim is reviewed de novo by the Court. A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss
is reviewed for correctness by the Court. Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, ^ 9, 99 P.3d
842.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Rule of Evidence 506(b):
General rule of privilege. If the information is communicated in confidence and
for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has a privilege,
during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from
disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician
or mental health therapist, (2) information obtained by examination of the patient,
and (3) information transmitted among a patient, a physician or mental health
therapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the
direction of the physician or mental health therapist, including guardians or
members of the patient's family who are present to further the interest of the
patient because they are reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
communications, or participation in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction
of the physician or mental health therapist.
Utah Rule of Evidence 506(d)(1):
Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule:
(d)(1) Condition as element of claim or defense. As to a communication relevant
to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any
proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim or defense, or, after
the patient's death, in any proceedings in which any party relies upon the condition
as an element of the claim or defense;...
78-14-6. Writing required as basis for liability for breach of guarantee, warranty, contract
or assurance of result.
No liability shall be imposed upon any health care provider on the basis of an
alleged breach of guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance of result to be
2

obtained from any health care rendered unless the guarantee, warranty, contract or
assurance is set forth in writing and signed by the health care provider or an
authorized agent of the provider.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(4). Privileged communications.
A physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of his patient, be examined in a
civil action as to any information acquired in attending the patient which was
necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient. However, this privilege
shall be deemed to be waived by the patient in an action in which the patient places
his medical condition at issue as an element or factor of his claim or defense.
Under those circumstances, a physician or surgeon who has prescribed for or
treated that patient for the medical condition at issue may provide information,
interviews, reports, records, statements, memoranda, or other data relating to the
patient's medical condition and treatment which are placed at issue.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
This action arose when a treating physician secretly agreed to serve as a paid witness
for his former patient's adversary in underlying litigation, with the understanding that his
cooperation would include a change to his original diagnosis. Nicholas Sorensen and his
guardians Kevin and Pamela Sorensen (hereinafter collectively "Sorensen") filed this action
on August 3, 2004, against defendants John P. Barbuto, individually, and John P. Barbuto,
M.D., P.C. (hereinafter collectively "Barbuto") (R. 1).
On August 31, 2004, Barbuto filed a motion to dismiss Sorensen's complaint on the
ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (R. 13). After
briefing and oral argument, the trial court dismissed the complaint, incorporating "all of the
legal analyses and authorities set forth in defendants' memoranda in support and reply...."
(R. 155). An Order was entered on May 17, 2005 (R. 158). Sorensen filed a notice of
appeal on May 31, 2005. (R. 164).
3

Statement of Facts
Sorensen's complaint included the following allegations:
On July 24, 1999, Nicholas Sorensen was a passenger in a single-vehicle rollover
accident on 1-15. Another passenger in the vehicle was killed and both Sorensen and the
driver were seriously injured. Sorensen was treated by Barbuto for his head injuries and
seizures for nearly a year and a half before Barbuto was removed by Sorensen's medical
insurer from its list of approved providers, at which time, Sorensen began treating with
other doctors. Barbuto's treatment of Sorensen included diagnostic tests and examinations,
prescriptions for medicine, overseeing cognitive therapy, and other treatment for seizures
and brain injury. (R. 2, ^flf 5, 6).
Being unable to reach a settlement with the driver's liability insurer, Sorensen filed a
personal injury action entitled Nicholas Sorensen v. Jack W. Marcelis, et al, Civil No.
00095711, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah (the "personal injury
action" or the "underlying action"). At the time the personal injury action was filed in
2000, Barbuto was still Sorensen's treating physician. (R. 2, ^flj 6-7).
During the course of the personal injury action, Barbuto's medical records were
produced. Neither party took Barbuto's deposition. The matter was set for trial in the latter
part of May 2003. Two weeks before the trial date, opposing counsel in Sorensen's
personal injury action subpoenaed Barbuto to appear and give testimony at trial. Shortly
thereafter, the judge continued the trial until October 2003 for reasons not related to this
matter. (R. 3, Iflf 8, 9).

4

Without notice to the Sorensens or their counsel, and without authorization by the
Sorensens, Barbuto continued to engage in ex parte contact with opposing counsel in the
personal injury action, with Barbuto agreeing to act as an expert witness against his former
patient. (R.3,^9).
On August 1, 2003, opposing counsel provided medical records and other
information to Barbuto and asked him to give his opinions about "what has been going on
with Mr. Sorensen since you last saw him," and to address "to what degree his current
issues are as a result of the [brain] injury and what those issues might be as a result of
problems Mr. Sorensen had prior to the accident." The letter also requested that Barbuto
contact counsel to discuss his opinions and several other issues that they would like him to
address. (R. 40, ^ 5).
Pursuant to this ex parte request, Barbuto prepared an extensive 10-page report,
dated August 11, 2003. After orally discussing his opinions with opposing counsel, Barbuto
was instructed not to send the written report to counsel, an instruction which he obeyed. (R.
40,16).
After being retained by opposing counsel, Barbuto changed his original treating
diagnosis of seizure disorders and began opining that Sorensen was not suffering from
seizures after all; rather, his problems were in large part psychological and social in origin
(a standard theme in nearly all of Barbuto's reports when hired by the defense). (R. 3-4, fflf
10-12).
Approximately two weeks before the October 2003 trial, the ex parte contacts
between Barbuto and opposing counsel were discovered by chance during the deposition of
5

another witness to the case. Immediately thereafter, Sorensen's counsel met with Barbuto
and scheduled his deposition for September 30, 2003. During such deposition, Sorensen's
counsel learned for the first time that opposing counsel had retained Barbuto, that Barbuto
had altered his treating opinions, and that counsel and Barbuto had agreed between
themselves to withhold this information from Sorensen's counsel. An emergency motion in
limine was filed, and the Hon. William B. Bohling excluded the testimony of Barbuto and
his new opinions. (R. 4,^1 ll). 1
Barbuto is well-known in the legal community for his extreme defense biases and his
close relationship with insurers and insurance defense counsel. Barbuto has made hundreds
of thousands of dollars a year doing so-called independent medical examinations for the
defense, rarely, if ever, doing any on behalf of a plaintiff. He has admitted performing
approximately 200 IMEs per year, all for the defense, rendering the predictable opinion in
nearly every case, if not all cases, that the plaintiffs pain and other problems primarily or
completely have their origin in psychological and/or secondary gain. (R. 4, ^f 12).
Because the defense bar provides the vast majority of his income, Barbuto does not
hesitate (as in this case) to change or spin his own treating medical opinions to favor the
defense once a claim is made, all for the purpose of enhancing his own personal monetary

1

Barbuto represented in his reply memorandum below that the sole basis upon which
Sorensen sought exclusion of Barbuto's testimony was that he was not designated timely
as an expert. (R. 128 n. 2). That was incorrect. The court may take judicial notice of the
actual court filing by Sorensen in the underlying case, a copy of which is included in the
Addendum hereto as Exhibit 3. The motion emphasized the violation of Sorensen's rights
as a patient, breach of confidentiality, and other impropriety of Barbuto's conduct, apart
from any timeliness issues. See id.
6

gain and to advance a strong philosophical opposition to the legal compensation system in
America. (R.4,f 13).
Barbuto's breach of duties caused Sorensen emotional distress, anguish and anxiety,
and some financial loss. (R. 7, 9,fflf19, 35).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is well established in the law, and was not contested below, that an implied
contractual relationship exists between physicians and their patients. The trial court
erroneously adopted Barbuto's argument, however, that no claim may be brought against
a physician for breach of an implied contract unless the contract is in writing. (Indeed,
the very notion that something implied must be in writing is counterintuitive.)
By its terms, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-6 limits only those claims for breach of
contract that are based upon an allegation that the physician promised or warranted a
particular result. That and similar statutes were enacted in response to the peculiar
evidentiary and related problems posed by that particular type of contract claim, problems
that are not presented when a duty does not depend on contested testimony, but rather is
implied as a matter of law.
The appellee's argument that implied contractual duties of a physician would not
include confidentiality of his patients' medical information is contrary to case law, the
nature of the relationship, and the long-established expectations of patients, reflected in
standards promulgated by the American Medical Association and Utah Medical
Association, the Hippocratic Oath, and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA).
7

In addition to contract-based claims, Sorenson's complaint supports various tort
theories of liability. Utah law first recognized nearly fifty years ago that a doctor owes an
actionable tort duty of confidentiality to his patients. That duty was breached here in at
least three separate respects.
First, the ex parte communications in which Barbuto engaged constitute a breach
of confidentiality. A majority of jurisdictions now recognize that, even when a patient's
medical condition is at issue in litigation, allowing unfettered access by opposing counsel
to a treating physician does not provide any protections to the patient.

Without

supervision of the disclosure process, a patient has no opportunity to object to the
relevance of questions asked or answers given, to clarify the scope of the medical
condition actually at issue, or otherwise to evaluate or assert his patient-physician
privilege. This Court recognized the need for such supervision and notice in Debry v.
Goates, 2000 UT App 58, 999 P.2d 582, even when the patient's condition is at issue.
In the court below, Barbuto argued that he could not have committed a breach of
confidentiality because he did nothing more than review records that had previously been
disclosed.

One of the key allegations in Sorenson's complaint, however, was that

Barbuto changed the diagnosis and indications in his own medical records, by definition
producing "new" information.
Finally, a breach of confidentiality arises when a physician discloses false or
inaccurate medical information.

The basic duty to preserve a patient's confidences

includes the concept that, when utterances are made, they must be truthful.
The allegations of the complaint also support a claim for breach of Barbuto's
8

fiduciary duties toward Sorenson. The law in Utah and elsewhere is that the physicianpatient relationship is fiduciary in nature. With the physician's fiduciary status comes
several independent duties of which Sorenson's complaint alleges a breach, including the
duties of confidentiality, loyalty, and refraining from taking advantage of client
confidences.
A separate claim for negligence arises if the fact finder believes Barbuto's claim
that he sincerely changed his mind about his earlier diagnosis. As a fiduciary, Barbuto
owed a duty to disclose subsequently acquired information that he knew would make
untrue or misleading a previous representation. Barbuto also owed a duty to disclose
information that a reasonable patient would consider material, which encompasses a
reversal of his own longstanding diagnosis.
Barbuto's alleged conduct also supports a claim for invasion of privacy. The only
way for Sorenson to ameliorate the effect of Barbuto's improper conduct required that
Barbuto's deposition, including its aspersions against Sorenson, be made a matter of
public record. Additionally, the circumstances allow an inference that a sufficiently large
number of people received Sorenson's private information, or that no minimum number
of recipients was required because the disclosure was made in breach of a trust.
The allegations of Sorenson's complaint, if believed by a fact finder, establish
outrageous conduct sufficient to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The complaint alleges, among other things, the breach of a patient's confidences
and the reversal of a physician's original diagnosis in furtherance of the physician's
personal agenda, both of which are reprehensible.
9

Sorenson's claim for negligence was not subject to dismissal on the ground that
Barbuto's actions were intentional. Intentional disclosures can be negligently made, and
both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have long held that allegations of negligent
and intentional conduct can co-exist on the "continuum" of culpability.
Finally, the trial court erred in adopting Barbuto's argument that damages were not
sufficiently pled. By definition, the general damages that flow naturally from a breach of
trust cannot be pled with specificity. Additionally, the complaint alleges that Sorenson
incurred economic loss, e.g., attorney fees and expense, as a result of Barbuto's breaches,
which is all that is required in an initial pleading.
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review of a Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is "a severe remedy and should be
granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled to relief under any
state of facts which could be provided in support of its claim." Colman v. Utah State
Land Bd, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court
must construe the facts in the complaint liberally, and consider all reasonable inferences
that may be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Busche v. Salt
Lake County, 2001 UT App 111, 26 P.3d 862; Raymond v. Bonneville Billing &
Collections, Inc., 04 UT 27, 89 P.3d 171.
Under Utah's notice pleading requirements, most claims need not be pled with
specificity in order to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion, so long as the complaint gives fair
notice of the nature and basis of the claim asserted, and a general indication of the type of
10

litigation involved. Busche, supra, citing Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d
403, 406 (Utah 1998); Hill v. Alfred, 2001 UT 16, ^ 14, 28 P.3d 1271 (even with respect
to fraud claims that must be pled with specificity, "liberalized pleading rules" still apply,
requiring nothing more than "fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim
and a general indication of the type of litigation involved").
Introduction
In this case, a physician is alleged to have made unauthorized and/or false
disclosures about a former patient's medical condition to an adverse party in litigation for
the physician's personal gain.

The trial court held that no cause of action can be

maintained under Utah law for such alleged misconduct.

That ruling, however,

contradicts both Utah law and that of most other jurisdictions.
As discussed below, most courts in the United States recognize a cause of action
for alleged breach of confidentiality by a physician, typically based upon one or more of
the following theories:

1) breach of implied contractual duties; 2) breach of

confidentiality and/or fiduciary duties, and 3) invasion of privacy. In McCormick v.
England, 328 S.C. 627, 494 S.E.2d 431, 435-36 (1994), the court summarized the thenemerging state of the law:
The modern trend recognizes that the confidentiality of the physician-patient
relationship is an interest worth protecting. A majority of the jurisdictions faced
with the issue have recognized a cause of action against a physician for the
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information unless the disclosure is
compelled by law or is in the patient's interest or the public interest. . . . The
jurisdictions that recognize the duty of confidentiality have relied on various
theories for the cause of action, including invasion of privacy, breach of implied
contract, medical malpractice, and breach of a fiduciary duty or a duty of
confidentiality.
11

Id. at 435-36; see also Judy E. Zelin, Annotation, "Physician's Tort Liability for
Unauthorized Disclosure of Confidential Information About Patient," 48 A.L.RAth 668
(compiling cases); David A. Elder, Privacy Torts, § 5.2 ("the clear modem consensus of
the case law has imposed a legal duty of confidentiality or a fiduciary duty" under
physician-patient relationship); 3 Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation (2d ed.), §
25:8 (categorizing theories of liability against physician for unauthorized disclosures).
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NO CLAIMS FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT CAN BE ASSERTED AGAINST A
PHYSICIAN UNLESS THE ALLEGED CONTRACT IS IN
WRITING.

Sorensen's first cause of action was for breach of implied contractual duties
arising out of the physician-patient relationship. It is well established in the law that such
duties exist between a physician and his patient. See, e .g., Leger v. Spurlock, 589 So.2d
40, 42 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1991); Stubbs v. North Memorial Medical Center, 448 N.W.2d 78,
82 (Minn. App. 1989); MacDonald v. dinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 486, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801
(1982); Bryson v. Tillinghast, 749 P.2d 110 (Okla. 1988); Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701,
287 So.2d 824 (1973).
In the court below, however, Barbuto successfully sought dismissal of Sorensen's
contract claim on the ground that the implied-by-law contract between them was not in
writing. Barbuto's principal argument was that all contract-based claims against doctors
are barred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-6 unless the contract is in writing. The assertion
of that argument, however, required a few well-placed ellipses.
omissions, Section 78-14-6 reads, in its entirety:
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Without Barbuto's

78-14-6. Writing required as basis for liability for breach of guarantee, warranty,
contract or assurance of result.
No liability shall be imposed upon any health care provider on the basis of an
alleged breach of guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance of result to be
obtained from any health care rendered unless the guarantee, warranty, contract or
assurance is set forth in writing and signed by the health care provider or an
authorized agent of the provider.
In his argument below, Barbuto, however, abbreviated the statutory text thus:
No liability shall be imposed on any health care provider on the basis of an alleged
breach of. . . contract . . . unless the . . . contract . . . is set forth in writing and
signed by the health care provider or an authorized agent of the provider.
(R. 18; ellipses in original).
Eliminating all of the qualifying words, Barbuto argued that "Utah law precludes a
contract claim against a physician absent a written contract signed by the physician or his
designated agent." (R. 18.) The trial court adopted Barbuto's reasoning, even though,
when read in full, the statute by its terms addresses only guarantees, warranties, contracts,
or assurances "of result to be obtained from any health care rendered."
The limited scope of the statute, pertaining to promises of a particular result, is not
accidental. Rather, it stems from the history of this specific type of claim. "[TJhe courts
have often said that in the absence of a special contract, a physician does not warrant the
success of his treatment, nor even that beneficial results will occur . . . ." Jack W. Shaw,
Jr., Annotation, "Recovery Against Physician on Basis of Breach of Contract to Achieve
Particular Result or Cure," 43 A.L.R.Sd 1221, § 2. See, e.g., Nauman v. Harold K.
Beecher & Assoc, 24 Utah 2d 172, 467 P.2d 610, 615 (1970) ("The law does not impose
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upon a physician or surgeon the duty of guaranteeing that his treatment will achieve good
results"), and cases cited.
Not surprisingly, given the stated exception, plaintiffs' attorneys began to allege
the existence of a special contract by physician defendants to achieve particular results.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, a plethora of opinions were issued involving such alleged
contracts or warranties. See, e.g., 43 A.L.R.3d 1221, §§ 3-6. The principal dispute in
nearly all such cases was whether an agreement existed.

Id., § 2 ("The problem,

therefore, appears to be one of proof that such an agreement was or was not made.") The
alleged promise was usually oral, posing endless 'he said-she said' evidentiary disputes
and making it difficult for defendants to seek early resolution of the lawsuit. The problem
was exacerbated by a blurring in some patients' minds between "therapeutic
reassurances" ("you'll be all right") and actionable representations or promises of a
particular result. See id., and id. § 2.
To address this problem, states began to require that claims against health care
providers based upon alleged contracts or warranties of a particular result be in writing.
See, e.g., Edwards v. Germantown Hospital, 736 A.2d 612, 615 (Pa. Super. 1999)
(purpose of 1975 statute requiring written contract was to codify law that physician is
neither a warrantor nor a guarantor of result); Zapata v. Rosenfeld, 811 S.W.2d 182 (Ct.
App. - Houston, 1991) (applying Texas statute requiring written promise or warranty of
particular result to enforce alleged promise).
Consistent with other states, Utah adopted Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-6 in 1976.
The statutes accomplished their goal; very few cases claiming promised results have been
14

brought in the past two decades. See 43 A.L.RJd 1221, §§ 3-8. By their terms, however,
the statutes apply only to claims of a contract (guarantee, warranty, or assurance) of a
particular result, not other contracts. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bumgardner, 71 N.C. App.
107, 321 S.E.2d 541 (1984), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part on other grounds, 347 S.E.2d
743 (N.C. 1986) (statute providing that ,f[n]o action may be maintained against any health
care provider upon any guarantee, warranty or assurance as to the result of any medical,
surgical or diagnostic procedure or treatment unless . . . in writing and signed by the
provider or by some other person authorized to act for or on behalf of such provider" did
not apply to claim for breach of contract not involving promise to yield specific result).
Other types of contract claims, ones which do not present the same unique
problems of proof, simply do not fall within the statute's scope. In the case of an implied
contractual duty to retain confidences, for example, the law implies the duty; therefore, it
is immaterial whether the physician also made representations in that regard. The trial
court erred in construing Section 78-14-6 as applying to all contract claims, regardless of
the subject matter.

The statute uses a string of similar words ("guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance")
because a cause of action may differ depending on whether a physician's statement is
characterized as a promise or a representation. "Technically, where the defendant has
made a promise to the plaintiff concerning the forthcoming operation or procedure, the
cause of action may properly be characterized as a contract action, whereas if the
defendant has made some representation of fact concerning the result of the operation or
procedure, the action would properly be one for breach of warranty." Daniel P. Kapsak,
"Cause of Action Against Physician for Breach of Contract or Warranty," 22 Causes of
Action 779 (2004), § 3. Section 78-14-6 covers all the bases.
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Barbuto also argued below that, assuming the existence of an enforceable contract,
the only implied duties that arose "would deal with the professional diagnosis and
treatment of the patient's condition. Plaintiffs are not claiming Mr. Sorensen's failure to
receive the 'fruits of the contract,' Dr. Barbuto's professional diagnosis and treatment."
(R.19).
That argument artificially narrows the scope of the implied contractual relationship
between a physician and patient. The "fruits of the contract" inherently include the basic
concept of confidentiality. In Aufrichtig v. Lowell, 85 N.Y.2d, 650 N.E.2d 401 (1995), a
physician allegedly provided a false affidavit to an insurance company that was adverse to
a patient with respect to a claim for benefits.

New York's high court rejected an

argument similar to Barbuto's, that the only duty owed to a patient was of competent
medical treatment, not of confidentiality:
The physician in this case would limit his duty to the provision of competent
medical treatment to his patient. Defendant, however, has ignored the central
thrust of this case and confused simple and ordinary medical malpractice with the
distinct yet related duty, when required, of providing truthful information about the
patient. Unassailably, part of a physician's duty to the patient, when authorized to
supply otherwise confidential information to others—either as a result of a
patient's express consent or waiver by the condition having been placed in issue—
includes truthful utterances, particularly, as here, when delivered under oath and
with awareness that a false statement will be relied upon the detriment of the
patient.
650 N.E.2d at 404; see also Elder, supra, § 5.2 (stating that a majority of courts have
imposed actionable confidentiality requirement "as a 'special and peculiar fiduciary
relationship' imposing an 'additional duty springing from, but extraneous to,' the
contract").
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Implied contractual duties derive from the nature of the relationship and the
reasonable expectations of the parties to the contract. Machan v. Unum Life Insurance
Company of America, 2005 UT 37, fflj 12, 16, 19 n. 2, 30, 116 P.3d 342.

In defining

those expectations, a court may consider external standards governing physicians'
conduct. Id.9 *j\ 30 ("Even in the absence of a private right of action under [claims
handling statute], we would deem it proper for a court to take into account the
legislature's mandates, as well as the insurance commissioner's regulations, regarding
insurance adjuster duties when making a determination of the parties' reasonable
expectations under the contract").
In this case, apart from a lack of support in the case law, any argument that a
physician's implied contractual duties do not include confidentiality is inconsistent with
well-established standards of conduct that form part of a patient's reasonable
expectations. All physicians, for example, are required to abide by the AMA Principles
of Medical Ethics. (The Utah Medical Association has expressly adopted the AMA
Principles. (R. 83-85).) Those standards require physicians to, among other things
"respect the rights of patients, of colleagues, and of other health professionals, [and]
safeguard patient confidences within the constraints of the law." AMA E-Principles of
Medical Ethics, Preamble, No. 4 (2002).
The AMA Principles also provide that:
The information disclosed to a physician during the course of the relationship
between physician and patient is confidential to the greatest possible degree. The
patient should feel free to make a full disclosure of information to the physician in
order that the physician may most effectively provide needed services. The patient
should be able to make this disclosure with the knowledge that the physician will
17

respect the confidential nature of the communication. The physician should not
reveal confidential communications or information without the express consent of
the patient, unless required to do so by law.
AMA E-Principles, E-5.05 (1994).
A patient's expectation of confidentiality also "has its genesis in the Hippocratic
Oath, which states in pertinent part:

'Whatever, in connection with my professional

practice, or not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to
be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge as reckoning that all such should be kept secret.55'
McCormick, 494 S.E.2d at 435, quoting Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 902
(17th ed. 1993); Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F.Supp. 793, 801 (N.D.
Ohia 1965) ("Almost every member of the public is aware of the promise of discretion
contained in the Hippocratic Oath, and every patient has a right to rely upon this warranty
of silence55).
A patient's reasonable expectation of confidentiality is further evidenced by the
widely publicized privacy protections afforded by the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. Among other things, HIPAA
precludes a physician from unilaterally disclosing medical information even when the
patient's condition is at issue in litigation. A health care provider may disclose protected
health information only upon receiving satisfactory assurance that the requesting party
has notified the subject of the request. See 65 Fed.Reg. at 82,814-15; Law v. Zuckerman,
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307 F.Supp.2d 705, 710-711 (D.Md. 2004) (HIPAA bars disclosures absent express
consent of the patient or court order).
The considerations articulated by one of the earliest courts to recognize an implied
contractual duty of confidentiality apply with even greater force today:
Any time a doctor undertakes the treatment of a patient, and the consensual
relationship of physician and patient is established, two jural obligations (of
significance here) are simultaneously assumed by the doctor. Doctor and patient
enter into a simple contract, the patient hoping that he will be cured and the doctor
optimistically assuming that he will be compensated. As an implied condition of
that contract, this Court is of the opinion that the doctor warrants that any
confidential information gained through the relationship will not be released
without the patient's permission. . . . The promise of secrecy is as much an express
warranty as the advertisement of a commercial entrepreneur. Consequently, when a
doctor breaches his duty of secrecy, he is in violation of part of his obligations
under the contract.
Hammonds, 243 F.Supp. at 801.
In light of patient expectations fostered by the medical community over the past
two thousand years, it was error for the trial court to adopt Barbuto's argument that the
duties arising from the implied contractual relationship between physician and patient do
not include confidentiality. Moreover, that duty cannot retroactively evaporate upon the
termination of the relationship. Information learned by a physician in the course of
medical treatment does not suddenly lose its confidential status when the patient transfers
to another health care provider.

The trial court ruled that no private right of action exists under HIPAA. Sorensen
acknowledges that, to date, no court has recognized such a claim. See, e.g., Bradford v.
Semar, 2005 WL 1806344 (E.D.Mo. 2005, listing cases). Accordingly, Sorensen does not
argue a direct cause of action under HIPAA in the present appeal. However, HIPAA and
its regulations remain evidence of the standard of care, Barbuto's knowledge and
disregard of the illegality of his conduct, and of Sorensen's reasonable expectations.
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Sorensen's breach of contract claim against Barbuto is not barred by the absence
of a written contract. Consequently, the trial court's judgment must be reversed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NO CLAIM CAN
BE MAINTAINED FOR BARBUTO'S ALLEGED BREACH OF
CONFIDENTIALITY.

In the court below, Barbuto did not dispute that a physician owes an actionable tort
duty of confidentiality. As the Utah Supreme Court wrote in Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d
191, 331 P.2d 814, 817 (1958), it is obligatory upon a doctor not to reveal information
obtained in confidence in connection with the diagnosis or treatment of his patient, and
"if the doctor violates that confidence and publishes derogatory matter concerning his
patient, an action would lie for any injury suffered." See also Newman v. Sonnenberg,
2003 UT App 401, ^ 9, 81 P.3d 808 ("[F]rom the moment a patient enters a doctor's
office, fills out forms, and speaks to a doctor, that doctor owes the patient a duty of
reasonable care (e.g., a duty of confidentiality and duty not to exploit the patient). . . .").
A key basis for the Supreme Court's observation in Berry was the reality that "[a
physician's] professional status and his duty to keep the confidence of his patient tend to
endow information he gives with more than ordinary credibility." 331 P.2d at 819. In
this case, Barbuto's alleged willingness to change his diagnosis for financial
consideration not only breached Sorensen's confidence, but also deprived Sorensen of an
important component in his underlying trial, objective, truthful testimony by a treating
physician. As the court observed in Aufrichtig, 650 N.E.2d at 405:
The defendant treating physician here was the crucial link and indispensable
source of knowledge and pertinent facts about Mrs. Aufrichtig's case and
condition for the purpose of her insurance medical benefits. Others would
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ordinarily be expected to rely on this unique source and did so, in the most formal
and official setting, according to this record. His assertion was not a casual
expression of belief, but was a voluntary and willful affirmation of the crucial false
facts and professional opinion. Plaintiffs had engaged his services rightfully
expecting not only reasonable medical care and competence, but also truthful,
continuing, necessary supply of medical information, when required.
M a t 405.
In contending that no breach of confidentiality can be maintained in this case,
Barbuto made two assertions. First, he argued that Sorensen's complaint did not specify
the confidential information that had been disclosed.

(R. 101-102, 106).

Second,

Barbuto argued that, once a patient files a claim involving personal injury, there are no
limits, restrictions, or duties of any kind regarding a physician's disclosure of medical
information to third parties. (R. 20-21). Because the arguments are related, they are
addressed together below.
Barbuto's first argument, that Sorensen was required to identify the specific
confidential information disclosed, is without merit. U.R.Civ.P. 8 contemplates basic
notice pleading; specificity requirements are limited to those claims identified in
U.R.Civ.P. 9. The complaint alleges that confidential information was disclosed (R. 6, T[
17), and there is no provision in the Rules of Civil Procedure requiring further elucidation
in the initial pleading. That is the purpose of discovery. (Indeed, considering that, by
definition, a patient is not privy to the content of ex parte communications, such a
pleading requirement would essentially preclude all claims.)
In any event, though, the complaint does put Barbuto on notice of what Sorensen
claims comprised Barbuto's breach of duty. The duty was breached in at least three
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separate ways: 1) through improper ex parte communications; 2) disclosure of mental
impressions and other information regarding Sorensen that was not in Barbuto's records;
and 3) disclosure of false or inaccurate information.
1.

The ex parte communications between Barbuto and opposing counsel

were a breach of confidentiality.
The complaint alleges that, without notice to Sorensen, Barbuto voluntarily
engaged in ex parte discussions with opposing counsel regarding Sorensen5s medical
condition. Although some courts have ruled otherwise, an emerging majority of courts
appears to hold that, when a patient places his medical condition at issue, information
relevant to that condition may be disclosed only pursuant to proper (formal) means. See
Daniel P. Jones, Annotation, "Discovery:

Right to Ex Parte Interview with Injured

Party's Treating Physician," 50 A.L.RAth 714 (compiling cases on both sides of issue);
Philip H. Corboy, "Ex Parte Contacts Between Plaintiffs Physician and Defense
Attorneys: Protecting the Patient-Litigant's Right to a Fair Trial," 21 Loy. U. Chi. L. J.
1001, 1003 (1990) ("Recent state court decisions, including several overruling prior
precedent, now reflect a strong majority view that condemns ex parte conferences"), and
cases cited.
Even when a patient has waived his privilege or a privilege is deemed not to exist
by virtue of asserting a claim, "the question remains by what procedures and subject to
what controls the exchange of information shall proceed."

Jones v. Asheville

Radiological Group, 129 N.C.App. 449, 500 S.E.2d 740, 748 (1998). The waiver or
absence of a privilege does not determine the means by which otherwise confidential
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information is disclosed. See, e.g., Morris v. Consolidation Coal Co., 191 W.Va. 426,
446 S.E.2d 648, 655 (1994) ("The patient's implicit consent . . . is obviously and
necessarily limited; he does not consent, simply by filing suit, to his physician's
discussing his medical confidences with third parties outside court-authorized discovery
methods, nor does he consent to his physician's discussing the patient's confidences in an
ex parte conference with the patient's adversary"); Manion v. N.P.W. Med. Ctr., 161
F.Supp. 585, 593 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (prohibition against ex parte communications "affects
defense counsel's methods, not the substance of what is discoverable"); Duquette v.
Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 269, 272, 778 P.2d 634, 637 (App. 1980) ("even where the
physician-patient privilege has been impliedly waived, the holder of the privilege waives
only his right to object to discovery of pertinent medical information which is sought
through the formal methods of discovery authorized by the applicable Rules of Civil
Procedures").
Absent any supervision by the patient over the disclosure, a risk is posed that
discussions will stray into improper areas.

Jones, 500 S.E.2d at 748 ("Requiring

defendants to abide by formal discovery rules in obtaining medical records from a nonparty physician, even where the patient has waived the physician-patient privilege,
protects the patient from disclosure of aspects of her mental and physical health which
may be irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible in court").
By their very nature, ex parte communications deprive the patient of any
knowledge or control over what actually transpires. "The plaintiffs counsel rarely is
notified and may leam of the interviews only much later. It is virtually impossible to
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determine whether disclosures of privileged confidences or other improprieties occurred
during the interviews. In essence, defense counsel has been able to take advantage of the
limited waiver of the patient privilege while evading the adversarial safeguards embodied
in formal discovery." Corboy, 21 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. at 1007.
The Morris court summarized its concerns with ex parte contact between a treating
physician and opposing counsel thus:
Even if no improper pressure were brought to bear on a physician, it would,
nevertheless, often be difficult for the defense to determine on its own if and to
what extent the physician-patient privilege was waived. Parties may be in
substantial disagreement over the kinds of injuries put in issue by the pleadings. . .
. Whether a physical or mental condition is in controversy often requires careful
judicial scrutiny and not a mere cursory reading of the complaint. . . . The
determination of whether a medical condition is in controversy often requires
specialized knowledge of the relevant factors which a court may look to in
deciding a case. . . . By restricting disclosure to that obtainable pursuant to statute,
court rule, or express consent, the patient's attorney will be afforded an
opportunity to object to the disclosure of medical information that is remote,
irrelevant, or otherwise improper, the court will be afforded an opportunity to
regulate disclosure, and needless lawsuits for breach of confidence will be
avoided.
446 S.E.2d at 656, quoting Anker v. Brodnitz, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979),
aff d, 73 A.D.2d 589, 422 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1979), appeal dismissed, 411 N.E.2d 783, 795
(1980) (court's ellipses); see also Jordan v. Sinai Hospital, 171 Mich.App. 328, 429
N.W.2d 891 (1988), overruled in part on other grounds, 435 N.W.2d 347 ("The
physician's ethical duty of loyalty and the implied promise of confidentiality which arise
upon treatment favor a bar on ex parte interviews, as does the fiduciary nature of the
relationship between patient and physician.
defense counsel with all relevant information").
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The formal rules of discovery provide

One of the leading decisions recognizing the need for a limitation on the means of
disclosing otherwise discoverable medical information is Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories,
Inc., 148 111. App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952 (1986). After a comprehensive analysis of the
arguments both for and against ex parte communications, the court concluded that public
policy militates against such unrestricted contact:
[W]e believe that modern public policy strongly favors the confidential and
fiduciary relationship existing between a patient and his physician. We further
believe that this public policy arises from the fact that society possesses an
established and beneficial interest in the sanctity of the physician-patient
relationship. We find this public policy to be reflected in at least two separate
indicia: (1) the promulgated code of ethics adopted by the medical profession and
upon which the public relies to be faithfully executed so as to protect the
confidential relationship existing between a patient and his physician; and (2) the
fiduciary relationship, recognized by courts in Illinois as well as courts throughout
the United States, which exists between a patient and his treating physician. . . .
[W]e believe, for the reasons set forth above, that ex parte conferences between
defense counsel and a plaintiffs treating physician jeopardize the sanctity of the
physician-patient relationship, and, therefore, are prohibited as against public
policy.
499 N.E.2d at 957.
An argument that, in hindsight, particular information disclosed turned out to be
admissible anyway - the judicial equivalent of "no harm, no foul" - does not override the
concern that protection of a patient's basic rights should not be left to opposing counsel
and a doctor (particularly one being paid by the opposing party). See, e.g., Crescenzo v.
Crane, 350 N. J. Super. 531, 796 A.2d 283 (2002) ('The determination of whether the
records are ultimately admissible should not in the first instance by made be a doctor
responding to a subpoena or an attorney who violates the Rule and improperly subpoenas
the records. . . . That determination must be made in a courtroom by a judge consistent
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with appropriate due process concerns including notice and an opportunity to be heard");
see also Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Iowa 1986)
("Placing the burden of determining relevancy on an attorney, who does not know the
nature of the confidential disclosure about to be elicited, is risky. Asking the physician,
untrained in the law, to assume this burden is a greater gamble and is unfair to the
physician").
Barbuto contends, however, that once a patient's medical condition is at issue in a
lawsuit, there are no restrictions on the manner or type of disclosures that a physician can
make, because at that point "the patient's privacy becomes moot." (R. 27; also R. 25
(claiming that patient has no legitimate expectation of privacy at all once claim is filed)).
Barbuto argued that Utah Rule of Evidence 506(d)(1) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8
allow unfettered ex parte communications between physicians and opposing counsel (and
anyone else, actually, under Barbuto's theory).
This Court has already rejected that argument. In Debry v. Goates, 2000 UT App
58, 999 P.2d 582, cert, denied, 9 P.3d 170 (2000), without notice to his patient, defendant
Goates provided an affidavit regarding the patient's health to opposing counsel in a hotly
contested divorce action. In a subsequent lawsuit by the patient, Goates argued that he
was permitted to do so by Rule 506 and Section 78-24-8(4) because the patient's
condition was at issue in the underlying case. The trial court agreed, entering summary
judgment for the defendant.
On appeal, this Court reversed. The Court initially noted that Section 78-24-8(4)
has been superseded by U.R.E. 506(d)(1), and therefore Goates could not rely on the
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statute to excuse his conduct. Id at \ 24 n. 2 ("The statutory privilege has no further
effect. Physician-patient and therapist-patient privileges are now exclusively controlled
by Rule 506").4
The Court then addressed Dr. Goates's claimed entitlement to ex parte disclosures
under U.R.E. 506. The Court first concluded that the exception to physician-patient
privilege in Rule 506 applies any time a patient's medical condition is placed at issue in
litigation, even if done so by another party.

Consequently, Mrs. Debry's medical

condition was at issue at the time of the disclosure. Id, fflf 25-27.
However, the Court disagreed that, merely because his patient's medical condition
was at issue, Dr. Goates had free rein in discussing that condition with opposing counsel.
The Court observed that, "although this exception to the privilege is broad enough to let a
nonpatient raise the patient's mental state as an issue in proceedings, access to medical
records is still constrained." Id, ^ 26, citing State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, ^ 30, 982 P.2d
79. Even when Rule 506 applies, "[a] nonpatient 'does not have the right to examine all
of the confidential information or to search through files without supervision.'" Id. "If,
after review, the court determines the records contain material evidence, the records

4

Barbuto acknowledged below that "Rule 506 is intended to supersede § 78-24-8, at least
with respect to the first two sentences in the statute which establish the privilege," but
argued that he can still rely on the statute because it has "never been repealed" and is not
inconsistent with Rule 506. Whether it has been repealed is immaterial; the superseded
statute is of no effect. As for alleged inconsistency, it is significant that the statute is the
only source to which Barbuto can point in claiming an entitlement to unsupervised,
undisclosed ex parte disclosures. (R. 21 n. 1, asserting that under the statute, "a treating
physician is free to provide information and interviews" without restriction.). The fact
that Barbuto must cite the superseded statute rather than Rule 506 to make such an
argument illustrates the extent to which the two provisions differ.
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should be exposed only to the extent necessary to present the evidence, thereby striking a
balance between the important interests of physician-patient confidentiality and the
pursuit of a claim or defense." Id.
As in this case, Dr. Goates made no effort to safeguard his patient's
confidentiality.

"From all that appears, Dr. Goates voluntarily furnished an affidavit

about his patient's mental condition to her adversary in divorce litigation," the Court
observed. "Dr. Goates gave his affidavit without a court order, without a subpoena, and
without even notifying Debry. She had no opportunity to assert her privilege." Id., ^ 27.
The Court held that, "under these circumstances, a patient must at least be afforded
the opportunity for protection. As part of a therapeutic relationship, a doctor or therapist
has an obligation to protect the confidentiality of his patients that transcends any duty he
has as a citizen to voluntarily provide information that might be relevant in pending
litigation." Id, ]f 28. "Before disclosing confidential patient records or communications
in a subsequent litigation," the court wrote, "a physician or therapist should notify the
patient. Even if the communications may fall into this exception to the privilege, the
patient has the right to be notified of the potential disclosure of confidential records.
Such notice assures that the patient can pursue the appropriate procedural safeguards in
court to avoid unnecessary disclosure." Id5

5

This ruling is consistent with the fact that, even in the few states that do not recognize
an evidentiary patient-physician privilege at all, a physician's duty of confidentiality is
held to preclude voluntary disclosure. See McCormick, supra (recognizing cause of
action for unauthorized disclosure even though South Carolina does not have a
testimonial privilege for physicians; "the terms 'privilege' and 'confidences' are not
synonymous, and a professional's duty to maintain his client's confidences is independent
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It is undisputed in this case that Barbuto made no attempt to notify Sorensen of his
disclosures to, and discussions with, opposing counsel, let alone that he was doing so for
personal gain. Moreover, notification alone will be insufficient to protect the patient's
rights in most instances. A physician like Barbuto and/or an attorney is likely to refuse
any oversight by the patient of the disclosure. (Indeed, Barbuto refused even to show his
report to Sorensen's counsel, asserting "work product" on behalf of opposing counsel.
See Addendum Exh. 3, Bates 6, f 8). Under such circumstances, general notification that
disclosures will be made does nothing to allow the patient to lodge objections as to their
scope or manner. Protection of patients' rights requires, at a minimum, some form of
participation by plaintiff and/or his counsel in the disclosure process, such as his presence
during conversations about his medical condition, or obtaining the information through a
list of questions disclosed prior to the interview, or through deposition or other court
authorized procedure.
2.

The complaint sufficiently alleges that Barbuto disclosed information

that had not previously been disclosed.
Barbuto also argued below that he could not have breached his duty of
confidentiality because he did nothing more than review records that had already been
disclosed.

(R. 23-24).

That factual assertion ignores the allegations of Sorensen's

Complaint. One of Sorensen's primary complaints is that Barbuto disclosed opinions,
observations, and other information that were not in the records disclosed, for example,

of the issue whether he can be legally compelled to reveal some or all of those
confidences, that is, whether those communications are privileged").
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changing his diagnosis to something far different from that stated in his own medical
records.

A new spin on a physician's own diagnosis is, by definition, previously

undisclosed information. See also 1 Utah Prac, Mangrum & Benson on Utah Evidence
(2004), Rule 506 (physician-patient privilege "applies not only to communications
between patient and physician, but also to facts obtained by the physician by examination
or observation").
Moreover, if Barbuto did nothing more than disclose information that had already
been disclosed in the medical records, why an hours-long meeting with opposing counsel?
A reasonable inference can be drawn from that fact alone that Barbuto discussed
information beyond the bare content of the medical records themselves.
3.

The disclosure of false information is a breach of confidentiality.

The third form of breach of confidentiality alleged in the complaint is that Barbuto
changed his original, longstanding diagnosis without any basis for doing so (other than
monetary gain), in other words, that Barbuto's "new" diagnosis was essentially false. A
physician's duty of confidentiality includes an obligation, when disclosing confidential
information, to do so truthfully. See Aufrichtig, 650 N.E.2d at 404 ("part of a physician's
duty to the patient, when authorized to supply otherwise confidential information to
others—either as a result of a patient's express consent or waiver by the condition having
been placed in issue—includes truthful utterances"). Sorensen's allegations state a claim
for breach of confidentiality in this aspect of Barbuto's conduct as well.

30

III.

THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT SUPPORT A CLAIM
THAT BARBUTO BREACHED HIS FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO
SORENSEN.

Utah law has long recognized that the physician-patient relationship is fiduciary in
nature. Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1980) (noting "fiduciary nature of the
[physician-patient] relationship" imposes duty to disclose any material information
concerning the patient's physical condition); see also First Security Bank of Utah v.
Banberry Development Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Utah 1990) (class of relationships
giving rise to duty of disclosure includes "where it is either presumed in law or proved in
fact that one party is in a superior or dominant position and the other in an inferior or
servient position. These relations include those evolving from domestic relations as well
as relations between . .. doctor and patient").
The fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship is widely recognized.
See, e.g., Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So.2d 348 (Fla. 2002), and cases cited; Eckhardt v.
Charter Hospital, 124 N.M. 549, 953 P.2d 722, 726-27 (N.M. App. 1997); McCormick,
492 S.E.2d at 435 ("Being a fiduciary relationship, mutual trust and confidence [in
physician-patient relationship] are essential"); Aufrichtig, 650 N.E.2d at 404 ("The
physician-patient relationship thus operates and flourishes in an atmosphere of
transcendent trust and confidence and is infused with fiduciary obligations").
As a fiduciary, Barbuto owed several discrete duties implicated by his alleged
misconduct.

31

1.

Duty of confidentiality.

One of the most basic of a fiduciary's duties is confidentiality. See, e.g., Kilpatrick
v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah 1996) ("As fiduciaries, attorneys
have a legal duty 'to represent the client with undivided loyalty, to preserve the client's
confidences, and to disclose any material matters bearing upon the representation of the
client").
The duty not to disclose confidential information necessarily extends beyond the
termination of the relationship through which the information was obtained. Envirotech
Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 496 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied (former employee's
fiduciary duty not to use confidential information to his advantage remained in force three
years after termination). Any other conclusion would force a patient to either remain with
the same health care provider in perpetuity, or subject himself to former providers' whims
with respect to his confidential information. (To avoid duplication, other issues relating
to confidentiality are addressed supra at pp. 20-30.)
2.

Duty of loyalty.

Under Utah law, fiduciaries are required to be "completely loyal to their clients."
Walter v. Stewart, 2003 UT App 86, H 16, 67 P.3d 1042. Such loyalty includes a duty not
to, voluntarily and for personal gain, take positions adverse to one's patient. See, e.g.,
Alexander v. Knight, 197 Pa.Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142 (1962) (physician's "confidential or
fiduciary capacity as to their patients . . . includes a duty to refuse affirmative assistance
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to the patient's antagonist in litigation. The doctor, of course, owes a duty to conscience
to speak the truth; he need, however, speak only at the proper time").6
3.

Duty not to take advantage of client confidences.

In addition to the foregoing duties, fiduciaries "must never use their position of
trust to take advantage of client confidences for themselves or for other parties." Walter,
2003 UT App 86, ^ 16. The allegations of Sorensen's complaint are that Barbuto abused
his position of trust as a former treating physician for his own gain and that of an
opposing party.
IV.

BARBUTO'S ALLEGED ACTIONS VIOLATE THE GENERAL
DUTIES OWED BY A PHYSICIAN TO A PATIENT.

It is alleged in this case that Barbuto changed his original diagnosis - upon which
the patient and subsequent physicians relied for years - without telling anyone (except

6

A physician's duty not to turn one's self into an adversary is different from the
obligation to testify truthfully, a distinction as basic as that between fact witness and an
expert witness. See Alexander B. McNaughton and Susan McNaughton, "Divided
Loyalty: The Dilemma of the Treating Physcian Advocate," 22 Okla. City U. L. Rev.
1051 (1997) ("There is a vast difference, however, in a treating physician testifying as a
fact witness based on personal observations and as an advocate."); Schaffer v. Spicer 88
S.D. 36, 215 N.W.2d 134 (S.D. 1974) (allowing claims against psychiatrist who
voluntarily gave affidavit to opposing counsel), quoting Hammonds, 243 F.Supp. at 805
("assuming, but without deciding, that the plaintiff waived the testimonial privilege
because of the deposition, this 'waiver' does not authorize a private conference between
doctor and defense lawyer. It is one thing to say that a doctor may be examined and crossexamined by the defense in a courtroom, in conformity with the rules of evidence, with
the vigilant surveillance of plaintiffs counsel, and the careful scrutiny of the trial judge; it
is quite another matter to permit, as alleged here, an unsupervised conversation between
the doctor and his patient's protagonist").
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opposing counsel) that his original diagnosis was wrong.7 In the court below, Barbuto
argued that, once a physician is no longer treating a patient, he has no duty to advise his
former patient of new information. (R. 108-109). That position might be tenable if this
case involved new technology or some other matter that could not fairly be placed upon
the original physician's shoulders. That is not Sorensen's claim, though.
Sorensen alleges that Barbuto's so-called "new information" was a conclusion that
the physician's own prior diagnosis was (allegedly) erroneous. If, as Barbuto claims, his
change of heart was sincere, then he owed Sorensen a duty to notify him, and/or his
subsequent treating physicians, that his own original diagnosis should no longer be
considered reliable. See, e.g., First Security Bank of Utah v. Banberry Development
Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1330-31 (Utah 1990) (fiduciary duty of disclosure, including
between "relations between . . . doctor and patient" includes "subsequently acquired
information that he knows will make untrue or misleading a previous representation that
when made was true or believed to be so"), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 551.
The duty of care generally owed by physician to patient is to exercise that degree
of skill and learning ordinarily possessed and exercised, under similar circumstances, by
other practitioners in his field, and to use ordinary reasonable care and diligence, and his
best judgment, in applying his skill to patient's case.

7

Farrow v. Health Services

As Barbuto put it during his deposition in the underlying case, his original diagnosis
might have "created a mythology" in Sorensen's subsequent medical treatment. {See
Addendum Exh. 3, Bates 61). Notably, opposing counsel's letter retaining Barbuto's
services requested Barbuto to let counsel know what Barbuto thought, "as his treating
physician early on in his injury, about his current condition." Id., Bates 21 (emphasis
added).
34

Corporation, 604 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1979). Those duties include the duty to disclose to
that patient that which is in his best interests and important that he should know.
Nixdorf, 612 P.2d at 354 n. 18. If a reasonable patient would consider the information
important in the course of treatment, the information is material and disclosure is
required. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131 n. 6 (Utah 1989). In this case, a jury could find
that a complete reversal in his diagnosis by the physician who treated Sorensen for the
first year and a half after his accident would be important to know.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT SORENSEN
COULD NOT MAINTAIN A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF PRIVACY.

One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for resulting
harm to the interests of the other. The right of privacy is invaded by, among other things,
unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, or publicity that unreasonably
places the other in a false light before the public. Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 564 (Utah
1988).
Barbuto did not dispute below that his modified report placed Sorensen in a false
light. Rather, his sole basis for seeking dismissal of Sorensen's breach of privacy claim
was that there was no public disclosure, and that Sorensen had no legitimate expectation
of privacy. (The fact that a patient maintains an expectation of privacy, albeit limited, in
a personal injury lawsuit has been addressed above, see pp. 20-30, supra.)
With respect to whether the disclosure was sufficiently public, the Utah Supreme
Court has indicated that disclosure of private information "to a small group of persons .. .
does not constitute public disclosure." Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 2000 UT 94, %
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12, 16 P.3d 555. That is not dispositive of Sorensen's claim, however. In the underlying
case, the only way for Sorensen to obtain partial relief from the effects of Barbuto's
misconduct required that Barbuto's deposition be filed with the court in the underlying
case, thus becoming a matter of public record. That is the epitome of public disclosure.8
Additionally, there is no specific "body count" required to maintain an action for
invasion of privacy. Sheila D'Ambrosio, "Invasion of Privacy By Public Disclosure of
Private Facts," 43 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 449 ("While an actionable disclosure is
generally one made only to a large number of people, it cannot be said that disclosure of
embarrassing private facts to a comparatively small number of people will automatically
be insufficient to constitute a public disclosure. There is no magic formula or 'body
count' that can be given to permit counsel to determine with certainty whether the number
of persons to whom private facts have been disclosed will be sufficient in any particular
case to satisfy the public disclosure requirement").
Barbuto's argument below failed to afford Sorensen all reasonable inferences that
could be drawn from the complaint. An allegation that private information was disclosed
to opposing counsel inherently encompasses others to whom counsel ordinarily might
reasonably be expected to relay such information. In this case, it is reasonable to infer
that counsel relayed the information to his client, to the client's liability insurance carrier

8

Barbuto represented to the court below that he "only testified at deposition because
plaintiffs required him to do so." (R. 108 at 10). That assertion was misleading. Once
the covert arrangement between his former treating physician and opposing counsel was
discovered, there was no other way for Sorensen to explore what had transpired and to
advise the court. As noted above, Barbuto refused initially even to give Sorensen a copy
of his report, invoking "work product" on behalf of opposing counsel.
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- who was making decisions regarding settlement - as well as to other expert witness(es)
and other employees of his firm. (The specific identities of these others can only be
obtained through discovery.)9
A minimum "body count" rule would not apply in this case in any event, because
the disclosure was made in violation of a duty of trust. See 11 C.J.S. Right of Privacy and
Publicity (2005), § 25 ("A communication to one individual, or a few, or to a small group
of people absent breach of contract, trust or other confidential relationship, will not give
rise to liability"; emphasis added). For each of these reasons, the trial court erred in
dismissing Sorensen's claim for invasion of privacy, and the judgment should be
reversed.
V.

SORENSEN STATED A CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.

A plaintiff is entitled to damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress
where the defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff (a) with
the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or (b) where any reasonable person would
have known that such would result; and his actions are of such a nature as to be

9

Apart from opposing counsel, the client and expert witnesses, communications with at
least two other individuals within opposing counsel's firm are mentioned in Barbuto's
records. (E.g., Addendum Exh. 3, Bates 19, 124). Even under Rule 9, specificity
requirements are relaxed if the circumstances are such that the plaintiff cannot be
expected to have personal knowledge of the facts constituting the wrongdoing. Arena
Land & Investment Co. v. McGee, 906 F.Supp. 1470, 1476 (D.Utah 1994). A privacy
claim is not subject to heightened pleading requirements, but the same principle should
apply. If it is reasonable to believe that further disclosures occurred - almost a certainty
in a case like this - the plaintiff should be able to discover that information. If it turns out
that, contrary to expectation, no such disclosures occurred, the matter can be resolved
through voluntary dismissal or summary judgment.
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considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted
standards of decency and morality. Schuurman v. Shingleton, 2001 UT 52, ^f 10, 26 P.3d
227, citing Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 P.2d 244, 247 (1961), citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46.
In this case, Barbuto argued that, as a matter of law, his conduct cannot be
considered outrageous because its lawfulness was "fairly debatable" under Utah law. (R.
25-26). This suggestion cannot withstand the allegations themselves, which include that
Barbuto, voluntarily and in furtherance of a personal agenda, made false statements
regarding his patient to a third party to enable that party to gain an advantage over his
patient, and accepted compensation from that party to reverse his prior opinions and
records. That is not "fairly debatable" conduct for a physician. See, e.g., AMA EPrinciples, E -9.04 (1994) ("incompetence, corruption, or dishonest or unethical conduct
on the part of members of the medical profession is reprehensible").
Whether particular conduct of a defendant was outrageous or intolerable is a
question of fact for the jury. Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685, 688 (Utah 1995) (whether
promise by already married man to marry plaintiff was outrageous was question for the
jury).

Significantly, the Jackson court recognized that, while "the mere decision to

withdraw from a planned marriage is an insufficient basis for this cause of action," it
became actionable if the defendant "acted with the intention of deceiving Jackson and
with the knowledge that his actions would cause emotional distress." Id. Likewise, while
the disclosure of confidential medical information might in some instances be insufficient
to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a jury question is
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presented when evidence exists that such disclosure was done sub rosa and for the
purpose of furthering the physician's personal agenda.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S
NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS.

In the court below, Barbuto offered, and the trial court adopted, "as a threshold
issue" that the allegation of intentional disclosure precluded a negligence claim. (CR. (R.
27 ("Plaintiffs don't shed any light on how a general negligence claim can arise from
allegedly intentional tortuous [sic] conduct.")
While Barbuto might have been uncertain as to how allegations of negligent and
intentional misconduct can co-exist, this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have made it
clear on several occasions. In Matheson v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980), for
example, it was undisputed that the defendant's actions were intentional, in that he fully
intended to throw a tootsie pop and to hit plaintiff with it. The defendant denied,
however, that he intended to harm the plaintiff. Id. at 322.
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that, because the
defendant intended his actions, the actions must constitute assault and battery as a matter
of law, and therefore were governed by the 1-year statute of limitations instead of the
ordinary 4-year personal injury statute. The trial court granted summary judgment, but
the Utah Supreme Court reversed, observing:
An individual may undertake an intentional act, such as throwing the tootsie pop in
this particular case, and if the act is undertaken without an intent to harm or a
substantial certainty that harm will result from the act, the actor is not guilty of an
intentional tort. Instead, in such a situation, the activity is properly classified as
reckless disregard of safety or reckless misconduct.
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Id. at 322. "It is this absence of intent to harm which renders reckless misconduct or
reckless disregard of safety a form of negligence and not an intentional tort," the court
observed. Id. at 323. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for trial.
In Doe v. Doe, 878 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1994), this Court likewise reversed a
summary judgment that had been granted upon a theory that a negligence claim could not
be pursued because the defendant's sexual acts were intentional. "An individual's acts
can simultaneously give rise to a claim for negligence and a claim for an intentional tort,"
the court said. Id, at 1162. "The two doctrines are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but
rather may overlap and coexist on a continuum." Id. at 1162-1163.
In reversing the summary judgment, the Court concluded, "the trial court appears
to have misunderstood this continuum in holding that defendant's actions could not, as a
matter of law, constitute negligence since they were intentional." Id. at 1163. The court
observed that it was bound by the recognition in Matheson, supra, that "reckless
misconduct is a form of negligence and is distinguishable from an intentional tort." Id.;
see also 51A Am. Jur.2d Negligence § 276 ("An individual may undertake an intentional
act, and if the act is undertaken without an intent to harm or a substantial certainty that
harm will result from the act, the actor is not guilty of an intentional tort").
It is possible for an intentional disclosure to be negligently made. (And a plaintiff
is permitted to allege so in the alternative. U.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(2)). For example, Barbuto
claimed below that he did not know that his conduct was unlawful. If the fact finder
believes him, it might still conclude that he was negligent for making no effort to
determine its legality, for falling below the standard of care in disclosing the information,
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for failing to recognize the scope of his fiduciary duties, for placing his interests above
those of his former patient, and so forth.
VII.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SORENSEN HAD
FAILED TO PLEAD DAMAGES ADEQUATELY.

As noted previously, for purposes of evaluating a motion to dismiss, the facts
alleged in the complaint are considered true, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor
of the plaintiffs claims. Sorensen alleged in his complaint that he suffered economic and
general damages. (R. 7, 9, Tflj 19, 35).
Barbuto argues, however, that because Sorensen was successful in filing an
emergency motion in limine in the underlying case preventing Barbuto from testifying as
to his modified diagnosis, no harm resulted from his breach of duty. The fact that
Sorensen was able to partially alleviate the harm done by Barbuto5s betrayal of his
fiduciary duties and breach of confidentiality does not eliminate other harm already done.
See, e.g., Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130, 139-140
(Utah App. 1992) (defendant's eventual payment of excess judgment entered against the
plaintiff as a result of its misconduct reduced damages, but did not eliminate claim for
general damages).
By its very nature, the violation of a patient's trust can be expected to cause
emotional distress and other general damages. See Elder, Privacy Torts § 5.2 (delineating
wide range of general damages recoverable for breach of confidentiality); see also
Machan v. Unum Life Insurance Company of America, 2005 UT 37, ^[ 12, 16, 19 n. 2,
30, 116 P.3d 342 (nature of insurance contract is to provide peace of mind, therefore,
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plaintiffs damages may include emotional distress). In addition to general damages,
Sorensen also alleged economic damages, including additional legal fees and costs (e.g.,
having to take a deposition of Barbuto to explore his improper activities), and an
entitlement to punitive damages. Sorensen's damages were sufficiently pled, and the trial
court erred by adopting Barbuto's argument and dismissing the complaint.10
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, appellants respectfully request the Court to reverse
the judgment of the district court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22

day of August, 2005.

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

lumphery^
Karra J. Porter
Attorneys for Pldintiffs/Appellants

10

Even if a fact finder determined that specific damages could not be established for
Barbuto's breach of duty, the law recognizes equitable remedies in such a situation. E.g.,
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 763 (1980) (where government could not
establish damages from defendant's breach of confidentiality, constructive trust on
defendant's monetary gain would be imposed). Sorensen's complaint includes a prayer
for equitable relief. (R. 10).
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

NICHOLAS SORENSEN; KEVIN and
PAMELA SORENSEN, limited
guardians and conservators of
Nicholas Sorensen,

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:

CASE NO.

040916294

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOHN P. BARBUTO, individually,
JOHN P. BARBUTO, M.D., P.C.,
dba NEUROLOGY IN FOCUS,

:

Defendants.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was taken under advisement by
the Court after the submission of Memoranda and oral argument by
counsel.

After further review and consideration, the Court rules

as follows.
1.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

prayed for.

is granted

in full as

By this reference, the Court incorporates herein all

of the legal analyses and authorities set forth in defendants'
Memoranda in support and reply, including that DeBry v. Goates. 999
P.2d 582 (Utah App„ 2000), has no application to the present case
because its facts are highly distinguishable.

SORENSEN V. BARBUTO
2.

PAGE 2

MINUTE ENTRY

Counsel for defendants is instructed to submit an Order

consistent with this Minute Entry and Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Dated

this

_day of May,

2jXfe.

'• / im

fT)k.-J:i:

TYRONE /r
MEDLEY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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SORENSEN V. BARBUTO

PAGE 3

MINUTE
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this — /

day o

2005:

L. Rich Humpherys
Attorney for Plaintiffs
50 S. Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Dennis C. Ferguson
Attorney for Defendants
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
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DENNIS C. FERGUSON (A1061)
WILLIAMS & H U N T
Attorneys for Defendants
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P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
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Facsimile (801) 364-4500

^SAUT LAKE COUNTY

0 ± ^

Deputy < W

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

NICHOLAS SORENSEN; KEVIN and
PAMELA SORENSEN, limited guardians and
conservators of Nicholas Sorensen,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. 040916294

JOHN P. BARBUTO, individually; JOHN P.
BARBUTO, M.D., P C , dba NEUROLOGY
IN FOCUS,

Judge Tyrone E. Medley

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to a Motion to Dismiss filed by
Defendants (hereafter "Dr. Barbuto55). The Court has reviewed the written memoranda
and the legal authorities cited therein filed by Dr. Barbuto and Plaintiffs, and has heard
and considered the oral argument of counsel. In considering the Motion to Dismiss, the
Court accepts as true the factual allegations set forth in Plaintiffs5 Complaint, which
include the following material facts:

1.

Nicholas Sorensen ("Mr. Sorensen") was injured in an automobile accident

on July 24, 1999. (Complaint, 11 5.)
2.

For the next year and a half (which means until approximately February

2001), Dr. Barbuto treated Mr. Sorensen for his neurological symptoms. After
approximately February 2001, Nicholas Sorenseifs neurologic care was transferred to
Michael Goldstein and Western Neurological Associates. (Complaint, 11 6.)
3.

Mr. Sorensen filed a legal action against Jack W Marcelis and others seeking

monetary damages for personal injuries received in the July 1999 accident. This legal
action was resolved by trial in October 2003, resulting in a verdict in favor of Nicholas
Sorensen. (Complaint, 11 7.)
4.

Defendant's medical records, including those from Dr. Barbuto, were

"produced and were made part of the stipulated evidence at trial." (Complaint, 11 8.)
5.

After Mr. Marcelis's defense counsel subpoenaed Dr. Barbuto to testify at

trial, Mr. Sorenseifs counsel in that action and counsel in this action, L. Rich Humpherys,
took Dr. Barbuto's deposition. (Complaint, 11 8.)
6.

During the course of his deposition, it was disclosed that Dr. Barbuto had

reviewed additional medical records sent to him by Mr. Marcelis's defense lawyer, had
offered expert opinions as to the cause of Mr. Sorenseifs neurologic symptoms, and had
agreed to testify at trial regarding the cause of Mr. Sorensen's symptoms. Plaintiffs allege
2

i

in this Complaint that Dr. Barbuto's expert opinion that was to be offered at trial differed
from the diagnostic statements set forth in his medical records. (Complaint, 11 10.)
7.

Claiming surprise, because Dr. Barbuto's involvement had not previously

been disclosed by counsel for Mr. Marcelis, Mr. Sorensen's attorney sought and obtained
an order excluding Dr. Barbuto from testifying at trial.
Based upon these facts, Plaintiffs assert theories of legal liability against Dr. Barbuto
based upon "breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing53 (First Cause of
Action), "breach of professional standards and statutes" (Second Cause of Action),
"invasion of privacy55 (Third Cause of Action), "intentional infliction of emotional distress55
(Fourth Cause of Action), and "negligence55 (Fifth Cause of Action). Plaintiffs do not
allege the medical care provided by Dr. Barbuto to Mr. Sorensen following his injuries in
the automobile accident of July 24, 1999 through February of 2001, when Mr. Sorensen
began treatment with a different neurologist, was negligent. Rather, Plaintiffs claim that
Dr. Barbuto5s liability arises solely out of his examination of medical records generated by
other health care providers after February of 2001, and ex parte communications with and
opinions rendered regarding the cause or causes of Mr. Sorensen5s symptoms to counsel
defending the personal injury action. The factual and legal underpinning of all of
Plaintiffs5 claims is the allegation that Dr. Barbuto breached a duty of physician-patient
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confidentiality by providing expert opinions on the cause of Mr. Sorenseifs medical
symptoms to counsel defending the personal injury claim brought by Mr. Sorensen.
Based upon the facts alleged by Plaintiffs, the Court finds that Plaintiffs5 Complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs5 claims alleging a breach
of a duty of good faith and fair dealing fail to state a claim because there is no underlying
contractual relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendants to which a duty of good faith
and fair dealing attaches. Plaintiffs' claim that there was an improper disclosure by Dr.
Barbuto of confidential physician-patient information fails because Mr. Sorensen's medical
condition and the medical records relating to it were placed at issue in the underlying
personal injury action, and Dr. Barbuto was privileged by statute and Utah State Bar
Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee, Opinion No. 99-03 to speak ex parte with counsel.
This case is clearly distinguishable from the case of DeBry v. Goates, 2000 UT App. 58,
999 P.2d 582 because, among other things, Dr. Goates disclosed confidential psychiatric
information during a continuing physician-patient relationship, which disclosure was a de
novo disclosure of confidential records. Neither does Plaintiffs5 citation to American
Medical Association Principles of Medical Ethics or Rule 506, Utah Rules of Evidence
create legal duties upon which a private right of action can be based. Similarly, there is no
private cause of action for alleged violations of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act. Plaintiffs' invasion of privacy claims fail because Dr. Barbuto did not
4
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publically disclose private facts. Indeed, Utah law permitted disclosure and discussion of
Mr. Sorensen's medical records, which were necessarily part of his personal injury claim.
Additionally, the Complaint fails to allege a legal claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress or to state a claim for negligence arising out of the physician-patient
relationship.
Finally, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate damages which could support a claim.
Dr. Barbuto did not testify at Mr. Sorensen's trial and Plaintiffs have not alleged that Mr.
Sorensen received any psychological evaluation or treatment for the alleged emotional
distress, that Mr. Sorensen needed mental health counseling, that he suffered physical pain,
that he suffered loss of employment or any other tangible injury associated distinctly with
the claims against Dr. Barbuto. In the context of this case, allegations of distress and
painful emotions, without tangible injury, are insufficient to support a claim for damages.
For these reasons and for all other reasons set forth in Dr. Barbuto's supporting
memoranda, the Court hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that Plaintiffs5 Complaint and all claims
asserted therein be and the same are hereby dismissed with prejudice. Each of the parties
shall bear its respective costs and attorney's fees incurred to date.
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DATED this _!__!__ day of
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2005.
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BY THE COURT

x / \AAA^~*\

t/\^~^

TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Distrjft Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

y • o./
^/L. ; Rich Hirniphprys/
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L. Rich Humpherys, 1582
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801)323-5000
Facsimile: (801)355-3472
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

NICHOLAS SORENSEN,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 000905711
Judge William B. Bohling

vs.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION IN LIMINE
RE: DR. JOHN P. BARBUTO

JACK W. MARCELIS, MICHELLE
MARCELIS and SEAN MARCELIS,
Defendants.

SYNOPSIS
After a serious accident on July 24, 1999, resulting in the death of one person and the
extensive injury to the plaintiff, plaintiffs treating physician referred plaintiff to Dr. John
Barbuto, neurologist, because of seizures from a brain injury. Dr. Barbuto's treatment began
August 4, 1999 and ended early 2001, and largely dealt with prescribing anti-seizure medication
and monitoring any seizure activity. The plaintiff changed to a different treating neurologist
when Dr. Barbuto was no longer on the approved medical list for medical insurance purposes.
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Dr. Barbuto's records were subpoenaed and have been disclosed. However, his
deposition was not taken though Defendants subpoenaed Dr. Barbuto to be a witness at trial.
Defendants have never disclosed at any time that Dr. Barbuto was involved as anything more
than a fact witness. Totally unbeknown to plaintiffs counsel, defense counsel has been meeting
with Dr. Barbuto ex parte without a HIPAA or any other release, and has retained him for
purposes of reviewing extensive information and documents in order to render expert opinions at
trial.
Plaintiffs counsel first became suspicious on September 17, 2003, during a deposition of
the defense expert, Dr. Weight, when defense counsel produced a new document from Dr.
Barbuto's file. Still, defense counsel failed to disclose the extensive ex parte involvement with
Dr. Barbuto even though plaintiffs counsel specifically inquired about it. Based on this
suspicion, plaintiffs counsel met with Dr. Barbuto on September 25, 2003 and for the first time
learned of defense counsel's extensive ex parte contact and retention of Dr. Barbuto. Because
Dr. Barbuto and defense counsel have engaged in illegal ex parte contact (without a HIPAA
release), because Dr. Barbuto openly caters to the defense bar and has an extreme defense bias,
and because plaintiff has just discovered that Dr. Barbuto has changed his medical opinions from
those contained in his medical records and has formed even new opinions in areas outside of his
original treatment, plaintiff brings this motion in limine to exclude his testimony.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On September 11, 2003, defense counsel sent two releases to plaintiffs counsel

and requested that plaintiff, Nicholas Sorensen, sign the releases, which would release medical
information directly to defendants' counsel. See copy of defendants' proposed releases, marked
as Exhibit 1 to the accompanying Affidavit of L. Rich Humpherys.
2.

Shortly after receiving defendants' request, plaintiffs counsel responded that

plaintiffs counsel had a policy of not giving general releases to opposing counsel, because of the
unfortunate experience of having some defense counsel attempt without notice to use the release
for ex parte contact with plaintiffs treating physicians. Plaintiffs counsel offered to obtain any
records defendants desired and would produce them, or defense counsel could simply subpoena
the records. See ^fl[ 1 and 2 of Affidavit.
3.

At no time has defense counsel attempted to take the deposition of Dr. Barbuto,

nor has defense counsel ever given any notice that defendants intended to call Dr. Barbuto as an
expert witness for the defense, but instead to only be a fact witness regarding his treatment of the
plaintiff. Dr. Barbuto's records were obtained more than two years ago and submitted to
opposing counsel and both counsel had stipulated to their admission as part of the total medical
record exhibit. At no time did plaintiff ever suspect defense counsel of having made ex parte
contact with Dr. Barbuto, for the purpose of providing him with new documents and infonnation
and requesting him to render expert opinions for the defense. Id. U 3.
4.

On September 17, 2003, at the commencement of the deposition of Dr. David

Weight (defendants' expert neuropsychologist), Tim Dunn produced a sheet of paper, which he
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represented to be a photocopy of a page from Dr. Barbuto's file. Plaintiffs counsel asked if this
was something in addition to the medical records that had already been produced. He indicated
he thought it was. Plaintiffs counsel asked when and how Mr. Dunn got the document and he
indicated that his associate, Steve Alderman had obtained it the day before from Dr. Barbuto's
file. Plaintiffs counsel asked why Mr. Alderman was going through plaintiffs treating
physician doctor's file without notice to us. Mr. Dunn indicated that they had a subpoena.
Plaintiffs counsel stated that he had not received any notice of a subpoena, except for trial, nor
any indication that opposing counsel would be going to Dr. Barbuto's office. Plaintiffs counsel
then asked whether Mr. Dunn was hiring Dr. Barbuto as defendants' expert. Without denying it,
Mr. Dunn simply stated he was paying for Dr. Barbuto's professional time, as he would with any
professional. Plaintiffs counsel then asked if Mr. Dunn or his associates had personally met
with Dr. Barbuto. Mr. Dunn indicated he was not sure what Mr. Alderman had done. Plaintiffs
counsel then expressed that it would be highly inappropriate for opposing counsel to meet with
plaintiffs treating physicians and eliciting expert opinions, without any notice to plaintiffs
counsel. Mr. Dunn simply shrugged his shoulders, implying that he wasn't sure what was going

on. Id H 4.
5.

Even though plaintiffs counsel had directly addressed this issue with Mr. Dunn,

at no time thereafter did defense counsel ever disclose that anyone had met with Dr. Barbuto
(other than to get a copy of the one page from Dr. Barbuto's file) or that defense counsel had
provided Dr. Barbuto with information or that he was going to elicit expert opinions from Dr.
Barbuto based on the information defense counsel had provided to him. Id. ^ 5.
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6.

After the deposition of Dr. Weight, plaintiffs counsel became more suspicious of

what contact had been made with Dr. Barbuto and what Mr. Dunn intended to do when he called
Dr. Barbuto at trial. Accordingly, plaintiffs counsel made an appointment with Dr. Barbuto and
met with him on Thursday, September 25, 2003. When Julie Eriksson, a paralegal, and
plaintiffs counsel sat down with Dr. Barbuto, without inquiry from plaintiffs counsel, Dr.
Barbuto immediately began to explain that he wanted the record clear, he had met and talked
with opposing counsel, had received extensive medical records from the office and had been
asked to address certain questions, and was being paid by Mr. Dunn's office for his time.
Plaintiffs counsel asked Dr. Barbuto if he had been retained as an expert. He answered that he
had and he was responding to opposing counsel's request that he review the extensive medical
records and render various opinions based on this review, the same kind of thing that he does in
other cases when he is hired as an expert, except he had not seen plaintiff since his treatment. He
also stated that opposing counsel had told him that opposing counsel was not going to refer to
him as an "expert." He didn't understand this, but he professed that he didn't understand a lot
about the legal profession. Id. ^ 6.
7.

Dr. Barbuto then began to explain that after meeting with defense counsel and

reviewing additional information, he was changing his opinions that he had reached while
treating the plaintiff. His conclusion while treating plaintiff and when contemporaneously
reporting to Dr. Vogeler (plaintiffs primary treating and referring doctor) was that the seizures
plaintiff had had after the accident were the result of the brain injury. Now, while not treating
plaintiff nor reporting to Dr. Vogeler, he concludes that the seizures were a result of a preexisting
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psychiatric and social (secondary gain) disorder. He readily admitted that his treating records
and his course of treatment reflected the conclusion that the seizure activity was as a result of the
brain injury, however, he was now changing his opinion. Id. ^j 7.
8.

During this conversation with Dr. Barbuto, plaintiffs counsel asked if he had

prepared a report outlining his changed opinions. Dr. Barbuto indicated that he had prepared an
extensive report (holding it in his hand) but that when he contacted Mr. Dunn's office and
explained his opinions, he was told, for reasons he didn't understand, not to send his report to
opposing counsel. Plaintiffs counsel asked to see the report. He refused, indicating that it was
attorney work product, and that plaintiffs counsel would have to obtain permission from Mr.
Dunn. Plaintiffs counsel reminded him that he was a treating physician and that plaintiffs
counsel was representing his patient. Dr. Barbuto quickly responded that plaintiff was his patient
and that presently he has no patient relationship with plaintiff. Plaintiffs counsel then asked if
he had prepared anything else pursuant to the request of Mr. Dunn's office. Dr. Barbuto stated
that he had prepared numerous pages of notes, but again, he would not allow plaintiffs counsel
to see them without Mr. Dunn's approval, claiming that it was attorney work product. Id. ^| 8.
9.

Over the years plaintiffs counsel has had numerous experiences with Dr.

Barbuto. In all situations Dr. Barbuto was involved in testifying in behalf of the defense and his
testimony is almost always the same—that secondary gain and other unrelated conditions are
mostly, if not completely, the cause of any current problems, assuming the problems are real. Id.

19.
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10.

In one of the last cases with plaintiffs counsel, Dr. Barbuto performed an

independent medical examination (IME) of plaintiff Melia Fidel before any litigation, and found
that she had a permanent partial disability rating of approximately 5 to 10% due to injuries she
sustained in her neck from an accident. Being unable to reach a settlement, Mrs. Fidel retained
plaintiffs counsel (here) to pursue her personal injury claim. When Dr. Barbuto was deposed,
he completely renounced his prior report and claimed that Mrs. Fidel had only a minor neck
strain which should have resolved within a few weeks after the accident and that there was
nothing wrong with her. See T| 9 of Affidavit.
11.

At trial in the Fidel case, Dr. Barbuto demonstrated his extreme defense bias,

testifying about how America's compensation system was to blame for not only Mrs. Fidel's
complaints, but for most chronic syndromes in general, basing his conclusions upon studies that
were allegedly done in foreign countries such as Greece and Lithuania where there are no
compensation systems. After excusing the jury, Judge Timothy Hanson listened to Dr. Barbuto
for a half hour as Dr. Barbuto explained his incredible and unfounded opinion that because there
were fewer patients with chronic medical problems in Greece and Lithuania, and because these
countries did not have a compensation system based on fault, therefore America's compensation
system is to blame for not only Mrs. Fidel's chronic problems, but for nearly all patients with
chronic problems. Understandably, Judge Hanson tlirew out all of this testimony. See copies of
the pertinent part of the trial transcript, pp. 34-54, attached as Exhibit 2 to Affidavit; see also ^ 9
of Affidavit.
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12.

Importantly, Dr. Barbuto has admitted that he annually performed on the average

approximately 200 IME's for the defense, making approximately $300,000 per year, but only did
one or two for the plaintiffs side, one being for his brother-in-law, an attorney who asked Dr.
Barbuto to do an IME but Dr. Barbuto never testified because his opinions were against the

plaintiff. UK 10.
13.

Dr. Barbuto is notorious for his strongly biased opinions that the pain and other

problems resulting from any trauma at issue were not caused from the trauma but originated
from some psychological or secondary gain origin. Plaintiffs counsel has seen compilations of
scores and scores of his defense medical examinations which all say nearly the same thing. Dr.
Barbuto seldom, if ever, recognizes the trauma as the cause of the chronic problems, and nearly
always suggests conscious or unconscious feigning or malingering (secondary gain). Id. ^ 11.
14.

Dr. Barbuto has publicly expressed his outrage regarding plaintiff attorneys who

try to establish his bias and has specifically denounced a seminar that Mr. Humpherys presented
to the plaintiffs bar regarding Dr. Barbuto's bias and willingness to give extreme defense
opinions to endear himself with the defense bar, the source of most of his income. See f 12 of
Affidavit.
15.

Plaintiff took Dr. Barbuto's deposition yesterday (September 30, 2003). Dr.

Barbuto confirmed:
a.

That he had no release from plaintiff to discuss his medical treatment with

opposing counsel. Rough draft of his deposition, pp. 75-77, attached as Exhibit 6.
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b.

That he had been asked on May 23, 2003 if defense counsel could retain

him at $315 per hour to review information and render expert opinions. See
letters between defense counsel and Dr. Barbuto, dated May 23, 2003, attached
hereto as Exhibits 1, 2, and 3.
c.

On August 1, 2003 (a day after discovery cut-off), defense counsel sent

extensive records to Dr. Barbuto and provided other information, asking him to
address various records, and concluded in the letter, "After you have a chance to
review his records give me a call so we can discuss your opinions. There are
several issues we would like you to address but we can talk about those when you
call." See letter of August 1, 2003, attached as Exhibit 4.
d.

On August 11, 2003, Dr. Barbuto prepared a ten page written report. He

contacted defense counsel and discussed his report and the other issues raised by
defense counsel. Defense counsel told him not to send his report to them. See
Report of August 11, 2003, attached as Exhibit 5, and p. 71 of the rough draft of
his deposition attached as Exhibit 6.
e.

Dr. Barbuto met with defense counsel for a couple of hours on September

16, 2003 and discussed Dr. Barbuto's opinions at length. See Dr. Barbuto's
billing statement, attached as Exhibit 7, and the rough draft of his deposition, p.
72, Exh. 6.
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f.

When plaintiffs counsel called toward the end of September to make an

appointment with Dr. Barbuto, he immediately called defense counsel to tell them
plaintiffs counsel was meeting with him, p. 73, Exh. 6.
g.

Dr. Barbuto admits that he never tried to let plaintiff and plaintiffs

counsel know of his involvement with defense counsel. See pp. 77-81, Exh. 6.
h.

Dr. Barbuto freely admits that he has now changed his opinion as to the

cause of plaintiff s seizures, and that his prior opinions created a "mythology"
about the cause of the seizures. See p. 23, Exh. 6.
ARGUMENT
L

DR. BARBUTO'S TESTIMONY SHOULD BE EXCLUDED IN ITS ENTIRETY
AND ONLY HIS MEDICAL RECORDS SHOULD BE ADMITTED INTO
EVIDENCE.
Dr. Barbuto's proposed testimony is fundamentally flawed and results in irreparable

prejudice and damage to plaintiffs case. Once Dr. Barbuto, a doctor widely known for catering
to the defense bar and for his extreme defense bias, has been retained ex parte by defense
counsel, his testimony as a treating physician is fundamentally flawed. Merely restricting his
testimony to his historical treatment cannot overcome this flaw and prejudice. He cannot undo
all of his ex parte contact or his review of large quantities of new information and the loyalty that
is associated with being retained by defense counsel (as evidence in part by his refusal to provide
plaintiffs counsel with his report, notes and other work product without defense counsel's
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approval). Any explanation of his records will be colored now through the improper tainting by
defendants' conduct.
Restricting Dr. Barbuto's testimony will be ineffective to avoid the prejudice. In fact, it
will cause additional prejudice since such restriction will preclude plaintiff from being able to
demonstrate Dr. Barbuto's extreme defense biases and his illegal ex parte contact with opposing
counsel. Instead, defendants would be able to perpetrate the myth that Dr. Barbuto is simply a
treating physician being fully candid and honest with the jury. This would result in the ultimate
damage to plaintiffs case, and would preclude plaintiff from having any means to present the
true picture.
The exclusion of his testimony is further warranted by defense counsel's failure to
disclose the ex parte contact, failure to disclose Dr. Barbuto's report, and in fact, taking
affirmative actions to avoid disclosure, contrary to Rule 26(a)(3)(4) and 26(e), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 26, requiring disclosure, is based upon the fundamental concept that
justice is best advanced by open disclosure between the parties, including expert opinions. This
concept is even more true when the defense has surreptitiously retained plaintiffs treating
physician. But for pure happenstance, plaintiffs counsel would have never known about all of
this until Dr. Barbuto was on the witness stand.
Rule 37 (f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides the exclusion of the expert when
proper disclosure is not made;
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as required... that
party shall not be permitted to use the witness, document or other material at any
hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause
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for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court may
order any other sanction, including payment of reasonable costs and attorney fees,
any order permitted under subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) or (C) and informing the jury of
the failure to disclose.

Id. (emphasis added). The Advisory Notes to Rule 26 on the subject state as follows:
The rule changes are intended to simplify discovery and promote full disclosure
of discoverable information.
* * *

If a party fails to comply with the disclosure rule, Rule 37(f) requires the court to
prohibit the use of the witness or evidence at trial unless the failure was harmless
or there is good cause for the failure.
Id. (emphasis added).
The facts clearly portray a situation where defense counsel was attempting to engage in
trial by ambush, the very thing Rule 26 was designed to prevent. Moreover, this was not
regarding a peripheral issue of small import. On the contrary, Dr. Barbuto's testimony goes to
the very heart of plaintiff s damage case, i.e., that plaintiffs uncontested brain injury has resulted
in little damage, and most, if not all, of the problems he is experiencing can be related to some
psychiatric disorder that pre-existed the injury. Not even defendants' neuropsychologist, Dr.
David Weight, supports the extreme position that Dr. Barbuto has now taken. Dr. Barbuto is
even so bold as to discard his treating opinions which were reported to the referring physician
and for which he billed the plaintiff.
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Apart from the propriety of defense counsel's actions, Dr. Barbuto clearly violated the
law in his ex parte communications with defense counsel. In the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (commonly referred to as "HIPAA"), health providers are expressly
precluded from disclosing information about their patient unless such disclosure is "pursuant and
in compliance with a consent that complies with § 164.506..." 45 CFR 164.502 (a)(l)(ii). The
Act further states that a provider "may not use or disclose protected health information without
an authorization that is valid under the section." 45 CFR 164.508. The Act gives specific
requirements before any authorization to disclose such confidential information is valid. Id., §
164.508(c). Neither Dr. Barbuto nor defense counsel had any release, let alone a "HIPAA"
release.
The Act has some exceptions to the requirement of a HIPAA release before disclosures,
however, under those exceptions, which don't apply, disclosure is subject to a condition,
"provided that the individual is informed in advance of the use or disclosure and has the
opportunity to agree to or prohibit or restrict the disclosure in accordance with the applicable
requirements of this section." 45 CFR 164.510. No notice was given by Dr. Barbuto or defense
counsel of their use of this confidential information to either plaintiff, his guardians, or plaintiffs
counsel.
The Act specifically addresses disclosure of the confidential information injudicial
proceedings. Such disclosure is allowed by court order or
in response to a subpoena, discovery request or other lawful process, that is not
accompanied by an order of the court.. .if:
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(A) the [provider] receives satisfactory assurance.. .from the party seeking
the information that reasonable efforts have been made by such party to
ensure that the individual who is the subject of the protected health
information that has been requested has been given notice of the request;
or
(B) the [provider] receives satisfactory assurance.. .from the party seeking
the information that reasonable efforts have been made by such party to
secure a qualified protective order that meets the requirements of (e)(l)(v)
of this section.
45CFR 164.112(e)(l)(ii).
The Act further gives other qualifications to the use of such protected information in
judicial proceedings, all of which are conditioned upon notice to the patient. Defense counsel's
ex parte contact with Dr. Barbuto has clearly violated HIP AA law, which is consistent with Rule
26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring up front and forthright disclosures. Defense
counsel made no effort to disclose the ex parte contact, together with their retention of Dr.
Barbuto as a defense expert, even though plaintiffs attorney two weeks before trial had
specifically asked about any ex parte contact. Except by pure happenstance, plaintiffs counsel
would have never known about this ex parte involvement until trial when Dr. Barbuto would be
testifying.
The waiver of any doctor/patient privilege does not justify this surreptitious ex parte
involvement. The puipose of a privilege is to require the nondisclosure of privileged infomiation
when subpoenaed or otherwise required to testify. A waiver of a privilege does not constitute a
waiver of all rights of privacy and confidentiality and the HIPAA laws, thus allowing a doctor to
talk with anyone about his patient and to even hold himself out for hire against his patient. There
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remains a common law right of privacy and confidentiality, which would require at least a court
proceeding, such as a deposition, a subpoena, and proper notice to the patient and his attorney,
before a doctor voluntarily and for hire, addresses his patient's medical affairs.
Apart from the issue of disclosure, Dr. Barbuto's new opinions were not formulated until
this past summer, and his report was not even requested nor written until August 11, 2003, long
after the discovery cut-off dates. In fact, at the pre-trial on May 23, 2003, the parties represented
that there was only a little discovery left and the Court opened discovery for the limited purpose
of allowing defendants to have an economic expert, whose report was to be filed by the end of
June and to allow a third deposition of the plaintiff.
Having discovered all of this twelve days before trial, and deposing Dr. Barbuto one
week before trial, does not resolve the severe prejudice to plaintiff. Dr. Barbuto refused to
provide plaintiffs counsel with his reports and other work product regarding his retention by
defense counsel until his deposition which gives plaintiffs counsel no time to prepare or be able
to respond with appropriate medical testimony at trial. When added to the fact that plaintiff did
not even discover this until approximately twelve days before trial, together with the calculated
and conscious effort to surreptitiously and illegally build evidence through a treating physician
who is a well-recognized defense biased doctor, requires the exclusion of his entire testimony.
Since Dr. Barbuto's treating records, which contain Dr. Barbuto's numerous narrative reports,
are fully available for use at trial, the exclusion of his testimony will result in no prejudice to the
defendants, exclusion is the only appropriate remedy. Dr. Barbuto's numerous reports to
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plaintiffs primary treating physician adequately sets forth Dr. Barbuto's opinions and treatment
at the time.
CONCLUSION
The Court must exclude Dr. Barbuto's testimony in total. There is no other way to avoid
the unjust and serious harm to plaintiff, and the unfair advantage to defendants. The relevant
information about Dr. Barbuto's treatment and opinions is adequately evidenced through his
medical records and reports.
DATED this . / ^ i day of October, 2003.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

yyt-'Rich Humpherys / ' '
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the /^"day of October, 2003, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE RE: DR. JOHN P.
BARBUTO was sent by the method indicated below to the following:

Tim Dalton Dunn
DUNN & DUNN
460 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

HAND DELIVERED
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Neurology In Focus
An Outpatient Neurology Clinic at HealthSouth
John P. Barbuto, MD

8074 South 1300 East, Sandy, UT 84094
Phone: (801) 565-6600 Fax: (801) 565-6774

Diagnostic evaluation. Neurological testing (EEGy EMG/NCV), and Therapeutic intervention

5/23/03
Kay Hanson, CLAS
D u n n & Dunn
Midtown Plaza, Suite 460
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, U T 84102
Re: Appearance at Sorsensen v. Marcelis trial
Dear Ms. Hanson,
We have received the notice of trial in the case of Nicholas Sorensen. As you
know, there can be one "sticky" point which must be resolved prior to appearance.
This is the issue of fees. I would like to presume that you expect to compensate me
for m y appearance at my normal fees ($315.00 per hour, including travel and court
preparation). However, it is often unwise to make presumptions. So, I would like to
clarify this. As you probably know, I see many patients with legal issues in the
background. It is not possible to simply appear as a courtesy.
As you know, technically I can be commanded to appear as a witness of fact.
The courts recognize that court appearance is a hardship and I have not personally
experienced a situation where it was expected that the doctor would do this for free
(or for the standard $18.50 service fee). However, the law does allow for such
command appearance. As a witness of fact I could be commanded to appear; but
then I would not prepare. I would not offer expert opinion. I would only restate
what is in the records.
Alternatively, the usual situation is that appearance is as an expert. Such service
would be charged as noted above.
Just to clarify the issue, please advise me which way you are asking for m y
appearance. Again, I wish I could simply make the presumption that you are
proceeding under the usual procedure (appearance as an expert). However, I don't
like to make presumption in issues of this type.
Sincerely,
JohnP.Barfc%o,MD

Out of Illness. Into l i f e
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DUNN & DUNN
A Professional Corporation

TRIAL

MIOTOWN PLAZA, SUITE 460

LAWYERS

TIM DALTON DUNN T

230 SOUTH 500 BAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH S4102
(801) 521-6677 PHONE
(801) 521 -6666 PHONE

SUSAN BLACK DUNN
ROBERT C. MOKTON *
CLIFFORD C- ROSS
PAUL J. SIMONTSON

(888) DUNNLAW

MAKJCA. RjocHOFft

(801) 521-9998 FAX
. _,, „
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STEPHEN D. ALD£RMANSTEPHANIE J. HOGCAN

May 23, 2003
VIA FACSIMILE (801) 565-6774
Dr. John Barbuto
Health South Rehabilitation Hospital
8074 South 1300 East
Sandy, UT 84070
Re:

S orensen v. Marcelis
Claim No.: 07A992060405
Our File No.: 00D-3860

Dear Dr. Barburto:
This letter comes in response to your letter dated May 23,2003. ^ P ^ ^ t P W I ^ J & S p i *
^^S^S^^^^^^^^^^m^ioT
your appearance at trial in the above referenced matter. In
fact, we wonder if you would be willing to spend several hours (approximately 5) and review all
of Nicholas Sorensen records. We would like to know what you think, as his treating physician
early on in his injury, about his cuiTent condition. Let us know and we will see if our client will
authorize something like that.
As you know, pursuant to our telephone call to your office yesterday, the trial that was
scheduled to begin on May 28th has been continued. The trial is now scheduled for October
(second place setting) or January, 2003 (first place setting). Accordingly, we will not need you to
testify at this time. We will keep in touch with regard to when the next trial will begin.
Let us know if you would review Mr. Sorensen's records for us. If you have any
questions, don't hesitate to contact me.
Yours truly,
DUNN^DUNN,P.C-

^ D m N S O N , CLAS
Certified Legal Assistant
KH/

Neurology In Focus
An Outpatient Neurology Clinic at HealthSoutb
John P. Barbuto, MD

8074 South 1300 East, Sandy, UT 84094
Phone: (801) 565-6600 Fax: (801) 565-6774

Diagnostic evaluation, Neurological testing (EEG, EMG/NCV), and Therapeutic intervention

5/23/03
Kay Hanson, CLAS
D u n n & Dunn
Midtown Plaza, Suite 460
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, U T 84102
Re: Appearance at Sorsensen v. Marcelis trial
Dear Ms. Hanson,
Thank you for your letter and clarification. Yes, I would be happy to review
the rest of Mr. Sorensen's records and include this in the overall assessment of his
illness. It is always a pleasure to see "the rest of the story" from which maximum
insight may be obtained.
Sincerely,
John P. Barbuf:^, M D

Out of Illness, Into Life
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D U N N & DU1NL<
A Professional Corporation

TRIAL

MIDTOWN PLAZA, SUITE 460

LAWYERS

TIM DALTON DUNN t

230 SOUTH 500 EAST

SUSAN BLACK DUNN

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102

ROBERT C. MORTON *

(801)521 -6677 PHONE
(801) 521-6666 PHONE

CLIFFORD C. ROSS
P A U L j . SIMONSON

(888)DUNNLAW

MARK A. RiEKHOFft

(801) 521-9998 FAX

STEPHEN D. ALDERMAN •
STEPHANIE J. HOGGAN

+

T Also Admitted In Hawaii
* Also Admitted In Wyoming
t t Also Admitted in California
* Also Admitted In Texas

August 1,2003

Dr. John Barbuto
Health South Rehabilitation Hospital
8074 South 1300 East
Sandy, UT 84070
Re:

Sorensen v. Marcelis
Claim No.: 07A992060405
Our File No.: 00D-3860

Dear Dr. Barburto:
Enclosed please find copies of Nicholas Sorensen's medical records in the above
referenced matter. You treated Mr. Sorensen following an automobile accident on July 24, 1999.
about a couple of
"things. TEe following is somFiinoi^^
Mr. Sorensen
since you last saw him.
Mr. Sorensen received cognitive rehabilitation from HealthSouth until December of 1999.
The last report from Eileen Paul, which was sent to you, indicated that he showed "significant
improvement". Mr. Sorensen received no additional cognitive rehabilitation until February of
2003. During that period Mr. Sorensen started college and held down a full time job,
successfully.
We have discovered that, prior to the accident of 07/24/99, Mr. Sorensen had a history of
depression and uncontrolled temper. He also has a history of suicide threats, prior to the accident
and since the accident. These suicide threats seem to be tied to breakups with girlfriends. You
will also note that Dr. Bigler has recommended that Mr. Sorensen see a psychiatrist on several
occasions and he has never seen a counselor of any kind except after he checked himself into the
hospital because he felt like he was going to hurt himself and then only briefly.
Mr. Sorensen did receive a brain injury as a result of this accident. The question we have
is to what degree his current issues are as a result of the injury and what those issues might be as
a result of problems Mr. Sorensen had prior to the accident.
I have also enclosed a medical chronology of Mr. Sorensen's care. It is not complete, but
it may be helpful in your review.
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After you have a chance to review his records, give me a call so we can discuss your
opinions about Mr. Sorensen's progress over the last several years. There are several issues we
would like you to address but we can talk about those when you call.
If you have any questions, don't hesitate to contact me.
Yours truly,
DUNN & DUNN, P.C.

£CTL^
ANSON, CLAS
CertifiedXegal Assistant
KH/
Enclosures

Neurology In Focus
An Outptticnt Ncuwhgy Clinic *tHemlthSouth
John P. Barbuto, MD

8074 Soutb 1300 But, Sandy, UT 84094
Phone: (801) 565-6600 Fax: (801) 561-7323

Dia&ostic evaluation, Neurobpcal testing (EEC, EMG/NCV), and Therapeutic intervention

8/11/03
Kay Hanson, CLAS
Dunn&Dunn
Midtown Plaza, Suite 460
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Re: Nicholas Sorensen
Dear Ms. Hanson,
I have performed an independent medical record review on Mr. Sorsensen at
your request While it is preferable to see the patient in person also, this is not always
possible. Medical records are accepted as a representation of the patient's illness, and
it is even recognised that details of the medical illness may be more accurately
obtained from records than from the patient. Consequently, it is reasonable to
evaluate the patient via the records. In the following review I have personally
reviewed the records.
Medical Records Review:
DATE
7/10/1997
1/6/1998
2/25/1998

PROVIDER
Douglas
Vogeler, MD
Douglas
Vogeler, MD
Douglas
Vogeler, MD

Douglas
Vogeler, MD
5/24/1998 Steve Hunt, MD
5/24/1998 Steve Hunt, MD
Douglas
5/29/1998
Vogeler, MD

3/23/1998

7/22/1998
9/8/1998

Douglas
Vogeler, MD
Douglas
Vogeler. MD

TYPE
follow-up

NOTES
patient seen for right knee pain attributed to twisting while
mowing lawn. There is reference to "happened 2 years ago".
follow-up patient seen for sinus congestion and headaches and depression.
follow-up patient seen for report of smashed right hand 10/97 and smashed
again 1/98. Also evaluated for right knee problems and referred to
orthopedics
follow-up
continuing problems with depression
Lab
Lab
follow-up

follow-up
fo!!cw-up

normal cervical spine series
normal CT brain scan
reports he was jumped by a gang. Seen for headache and
dlzzines. Contusion found behind right ear. Reported to have
concussion/contusion and depression.
"still gets bad daily headache' Still moody. History of depression
prior to accident.
seen for reported 4-wheeler accident. Reports left arm and
shoulder pain and numbness in 4th and 5th fingers.
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7/24/1999

Tremonton City
Ambulance

Evaluation

7/24/1999

Bear River
Valley Hospital

Evaluation

7/25/1999

Christopher
Penka, MD

Evaluation

7/26/1999

McKay-Dee
Hospital
Nurse?

Discharge

Hospitalization revealed good improvement. Patient continued to
complain of headache. Plan for transfer to Alta View Hospital.
progress note Patient apparently had "review" of potential for PTSD and advised
to see Dr. Bigetow.

7/26/1999

John Sanders,
MD

Admission H&P Patient admitted for treatment. Reference to prior concussion one
year prior "when a gang Jumped him and beat him up". "He even
had to change schools and went through some traumatic
episodes with that.*1 Exam notable for abrasions. Admit with
diagnosis of cerebral concussion and bilateral contusions.

7/26/1999

John Sanders.
MD

progress note

Patient noted to be awake, alert, cooperative, oriented and to
have no motor or sensory deficits. DTR noted to be hyperactive
but equal.

7/27/1999

Cottonwood
Hospital:

Lab

CT brain scan shows multiple areas of increased attenuation
primarily In the frontal lobes and felt to be most likely representing
small parenchymal hemorrhages.

7/27/1999

Brenda Ross
Zigich, CSW

Evaluation

Report of prior concussion with subsequent depression.
Discussion of PTSD, concussion, and depression from current
event

7/28/1999

John Sanders,
MD
Cottonwood
Hospital;
Douglas
Vogeler, MD

progress note

patient noted to be much improved and is discharged.

Lab

MRI of right knee shows media suprapatellar plica but otherwise
normal knee,
seen for follow-up of mva with reported significant head trauma.

Douglas
Vogeler, MD

follow-up

7/24/1999
7/25/1999

7/26/1999

7/29/1999
7/30/1999
8/3/1999

One car rollover. Found lying next to car Bleeding.
Transported. GCS 14/15 (a second report, also EMS, reported
13/15). Jaw pain and abrasion back of head, down back, left arm.

Seen for accident. Noted to be confused. Abrasions of elbows..
knee, chest, scalp.
Bear River
Lab Chest x-ray: aspiration pneumonia and/or pulmonary contusion of
Valley Hospital
right lung. Normal cervical and lumbosacral spine.
Patient reported to have been a roll-over accident in which he
McKay-Dee Admission H&P
Hospital
was ejected. He was found to have a closed head injury and
transferred from another hospital. Exam shows nose abrasions,
multiple chest abrasions, multiple ecchymoses of abdomen,
bilateral abrasions to lower extremities. No spine problems
noted. Labs showed bilateral frontal lobe contusions, left worse
than right, right occipital fracture. Chest x-ray shows right
pulmonary contusion. WBC 20.8. Many other tests done and
basically normal.

follow-up

Patient seen for neurosurgical evaluation of bilateral frontal
contusions and skull fracture. Patient reports thai he lost control
of his vehicle, Exam: neurological noteable for GCS 15/15,
retrograde and anterograde amnesia, other basically normal
Prior history of another concusslve event one year prior.

reports pinching in right knee and low back pain with radiation
down the right leg. Background depression and concussion also
noted.
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8/4/1999

John Barbuto,
MD

Evaluation

patient seen for consultation for head Injury. Noted to have had
evidence for possible skull fracture and frontal contusion.
Background depression noted. Exam basically normal at bedside.
Felt to have concussion and contusion with unclear role of
background depression.

8/13/1999

Eileen Paul, MD

Evaluation

Patient has speech/language pathology evaluation. He Is noted
to have some cognitive deficits primarily in learning and
processing speed.

8/17/1999

John Barbuto,
MD
John Barbuto,
MD

8/15/1999

Lab EEG: "overall tense with some mild dysrhythmia and questionable
left occipital slowing."
follow-up Patient presents reporting spells. No definite evidence of seizure
activity, but also not excludable. Started on Depakote.
Lab
Lumbar CT scan shows focal small central and right
posterolateral Grade 2 L5-S1 disc herniation that abuts both S1
nerve roots, right greater than the left. Diffuse Grade 1 L4-5 disc
bulge.

10/14/1999

Cottonwood
Hospital:

10/26/1999

Reed Fogg, MD

Evaluation

patient seen for his low back pain. He is said to have seizures
and severe, disabling, back pain. Patient taking 4 psychoactive
medications. Concluded to have "low back pain, rule out internal
disc disruption, rule out chronic ligamentous and muscle Injury."

10/26/1999

John Barbuto,
MD
Cottonwood
Hospital:
Reed Fogg, MD

follow-up

patient reports cessation of his seizure-tike spells since three
days after starting Depakote.
Lumbar MRI shows grade 2 central to right disc protrusion at L5S1 and mild facet arthropathy at L4-5 and L5-S1.
Scanfindingsare reviewed and It Is concluded that the patient
may have an Internal disc disruption. Dr. Fogg advocates a
conservative approach. Direct attribution to the auto accident is
advocated.

12/10/1999

John Barbuto,
MD

follow-up

12/16/1999

Cottonwood
Physical
Therapy
Eileen Paul, MD

11/4/1999
11/16/1999

Lab
follow-up

"At some point we may wonder whether the Depakote is helping
him because it is treating seizures or because it is treating a
mood disorder. However, for the time being we will assume it is
treating seizures."

Evaluation patient completes Intake forms for physical therapy. Patient has a
brief course of therapy.
follow-up

patient completes cognitive therapy (spanning from 8-13 to this
date). Patient said to have had significant improvement in all
areas.

John Barbuto,
MD
Kethy Alderson,
MD
John Barbuto,
MD

follow-up

Letter to patient regarding the status of his claims and plans.
[See letter for details.]

Lab

EEG normal.

follow-up

T w o normal EEG's. Can't prove seizure."

6720/2000

Cottonwood
Hospital:

Lab

lumbar discography; L4-5 anatomically normal and no symptom
production. L5-S1 injection produced his typical low back pain
and annular cleft was observed with subllgamentous extrusion.

8/2/2000

Terry Sawchuk,
MD

Evaluation

Patient is seen for his reported back and leg complaints. Five
page report, In conclusion, IDET is advocated.

12/20/1999

3/9/2000
3/20/2000
4/26/2000
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12/1/2000

Erin Blgler, PhD

1/10/2001

Cottonwood
Hospital:
Michael
Goldstein, MD

2/27/2001

Evaluation

patient seen for neuropsychological evaluation. "Results of
intellectual assessment indicate level of function to be within the
average range. No specific Intellectual deficit Is noted/ He Is
noted to have significant levels of depression and anxiety. He is
felt to have "classic post-concusslve syndrome" [except for the
obvious issue that It is a year and a half after the concussion],

Lab EEG: low voltage fast pattern, some tension, one posterior spike
noted.
Evaluation

Patient seen for neurological evaluation. Noted to be e 19 year
old full time college student at SLCC. Seen for evaluation of
seizure disorder. Patient reports that "shortly after the accident
Mr. Sorensen began experiencing partial seizures, which would
occur approximately 8-10 times a day8 [Note: this is not an
accurate history. Patient had seen me In 1999 with no mention at
all of seizures. Later there were only questions In this regard.
See conclusions.] Report Is 4 pages long. See for details.
Based on what patient presents the history of seizures is
presented as if established.

3/16/2001

Reed Fogg, MD

follow-up

In a letter to IHQ Health Plans Dr. Fogg discusses that "I
recognize there is still some question as to the validity of an IDET
procedure. However, I believe that Nicholas Sorensen would be
much better served with an IDET than an anterior Interbody
fusion*

3/21/2001

Michael
Goldstein, MD

Lab

MRI of brain shows "findings are consistent with remote post
traumatic changes. There are small hemorrhages and
encephatomalacia at the frontal poles and left frontal convexity."

Lab
Cottonwood
Hospital:
Terry Sawchuk, Admission H&P
MD

Lumbar MRI: grade 1-2 posterior central disc protrusion.

7/27/2001
8/17/2001

Patient admitted for treatment of lumbar herniated disc. Patient
taking Depakote, Effexor, Trazodone, Celebrex. Admitted for
IDET procedure, which occurs on this date.

9/14/2001

Cottonwood
Physical
Therapy

Evaluation

patient seen for another brief course of physical therapy.

1/23/2002

Michael
Goldstein, MD

Lab

24 hour ambulatory EEG shows normal background activity.
Patient reports various behavioral disturbances. Report
concludes "normal 24 hour ambulatory EEG with no correlation
between EEG and symptoms Including 'shut down feeling*".

2/8/2002

Michael
Goldstein, MD
Gregory
Dunnavant, MD

follow-up

patient seen for tremor. He Is felt to have an essential tremor.
possibly aggravated by Effexor and Depakote.
Patient seen for depression. He asserts that Hnobody take my
headaches seriously*1. He asserts that he Is "stressed out" about
life. Patient felt to have a mood disorder and psychiatric care is
arranged.

2/22/2002

Evaluation

2/27/2002

Michael
Jorgensen, MD

Evaluation

Patient seen In ER for "complains of two personalities, feeling of
losing control". Reportedly having suicidal thoughts. Reports
chronic headaches in background. Also reports prior head
trauma and seizures. Meds: Depakote, Effexor Trazodone: Paxil.

2/27/2002

George
Nlkopoulos, MD

Admission H&P

patient admitted for suicidal behavior. He is concluded to have
meu'or depression.
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3/2/2002
4/2/2002

George
Nikopoulos. MD
David Weight,
PhD

Discharge

Patient discharged from LDS hospital whore he was admitted for
depression.
Evaluation Neuropsychological evaluation. 15 page report. Overall patient's
Intellectual function Is determined to be in the normal range. He
Is noted to have had objective Injury in the Index accident. And,
he Is noted to have had pre-accident depression.

5/30/2002

Michael
Goldstein, MD

follow-up

patient seen for spells. "I reviewed the situation with Nicholas
and his father. I explained to them the executive function deficits
and impulse control problems he was having are related to his
brain injury. I recommended that they keep in close contact with
the psychiatrist and counselor to determine what medications
would be best for this." [Considering the recommendation for
psychiatric treatment and the prior psychiatric care how can one
be sure this Is injury and not psychiatric illness?}

2/14/2003

Kristin Lambert,
M.ED

Evaluation

Patient is seen for speech-language pathology evaluation.
Patient gives history of a 3.9 GPA In high school at A's and B's at
SLCC. He claims reduced academic load due to fatigue. He
obtained social dispensations for classwork. His various claims of
symptoms and conditions are discussed. He has cognitive testing
which is reported to show various deficits. [Note: the studies list
his apparent state of function, but the report does not provide
conclusions as to what caused that state of function (which, l
would argue, is appropriate).]

4/10/2003

Douglas
Vogeler, MD

lab

patient has Epstein-Barr titers which are high, both IgG and IgM.

Impressions and Conclusions:
Mi. Sorensen presents a particularly interesting and complicated situation. In
the final analysis it is my opinion that his condition is best understood using a
biopsychosodal model of analysis. And, all three elements (biological, psychological,
and social) are seemingly quite important
On 7/24/99 the patient was involved in an accident In the review of the
records of the event it is noted that the patient was involved in a single-car rollover.
The patient asserts that the accident happened because the driver lost control of the
car.
At first blush the initial perspective is that Nicholas was cleady injured in the
accident. He was admitted to the hospital with bilateral frontal brain contusions, a
probable lung contusion and multiple abrasions. There is also a history of lumbar
disc protrusion which does seem reasonably related to the accident
The frontal brain contusions are unquestionably related to the accident The
brain contusions were followed initially by prompt improvement, in a fashion quite
compatible with actual injury. Within days his clinical function was basically normal.
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However, the long term story of his brain function requires a more complex analysis
(as discussed below).
The lung contusion was also unquestionably related to the accident This
problem cleared quickly.
Multiple abrasions were also unquestionably related to the accident However,
these were basically minor, and also cleared quickly.
The lumbar disc protrusion is probably also related to the accident The disc
bulge was not dramatic. However, he was only 18 at the time and a lumbar disc bulge
would be uncommon at that age. In addition, while not immediately, it was only a
few days after the accident when he complained of the low back and right leg
problems. Given the presence of the other, more critical, and obscuring, issues it
seems prudent to disregard the fact that lumbar and right leg complaints were not
immediate.
Therefore, the first perspective is that he was injured. I'll say more about this
below.
Yet, the second perspective is that he has improved much more poorly than the
degree of his objective findings would have predicted, particularly at his age. The
failure to follow a normal graph of healing suggests that psychosocial factors may be
at play. Indeed, he had an underlying depressive disorder. Further, much of his care
subsequent to this accident has centered on subjective complaint and on clearly
psychiatric issues. So, there is a second story which is his psychiatric story.
Third, there probably is a significant contribution from the social
circumstances. Even in spite of his psychiatric history there are features which
suggest that the social context is acting as a fomenting influence.
To me this patient is particularly fascinating because it appears that he has a
mythology of purported seizures which I inadvertently set in motion. I saw the
patient about 10 days after this accident At that time he had no history suggesting
any seizure activity. However, because of his documented contusion I thought it wise
to do an EEG to see if there was any subclinical seizure activity. His EEG ended up
showing some minor dysrhythmia, maybe of the type often seen in psychiatric
patients (an interesting side discussion). When these results returned I told the patient
about the results, and probably said something to the extent that the EEG was not
exactly normal but did not look like seizures. At that moment I may have planted the
seed. The patient then later returned with the "evolved" claim of spells. Given the
claim and the presence of the prior contusion I had little choice but to proceed with
the possibility of seizures and I prescribed Depakote. However, I noted at that time
that there was no solid evidence of seizures. Reportedly due to insurance change, the
patient stopped seeing me shortly thereafter. Now, years later, it becomes apparent
that this beginning seemingly set in motion a mythology—the mythology that he has a
seizure disorder. When he saw Dr. Goldstein in 2001 he then presented the history
that he began experiencing partial seizures numerous times a day shortly after the
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accident and that I had started him on Depakote as if seizures were confirmed. In
spite of the patient's claim of spells up to many times a day, his subsequent EEG's
(including an ambulatory 24 hour EEG) have not shown definitive epileptiform
activity. He has continued Depakote but there has not been confirmation of the
presence of seizures, Depakote is also used routinely in mood disorders. While the
possibility of seizures most clearly exists in a patient who has had brain contusions.
The actual presence of seizures has not been confirmed. In addition, the 24 hour
ambulatory EEG commented directly on the lack of correlation between his claimed
spells and any evidence for actual seizure discharge.
So the analysis of this young man requires, in my opinion, recognition of all
three major components: biological, psychological, and social, ** In a situation of this
type, with clear brain injury, the resolution of the contribution from the various
components may become a daunting task. I do not claim to have a crystal ball.
However, FU do the best I can here to segregate the issues.
Let us consider the issue of brain injury first There is no question that brain
injury occurred. Further, there is no question that brain injury may have impact on
psychological function. Therefore, reasonable consideration of a role for the accident
in both structural issues and psychological issues is required. Based on the scan
findings and his prompt improvement when hospitalized acutely it would be predicted
that he would have good resolution of this component of his syndrome. (Indeed, that
was my prediction when I first saw him only a few days after the event) And, he did
indeed improve promptly during the early course. However, lurking in the
background were both psychological and social issues. Unfortunately, it appears these
conspired to preclude the prompt resolution which his initial findings would have
predicted- Note in this regard that later testing of his cognitive function showed
dysfunctions which were non-spedfic, and of types which may easily be seen in
depression and/or anxiety. Both Dr. Bigler and Dr. Weight, for example, found that
his intellect was basically normal. Brain scans did reveal some residual findings, but
these were not large. Similar degrees of abnormality may be found in patients with no
clinical abnormalities.
He had underlying psychiatric illness and then he had frontal lobe injury. So,
one question we must examine is the impact of frontal lobe injury on behavioral state.
This can take us back to the famous case of Phineas Gage, who, via an unintended
frontal lobotomy from brain penetration by a tamping rod, showed us the potentials
for behavioral change which may occur from frontal lobe problems. To be sure,
invoking such issues as directly pertinent to Mr. Sorensen would be hyperbole.
However, the concept of behavior change from frontal lobe injury can be relevant.
So, we then must ponder whether his frontal lobe injury was truly contributory to his
later behavioral dysfunction. While the discussion can be lengthy, I would summarize
that I don't think his degree of frontal lobe injury had any notable long term
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behavioral consequence. Rather, it seems to me more probable that his behavioral
problems were simply further manifestations of his underlying psychiatric illness.
Depressive disorders commonly begin to manifest in the late teenage years.
Typically they progressively worsen during the 20*8 and 30*8 under the influence of
increasing life stresses. From actual injury, particularly of the degree he suffered,
suicidal ideation would be very anomalous. However, from depressive disorders this
may develop. I think the clear issues of suicidal ideation stand as additional support
that his behavioral disturbance was a mood disorder rather than a frontal lobe brain
injury consequence,
Summarizing, I think he did have a brain injury and short term it was clearly an
issue. However, long term it appears his depressive disorder is much more relevant to
his behavioral and cognitive issues.
The next issue is the question of seizures. This is largely discussed above. To
summarize, I don't think time and subsequent testing has confirmed any seizure
disorder.
The next Issue is the lung contusion. This resolved promptly.
The next issue is the multiple abrasions. These also resolved promptly.
The next issue is the lumbar disc disease. I do think this needs to be related to
the auto accident However, we do have a confounding factor. Many, many patients
with chronic stress biology will manifest back pain complaints which are ultimately a
derivative primarily of chronic stress-induced muscle spasm. Not only does this mean
that the mechanisms involved may be mixed issues (disc plus spasm, for instance) but
it also means that persisting problems may be more related to the stress than to the
disc. Further, patients with primarily stress mechanisms tend to fail surgery (when
someone docs this chasing a modest disc bulge). In the case of Mr. Sorensen we note
that his disc bulge was not dramatic. It does appear from the discogram that the
bulged disc was a source for his pain. The records do not make it clear if his IDET
worked or not. At this point I would suggest that the disc bulge, early back care, and
the IDET should be related to the auto accident However, if he did poorly after the
IDET then we need to give consideration to recognizing that surgical failure and long
term complaint may be related to his undedying stress and depressive illness rather
than to the accident.
I believe the above answers the questions you posed.
Sincerely,

John P. Barbuto, MD
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EndNotes:
A

The BioPsychoSociftl Model of Analysis:
The biopsychosocifll model of analysis is particularly appropriate many poorly explained, yet chronic,
syndromes, parnctdarly those which are alio poorly responsive to medical treatment The model acknowledges the large
and expanding body of literature identifying that biological elements, psychological elements, and social dements may all
contribute importantly to such syndromes. Treatment failure is often best explained by recognition that social and
psychological issues may make illness self-propagating, and claim of illness even advantageous. The biopsychosocial
model was proposed by Geotgc Engel in 1977 as a replacement fbt the old "organic versus nonorganic" dichotomy
which is routinely neither accurate nor sufficient at an analysis paradigm for complex syndromes of these types. There
arc now on the order of 1200 peer-reviewed articles referenced m Medline which discuss the subject from one
perspective or another Over 200 of these focus on chrome pain syndromes. In addition there ate perhaps many times
this many published editorials or other non-Medkne discussions which reference this concept The AMA Guides to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment has also referenced this discussion in its consideration of chronic pain
In the biopsychosocial syndrome it is typical for psychiatric or social mechanisms to be predominant Yet, the
patient may strongly deny these issues The patient may become quite angry when such issues are discussed
Overstatement of a claim of injury, m particular, has become a route for these patients to serve many hidden social and
psychiatric agendas
Another issue common to the biopsychosodal syndrome is excessive support of an biological (particukry
injury) hypothesis by providers or others who may stand to benefit from economic opportunities these patients provide
These patients, driven by their psychological issues and/or social needs, may volunteer for grossly excessive medical
care and other services, A minor "fender-bender'* for example, may be driven to an opportunity for many years of
services While most providers do not seek an inappropriate relationship to these patient*, there are a small number of
providers who may exploit these patients Highly invested participants may become very vociferous in objection to
discussion of the actual issues.
In the biopsychosoaal syndrome the patient may ultimately become the victim the services provided- An
objectively minor accident, for example, may be fostered into a multryear illness—one m which there is grossly
excessive medical care, poor response to treatment, iatrogenic worsening via excessive belief in illness and consequences
of unnecessary mvasive treatment. The biopsychosocial syndrome patient may become emotionally and physically more
dysfunctional over time The patient may ultimately become "a wreck"—not due to the original event, but due to the
excessive utility of ovetstaang the hypothesis of biological illness (particularly injury) The ultimate utility of
understanding the biopsychosoaal model is greatly more accurate and effective patient care
* The Need to Hypothesize*
The court systems understandably prefer not to hypothesize. However, in the biopsychosocial patient
hypothesis is basically unavoidable Characteristically in these patients there is a large disparity between sohdly
objectively findings (for example, by the laboratory) versus symptom claims being made. Therefore, we may need to
hypothesise what wc think accounts for the disparity
Commonly providers attempt to explain the biopsychosoaal syndrome patient by some hypothesis which
presumes an occult biological process Labels such as "sprain", "strain", "soft tissue injury", or "post concussion
syndrome" ate often invoked. Yet, while such hypotheses might, atfirstblush, %ccm reasonable, the course of the illness
reveals that the syndrome is excessive for any reasonable use of such terms. In the biopsychosocial patient it is common
for minor versions of these processes to be present at the beginning of the syndrome, but as time proceeds these resolve
and become replaced by psychosocial dynamics Typically this transiuon occurs in the first few weeks of the churned
illness
In some of these patients there arc no objective findings The entire claim of the illness proceeds on subjective
complaints. In othet patients minor injury is proven but it b minor, and not a reasonable explanaaon for the subsequent
excessive syndrome And, in a few there is clear and significant injury, yet, there is a subsequent syndrome which
exceeds what even this would reasonably predict. We may, to a reasonable extent, allow ourselves to hypothesize some
kind of injury mechanism; however, in these patients psychological or social mechanisms often provide a much more
logical way to explain the disparity between major claims and minimal test findings.
Since we have a poor ability to test for stress illness, psychiatric illness, and hidden social agendas we have a
limited ability to prove absolutely when these are present Therefore, we have a limited ability to prove mat these are the
cause for the disparity between the patient's few abnormal tests and the extensive syndrome claimed. Yet, it is actually
bias or prejudice to discount psychological or social mechanisms and presume injury. To do so may not only be
inappropriate in resolution of social contingencies, tt may slso encmirflge the patient to remain ill and to receive ill-
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conceived medical care, la these patknta we may need to hypothetic which specific psychological or social issues are
present (because the laboratory cannot confirm our hypothesis) but psychosocial dynamics routinely make far greater
sense than an injury hypothesis.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-00O00-

NICHOLAS SORENSEN,
Plaintiff,

DEPOSITION OF:
JOHN P. BARBUTO, MD

JACK W. MARCELIS, MICHELLE
MARCELIS and SEAN MARCELIS,
Defendants.

Civil No. 000905711
(Judge Bohling)

-ooOooBE IT REMEMBERED that on the 3 0th day of
September, 2003, the deposition of JOHN P. BARBUTO, MD,
produced as a witness herein at the instance of the
plaintiff herein, in the above-entitled action now
pending in the above-named court, was taken before
JEANETTE LUND, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, commencing
at the hour of 3:15 p.m. of said day at the offices of
Dr. Barbuto, 8074 South 13 00 East, Sandy, Utah.
That said deposition was taken pursuant to
notice.
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

JOHN P . BARBUTO, MD,

3

called as a witness for and on behalf of the plaintiff,

4

being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as

5

follows:

6
7

EXAMINATION
BY MR. HUMPHERYS:

8

Q

Would you state your full name, please?

9

A

John Patrick Barbuto.

10

Q

Your occupation?

11

A

I'm a neurologist.

12

Q

Did you have the occasion at one point in time

13

to treat a patient by the name of Nicholas Sorensen?

14

A

I did.

15

Q

And what was the time period in which you

16
17
18
19

treated him, beginning and ending date?
A

I first saw Nicholas on August 4th of 1999 and

the last visit appears to be 2/13/01.
Q

Other than responding to subpoenas, did you

20

have any further involvement with this case until May

21

of 2 003 when you were subpoenaed to go to trial and

22

there was some communications with Dunn & Dunn?

23

A

No.

24

Q

Before we get into anything more, let me mark

25

some exhibits and we can get those identified and

3
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1

squared away before we move into the other areas.

2
3

MR. HUMPHERYS:
Exhibit 1, please.

4
5
6

Would you mark that as

(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 1 was marked for
identification.)
Q

Doctor, I'm going to show you what's been

7

marked Exhibit 1.

Just thumb through that and make

8

sure these all appear to be records or copies of

9

records from your file.

Not that that is complete, but

10

that everything in Exhibit 1 are records from your

11

file.

12
13

MR. HUMPHERYS:
please.

14
15

Will you mark this as No. 2,

(Whereupon, Exhibit Nos. 2 through 5 were
marked for identification.)

16

THE WITNESS:

Yes, it appears these are all

17

from my file.

18

insurance companies and things, and it looks like those

19

are letters that were either to me or from my file, but

20

without actually looking at those letters I can't tell

21

they are actually my documents.

22

I'm not sure of that.

23

records, and those clearly are from my file.

24
25

Q

There are a few letters in here from

I think they are, but

Most of the records are my

With the exception of the letters either to or

from an insurance company?

4

1

A

Yes, I think that's correct.

There's a letter

2

from Eileen Paul in there, that top one, which I know

3

appears in my stuff someplace.

4

it, I can say for sure.

5

they're letters from insurance companies, and I don't

6

know for sure they're in my file.

7

because I gave you copies of my file the other day, so

8

I think that's where you got them.

9

Q

And I think the rest of

It's only those ones where

I think they are

Let me show you what's been marked as

10

Exhibit 2, which are copies of. records we obtained from

11

your file last Thursday when we met, I believe it was

12

Thursday, and I just wanted to make sure those are also

13

copies of records from your file.

14

A

I think all of these are except there's one of

15

them I don't recognize, which is a letter dated 1/5/99

16

from Nicholas Sorensen and it's to Safeco Insurance,

17

and I don't -- that may be in my records, I just don't

18

recognize it.

19

Q

All right.

Why don't you check, because I

20

believe we got it from your records.

21

ask you where you got it, because it didn't seem like

22

it was a letter that concerns you or was addressed to

23

you.

24
25

A

I was going to

It's towards the bottom of your file I believe.
Let's go backwards, then.

I'll go from the

other end.

5
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1

Q

There it is.

2

A

Here it is.

3

Yes, it is in my file.

4

Q

Do you know where it came from?

5

A

No.

6

Let me see if I can tell by where it is.

Yes, it looks like this came with this letter

7

here from Greg Hamblin from September 1st, 2000, from

8

Allstate.

9

who is a claims representative at Allstate, and it

10

There's a letter here from a Greg Hamblin

says - - d o you want me to read it?

11

Q

No, that's all right.

12

A

It looks like that's where this came from.

13

Q

Is that what it says or is that what you're

14

assuming?

15

A

It says here, "In a letter written by Nicholas

16

regarding his claim, he mentions you are treating him

17

for a brain injury and subsequent seizures."

18

there is this letter that is dated 1/5/99 by the

19

patient, and there is a highlighted portion of it that

20

says, "Dr. Barbuto who has been treating me for my

21

brain damage.

22

and he put me on Depakote."

23

probably sent as an attachment ot the letter from a

24

Greg Hamblin.

25

Q

Okay.

And then

After the accident I was having seizures
So it looks like this was

It doesn't look like it specifically

1

r e f e r r e d t o , but: t h e r e ' s s o m e l o g i c a l

2

beM- •

3

A

connection

Y e s , ti.at ' s o n e of t h e r e a s o n s I l o o k e d a t

4

w h e r e t h e y we re ; :i the c h a r t .

5

i n , rr • * •

6

ord

7

they yet c o p i e d , things can c e r t a i n l y get mixec, ..}

8

But

tst so h a p p e n s

9

letter

-*-"; * he i-#-t-, . • ,-f e r e n c e c

10

O; l '

11'

s o p r e s u m a b l y t h a t ' s w h e r e it c a m e

12

_

13

B a s i c a l l y as s t u f f

*• ! ^ s <" it •• • J s *• qf*- s pu t- i r chr- -nologica 1

it i,- u: i uxtaposi tioned
tb it

All right .

i-d Miat sec* ion

-i .---.]'„•

15

t o y o u dated August

16

c o n f i r m that tli^: is a l s o p a r t of y o u r

A

Yes.

18

Q

Ana ^.;._.

19

m e today.

20

1v

21

Q

22

A

23

Q

•:. 'd,

Fair e n o u g h .

N o w ----,-'-•' : .- -.

17

us

from.

marked as i-.;--- -.,

25

> ..

<

14

24

comes

• •? b e e n
^n n & Dunn

j*.

.. •• r. and rist nave y o u
records?

_..,..... \ that you provided

Is this a o i l l i n y

to Turin & D u n n ?

F

D o e s t h i s c o m p r i s e a l l o f the b i l l i n g s y o u

have si i bmitted to Dunn & Dunn?

A

Yes.

7

1
2

Q

And there's currently an outstanding balance

of $787.50?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

Do you anticipate doing any additional work

5

for Dunn & Dunn or any additional billing?

6

A

I suppose that depends upon what you guys do

7

with this case.

In other words, as you know, he did

8

ask me to review the additional records, which are

9

here, and then I did talk with him thereafter and

10

that's reflected in the billing.

11

are able to settle this thing, then the answer would be

12

no.

13

certainly that he would want to talk to me prior to

14

trial, or you might even want to talk to me prior to

15

trial, but certainly he may want to, and so I would

16

presume that to be the case.

17

And so if you guys

If that is not the case, then it is possible

Also, when we had our conversation the other

18

day I mentioned to you that if there were additional

19

data, such as prolonged EEGs, other kinds of things

20

that would provide further data regarding this question

21

of seizures and spells and what these spells are, if

22

there were additional data of that type, then that may

23

be relevant in the file sort of assessment of where we

24

think we are with this.

25

that information, then presumably that would come into

And if you or he would gather

8

3

discussion also.

1

I

:

iI
IIHJII

'I

,
/"i

t

i in terms of bei nq rranrrted, t o d o a n y t h i n g

,. ..ave n o p r e s e n t n i r t •'
Correct

I take that b a c k .

THE W I T N E S S :

MR

ALDERMAN:
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::hc t: :i : e g,= :i : d?
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Y e s , w e ' v e sent y o u a ; i;> u a .
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A nd

h :i t d I: 5 appeai s to b e a r e p o r t

dated August
Correct.
And it is t e n p a g e s long; is that correct?

Now,

does y o u r r e p o r t of August 1 1, '2 0 0 3 ,

conta,;. yonr ci ir rent o p i n i o n s ?
Y e s , I b e 1 i ev e i t d o e s
' •• * - i .

• ;nr

a d d L I l u i i ci I i . l i i i n
i i I ni i i I

In I

I b e 1 i eve there h av e
I in i

i ni i

ni ni ni I i

n
i I iiit

and so that c o n t a i n s t h e o p i n i o n s I had as of t h e

t. Line " *JI ..<(.

:' ; e s .

Ha v i nn ------ r e c e i v e d th i n i mmed lately be f c T~e

ioi

couple few p a r a g r a p h s .

maki- -:p of y o u r r e p o r t .

H e l p m e understand t h e

r i rst p a r a g r a p h o b v i o u s l y
jrni this
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1

independent medical record review.

2

A

Right.

3

Q

And then the next section is simply your notes

4

from the records that you have reviewed?

5

A

Correct.

6

Q

And you know of no other notes other than

7

these typewritten notes that you have taken based on

8

your record review?

9

A

That's correct.

You know, when we were

10

starting here at the beginning you mentioned you

11

thought you saw some handwritten notes.

12

usual character to handwrite because my handwriting is

13

not that great and I usually just work at the computer.

14

So I don't -- I'm not aware of any handwritten notes.

15

This is where I would normally put all of my stuff.

It isn't my

16

Q

And you would not keep any handwritten notes?

17

A

I would never have generated them.

In other

18

words, they would be -- when I'm going through records,

19

I actually have my computer set up and I'm sitting just

20

as this young lady is here typing into the computer.

21

Q

At the end you have end notes on pages 9 and

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Tell me what these are.

25

A

Basically those are some sort of broad

22

10.

10

I

discussions that are commonly relevant to these kinds
•vas theit
A.i
t :iat

5

* ?M

.;.,... .

..

\. *

h-.: is a - - f ii. i.

. ;'

because

.. -jv. ;L!iient

-ise to start with making my notes is a form,
(
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6
7

iui vt.- r ,. , Jo record review:

8

contains, a-, i •:..•( u:.

9

record rev Lew,
, <• »m i c

t

'

tl:

. . .

the basic structui*

such as

i mpressions and conclusion, and ther e

I j,/!1!, i 1 11 i, t ..." • , • !,.". ," i n '

ii

biopsychosocial model that come up i ecur lently, so I
put those as footnotes and they are just

in the for m

and they happen to, then -- tiiey print at the end of
the doci iment
In this case where those footnotes reference
is n. * lie second paragraph of page '•'.
j

*; 5 * v-: - is ri:np] y like the

All right

-- or is a foot
To explain.
paragraphs on page 7?
• - '> g h t
; J - >w,

s oine o f t h e s e concepts and t h i nq s .

i s t h :i : • - • o p s y c h o s c. >i: i a .1 itiod e I a 11 a 1 \ 11 i s

something that you generated as it relates to Nick or
is t:h:i s something that

is qeneric?
i• i

I . i I )< ni i mi1 (

, J in jii j i

ni l

1

model itself?

2

Q

I'm talking about footnote A.

Was this

3

generated specifically as it related to this matter or

4

was it generated in some generic form that you just

5

copied and pasted?

6

A

Right, that f s just in the form as a generic

7

thing about the biopsychosocial model, some of the

8

background.

9

Nick.

10

Q

11

That does not pertain specifically to

I see.

And tell me where the source of this

information came from.

12

A

Well, I wrote it, and it is a sort of broad

13

brush discussion of the biopsychosocial model and

14

references some of the literature which is in the

15

background for that, such as George Engel's stuff that

16

was the original article in Science magazine and then

17

some of the Medline references and that kind of thing

18

that are discussed.

19

elements of a biopsychosocial model and why do we use

20

it.

21

not familiar with the model.

22
23
24
25

And it talks about what are the

So it's a general perspective for people who are

Q

Tell me what article George Engel's -- or

publication came from?
A

It appeared in Science in 1977, and I don't

remember the exact title.

It's something like

I

"Biopsychosocial Model, An Alternative to the
ft

' • r>

standard analysis 01 scirtuthmg
: r.i'*_ >' come place,

vhe t •• : e
icti^'lv put

r

e ii.igotten exa tly
guess I did; ! t

\ -t

thp specific footnote in heie.

1 do Lave

1Any other paLi n-aL iuii3 except -- other thar;
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1

Wei '

ar T --a id here, there ai" about

iook under biopsychosocia 1,

citing?
1,2C
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rapidly these days because there's actually a . r c
•. t i c 11: s i K";V; t- - "•!- - :-

* -•• • *

rap;;

•

- * ' - -i s i nq
: thei n a .r e

.

relating to chronic pain syndromes.
are nou n i- •

And there actually

-f articles talking about
- • ^:i; 1'i_iuLJib^

" ii"

v- a-

fair! * -

'his -- the

' ' st- • ,- , I thin1.
a were I * : ilk

three major articles on the biopsychosocial model ,
re1ationship to spine disorders, if I reca11 correctly.
' drtiCiL.,
someplace.
"

•
. J V C L. JII.C ._•! them

se
i .: .:., . ,,es

I. have a whole box of files on pain

articles and various kinds of things like that and some

1
2

Q

Would the same discussion be true with your

footnote B, that is, that it's a generic discussion?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

That isn't necessarily geared toward Nick?

5

A

Correct.

In other words, it's -- well, it is

6

only in the sense that I brought up in his context that

7

the biopsychosocial model seems to be a useful model to

8

invoke in analyzing his situation.

9

sense that we often need to hypothesize in some of

And so in the broad

10

these -- because in some of these patients, and this is

11

less true for Nick, but in some of these patients

12

there's often not very much to work with that you can

13

see on laboratory studies, so we end up, then,

14

struggling under various kinds of hypothesized labels

15

such as sprain or strain or that kind of thing.

16

Now, in Nick that's less true, although there

17

is this whole discussion of the seizure issues in him.

18

And depending upon how we end up finally concluding on

19

that, we can invoke more or less of the - - o f this

20

discussion as it relates to him.

21

So this is not -- this is what you would call

22

boilerplate, meaning it's a general piece that's

23

relevant to things, but it is not specifically relevant

24

to him.

25

background of how do we think about these things.

It's not written for him.

It's more of a

14
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1

1 1*

2

of

3

from g e t t i n g a framework to "understand h o w to think

4

about these t h i n g s .

5

•

;

Q

. : :i

it

N o w , goina bar!: into y o u r report marked as

6

E x h i b i t: 5 uncie • :i : t - • - • ag " M e d :i c a 1 R e cc i d s Re v i e w ' I

7

n e e d t o a s k y o u -- let's s e e , if y o u have -- I guess

8

y o u don't:

9

irif'-.i -

10

A

11

' it a fai: . f a t e m e n r ?

f errn (if m i
Correct

III il wc •

Q

Yes.

15

Q

For example, r-

records from h c » - i r

17

A
an d

x

i. . . •. ; h..,

A1 ] right.
treatirq

:

^ ,

o u have?: n o t see a n y

»•» t * * •*
I " Mi

-*— '

21

Lin

" f P r e l i e f ell I

r •

.

Originally when you first started

were you finished looking?

Go ahead.

H-S.

22

\

23

wou1c

• 1L

f

--t

a

]9
20

-

h . i , r ' • • " i <«j wt'I1"-

A

] 8

• require

B u t w h a t e v e r " s b e e n g i v e n t o y< . y o u

14

"• "

have all T ne

-rify w h e t h e r y

records and then could c o r r e l a t e them with wiM 1 I h t / e .

12
13

you car •

as

Originally w h e n y o u first treated Nicholas,
.+ be a fair statement to state that y o u saw h i m
r

- *~v~

p h y s i c i a n f r o m D r . Vogeler?

it1,

15

xj L? J

1
2

Q

And he presented to you having a traumatic

brain injury, correct.

3

A

Correct.

4

Q

And it was an objectively diagnosed brain

5

injury, correct?

6

A

Correct.

7

Q

Tell me what your understanding is of his

8

current residual scans of the brain.

9

what is objective about his brain presently as you look

10

What is visible,

at scans regarding any injury?

11

A

Well, first of all, the word presently is a

12

bit difficult there.

13

now, I don't know what might be his latest scan, so all

14

I know is what we have in the records that I've looked

15

at.

16
17
18

Q

If you mean presently meaning

Let me back up and say to the last point in

time that you have record of or that you know about.
A

Let me, then, answer that this way.

Let me go

19

backwards through the records I have to see what is the

20

last scan that I have referenced.

21
22
23
24
25

Q

By the way, did you see the scans themselves

or only the reports?
A

I think I just saw the reports.
It looks like the last scan referenced is the

one of Michael Goldstein from March 21st of 2001, and

16
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1

a t that time m y note regarding what h e said he saw w a s ,

2

quote,, Findings a r e consistent with remote post

3

t r a u ma t i c c h a n g e s

4

e n c e p h a l o m a l a c i a at the frontal poles and left frontal

5

convexity.

6

g

C o n v e r t t h a t , < 1- ••>.-•• .

7

A

So tne scan w^. .
=

Th e r e a :t : e s in a 1 3 h e i n : i :i : h a g e s a n d •

;

M;!'.-

\ ^\

.•;. • .

\ anuuaqe.
-.;:..; consiD* - m t
Tiu.-.

8

w i t h t h e c o n c l u s i o n that h e h a d p i i o r ii-niry

9

r e s i d u a l s included e v i d e n c e ot old i. ronta.1 hemorrhage

10

a..--

1 1

hlH)

:hli'. W -< •

..'•.;"!;

12
13

.v.,..:! :

'.

•::

.•-

aica

l.-,;:i.: : . . !

I :

1 Oieiiead .

Meaning t h a t what . ' i>ey h a v e a t r o p h y ,
just

14

they

are

ch .sr-.i r- t, * ' i a t ?
A

I

15

e n c e p h a l o m a l ^ v ^ ^ „tea;.L3 u t i ^ . L a i d ; abnoiiiui it ies w h i c h

16

c e r t a i n 1 y can include that.

17

e n c e p h a 1 o m a 1 a c i a, t h e y m e an 111 a t t h e br.n ! •• i s n o w

18

a b ii o i: in a 3 3 ;;y z ::»n f :i g i 11 e :i

19

b e atrophy as o n e of the c o m p o n e n t s .

20
21
22

<

So by u s i n•; *: he word

s .n :i i ; n :l = • :i : t: h a t • :: : i II :i c e :i : t a :i n 3 >

What about generalized atrophy, are you aware

o f w h e t h e r or n o t N i c k ' s b r a i n h a s suffered such from
t.

23

:'hjs r e p o r t doesn't m e n t i o n generalized

24

atrophy..

.And as I said, that's the last report that I

25

see in the records.

17

1

Q

But what I'm asking you is do you know of any

2

record that has indicated generalized atrophy of his

3

brain?

4

A

5

here.

6

Let me look back to see what else we've got

Another scan that I see is from July of 1999.

7

And, again, that reported small parenchymal hemorrhages

8

primarily in the frontal lobes again.

9
10
11

Q

So you have no opinion whether there was or

was not; is that a fair statement?
A

12

Correct on that one.
And then we had one from May of 1998, which

13

was a CT brain scan and that was read as normal, that's

14

a different technology, but that technology was read as

15

normal.

16

scan of 1998 was negative and the CT brain scan of 1999

17

was positive; however, that may represent an evolution

18

in the sophistication of the machinery, presumably it

19

does not mean that he developed secondary hemorrhage,

20

but -- I don't know a reason why he would do that, but

21

I would note that those two reports say different

22

things.

23
24
25

Q

Now, it is noted, as well, that the CT brain

So I know -So it's consistent with the rather significant

auto injury, isn't it?
A

Right.

18

1
2
3

Q

The hemorrhaging and the possible skull

fracture and so forth?
A

Correct.

So I have nothing that I can see in

4

my notes that said that anybody said he had general

5

cerebral atrophy.

6

have had, I just don't have that in my notes and I

7

don't see having referenced that in my notes.

8

Now, that doesn't mean he couldn't

Has somebody said that?

9

Q

Well --

10

A

I realize you're asking the questions, I'm

11
12
13

just trying to understand the patient.
Q

I understand that.

We'll just have to deal

with that another time I'm afraid.

14

A

Okay.

15

Q

I'm trying to understand, as you are assessing

16

the paper review, what you're finding and what you

17

think is significant.

18

A

Okay.

19

Q

Now, regarding your impressions and

20

conclusions, since I've not had a chance to read them,

21

with the exception of a few paragraphs, why don't you

22

summarize what you believe to be, first of all, the

23

areas that you have addressed and then we'll talk

24

specifically about your impressions and conclusions.

25

A

Okay.

Well, as a neurologist, my main

19

1

interest is in his nervous system.

2

other issues such as the lung contusion and abrasions,

3

but my main interest, of course, would be in his

4

nervous system and its function.

5

overview, the first perspective was clearly injury.

6

There is no question he was injured and that he had

7

highly objective evidence of quite significant injury.

8
9

I did reference

And in the broad

That injury occurred not only in his brain,
but also occurred as a lung contusion, multiple

10

abrasions, and I also talk about low back problems and

11

suggested his lumbar disc protrusion was probably

12

related to this accident also.

13

Now -- so the first perspective is injury.

14

The second perspective is the issue of the seizures and

15

what are we doing with that.

16

conversation the other day, when I first saw him and he

17

began to mention these -- well, actually, when I first

18

saw him, because he had a clearly objective brain

19

injury and because some of these patients may develop

20

seizures, I did an EEG, and his EEG showed some

21

dysrhythmia, which was of fairly nonspecific type, not

22

clearly seizures, but not, at the same time, excluding

23

seizures.

24

injury and had an EEG showing a dysrhythmia, then the

25

question came up whether or not he could be having --

And as you know from our

Given the fact that he had had this brain
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1

he could be at risk for seizures and, therefore,

2

whether we should put him on medications, and I did put

3

him on Depakote.

4

Now, what I don't recall off the top of my

5

head, we would have to look back through the details to

6

retrieve this, but I don't recall whether he mentioned

7

he had spells at the time we first gave him the

8

Depakote or whether it was the combination of just a

9

clear head injury and an EEG showing a dysrhythmia that

10

led to the Depakote.

11

actually worked, so I would have to look back to see if

12

there was any actual mention of any spells.

13

I don't remember which way that

However, certainly, at around that time

14

afterward or before, but around that time, he did

15

develop, then, these reported spells and we put him on

16

Depakote and his spells then improved.

17

together the issue of brain injury and the EEG and the

18

report of spells and the report that the spells

19

improved with the anticonvulsant, I then concluded he

20

had seizures.

21

So putting

However, there also was in the background his

22

prior history of depression and there was the

23

additional observation that his EEG didn't show any

24

definite seizure activity, so I put in the records,

25

even in that early stage that I -- this was not a

21

1

confirmed diagnosis of seizures, but rather was a

2

possible diagnosis and it was a strategic approach

3

recognizing that seizures can get somebody into trouble

4

and all of that.

5
6
7

Q

You did reach a diagnosis, did you not, in

your records that there was a seizure disorder?
A

Right.

And so -- yes, I did.

And as I said,

8

I also included in the records the recognition that

9

that was not completely confirmed, but it was my

10

working diagnosis.

11

and he did well and that supported the idea that he had

12

seizures and then we went on with that.

13

So we treated him for these spells

Now, as you know, as this problem evolved, it

14

eventually came that Nick stopped seeing me, and so

15

then later when I got involved in this again when I was

16

asked to review his record, then looking through the

17

records what I found was that his spells, which were

18

being labelled as seizures, were apparently being

19

repeated and were apparently not so responsive to

20

medications.

21

confirmed seizures and, in fact, there was even the

22

report that his ambulatory monitoring showed a lack of

23

correlation between his spells and his EEG.

24

all of that raised the question whether he really did

25

have seizures, and that raises the question whether the

In addition, subsequent EEGs had not

So then

22

1

failure of the treatment as time went on was related to

2

insufficient treatment of seizures or whether it was

3

due to the fact that these weren't seizures.

4

So based on my review and in the August

5

document that I generated, my position was that I had

6

started him on these medications on the hypothesis of

7

seizures based on early data, subsequent data did not

8

apparently demonstrate EEGs confirming seizures, and

9

his course apparently did not show good response to

10

treatment, so then I brought up the possibility that I

11

actually generated a mythology, the mythology that he

12

seizures.

13

mythologies in patients, but it can be done

14

accidentally and, you know, inadvertently.

15

Now, obviously, I don't intend to generate

So then when looking back, given, again, the

16

perspective that subsequent EEGs did not confirm

17

seizures, what I recognized was that it was possible,

18

his spells were actually not seizures, that his

19

response to the Depakote was either incidental or was

20

treating his underlying depressive disorder and that

21

the whole label of seizures was not really a confirmed

22

pathophysiologic mechanism.

23

Now, as I told you the other day when we

24

talked, I would consider this issue still currently

25

unresolved based on the data that I have, okay, which

23

1

is I don't actually know if he had seizures or has

2

seizures.

3

beginning and perhaps his subsequent spells are now of

4

other mechanism.

5

at this time and they are inadequately controlled,

6

based on what I have read in the records at least.

7

But which is the correct answer?

Had meaning he could have had some at the

Or it could be that he has seizures

Well, as I

8

told you the other day, that depends upon biologically

9

whether we can confirm that there actually is a seizure

10

pathophysiology going on.

11

suggested that it might be worth while for you to send

12

him to the university to have them look at the issue to

13

see if they can confirm whether his spells are actually

14

seizures or not.

15

And as you recall, I

You also brought up the issue that apparently

16

his family has offered the possibility that maybe he

17

had seizures at the beginning, and you mentioned maybe

18

that you thought only one of them was actually a

19

seizure, and that maybe his other spells were not

20

seizures, that they were some other mechanism.

21

don't know that we know entirely, but it's very

22

important to this patient, it's also important to you

23

guys as you do your job, but it's important to this

24

patient because ultimately we have to decide what we're

25

treating, and in order for him to do well, we have to

So I
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1

try to treat the correct pathophysiology.

2

So at this time, my summary on the seizure

3

issue is that I was the one that originally started it

4

and based on early data, I did accept the diagnosis of

5

seizures but subsequent information has apparently not

6

clearly confirmed that process and my question now --

7

and I will leave it as a question - - i s does he really

8

have seizures or is that a mythology that I started and

9

it is really not seizures, but some other kind of

10
11

problem.
As I've already referenced, he had an

12

underlying psychiatric disorder with depression and

13

that's important because it can generate symptoms

14

itself and then you get into the issue of trying to

15

determine which mechanism generates symptoms that he

16

may be claiming at this time.

17

claiming cognitive dysfunction at this time or fatigue

18

at this time or spells of altered consciousness at this

19

time, which mechanism generates those?

20

disorder of structural type related to trauma or is it

21

his depressive disorder and perhaps psychophysiologic

22

mechanisms.

So, for example, if he's

Is it brain

23

So that is something we have to try to analyze

24

in the accurate care of the patient, but also in regard

25

to what you all do, okay.

And as I've said, and I told

25

1

you the other day, data can shift this thing one way or

2

the other.

3

that he's having seizures, then, great, that resolves

4

the issue.

5

having seizures, then we would have to try to determine

6

what is the nature and cause of the spells he may be

7

having, and I say having recognizing that I've only

8

looked at his records, I don't know what this man looks

9

like clinically at this time, so I don't know what his

In other words, if we have solid evidence

If we don't have solid evidence that he's

10

current behavioral state is or what he claim at this

11

moment.

12

So whatever information we have, whatever

13

solid information we have would be very important in

14

trying to determine what we currently view as the

15

problem, and then when you have that perspective, you

16

can then look backward to try to decide what do we

17

think that meant in the early stage.

18

if it was true that he had studies at the university

19

now, let's say, and they confirmed that he had an

20

active seizure disorder, active seizure focus, then

21

several things become important for him.

22

we've confirmed that that's the mechanism of his

23

spells.

24

the optimal treatment for the spells, medical or

25

surgical or whatever.

So, for example,

One is that

Number two, you then have to determine what's

And number three, in regard to
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1

prognosis, adjudication, that sort of thing, then you

2

guys would have that information to decide your parts

3

of it, whatever's going to happen there.

4

Q

Let me interrupt you for a second.

Tell me

5

what tests you're specifically referring to or believe

6

would be helpful in determining this?

7

A

Well, he's had one ambulatory EEG, but I think

8

having another ambulatory EEG or even inpatient

9

monitoring at the university would be very helpful.

10

Inpatient monitoring would be ideal.

11

finish that, let me just raise a point here.

12

treating the patient.

13

going -- putting him through inpatient monitoring would

14

be a waste of everybody's effort.

15

And before I
We're

If he has no symptoms, then

So presuming he has symptoms now, presuming

16

this is a struggle we need to struggle with, okay.

So

17

if we need to struggle with this, the patient is on

18

medicines and we're not sure whether he needs to be on

19

them or the patient is having spells that are not

20

adequately controlled, if those are true, then I would

21

suggest you consider inpatient monitoring at the

22

university where they can look in detail at evidence

23

for seizures, and they can also see what his spells

24

look like to determine what is the relationship between

25

those spells and any EEG findings that he may have.
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1

If that did not answer the question, there are

2

other tests that conceivably you could do.

3

Research Park they have MEG studies,

4

magnetoencephalography, it's a research test and I

5

don't know that you guys would want to get into it

6

because it's not something that your venue may want to

7

go into.

8

but if you're trying to struggle, as I do, with how do

9

you take care of the patient, you use whatever tools

10
11

Over in

In other words, it's research level stuff,

you can.
So over there they have a test and it is

12

apparently quite sensitive for looking for evidence of

13

active seizure foci.

14

source imaging at Research Park which did not get out

15

of the lab, at least at this moment.

16

technical reasons, it's very expensive and time

17

consuming.

18

sensitive, so conceivably if we really had to struggle,

19

those would be something else that could be done in the

20

struggle to try to analyze the problem.

21

most practical clinical approaches would simply be

22

inpatient monitoring at the university.

23

They have a thing called magnetic

I think for

But that technique apparently is highly

Certainly the

If you can then use a test of that type and

24

confirm the mechanism of his spells, you could then

25

delineate not only the optimal treatment approaches,
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1

but also you could delineate the whole adjudication

2

discussion of that -- for that piece of it at least.

3

In regard to treatment for him if he's having

4

seizures, there are various kinds of approaches.

There

5

are not only medications, but there's also such

6

treatments as vagal nerve stimulators and even seizure

7

surgery.

8

due to a focal structural abnormality and if

9

medications are not working well, there is an

If a patient has a focused seizure disorder

10

increasing interest in seizure surgery because you may

11

be able to remove the seizure focus.

12

The enthusiasm for that type of technique

13

varies depending upon different research centers and

14

things and it' s not something that everybody has

15

agreement on, but certainly in the literature there is

16

some increasing enthusiasm for that perspective.

17

Q

Is that a fairly expensive surgery?

18

A

It is.

19

Q

And any idea what that kind of expense would

21

A

I don't.

22

Q

But it is relatively new, therefore, it will

20

23
24
25

be?
I have no idea.

be fairly costly, I assume?
A

It's not new, but I think there's changing

views of its use.

When I was going through training
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1

and even up to very recent years, seizure surgery was

2

relegated to people who had failed numerous medications

3

and really were having refractory state.

4

literature in recent years there has been the argument

5

that if people have failed a couple of medications --

6

and couple may be too minimal, but there are some

7

articles advocating that -- that if they have failed a

8

couple of medications and they have a very clear

9

seizure focus that we should consider the possibility

In the

10

of removing the seizure focus.

11

argument is the observation of the costs to the patient

12

of lifetime treatment, as well as side effects of

13

medications and so forth.

14

and there is more interest than there has been in the

15

past.

16

And the reason for that

So the balances are shifting

Now, you can certainly talk to Fred Matsuo or

17

Tawnya Constantino -- Matsuo is, M-A-T-S-U-0, and

18

Constantino is C-O-N-S-T-A-N-I-N-0 -- who are in the

19

Department of Neurology at the university and are their

20

epileptologists, E-P-I-L-E-P-T-O-L-O-G-I-S-T-S, and

21

they can TELL you what they believe IS the role of

22

seizure surgery at this time, so that would be a place

23

for you guys to gather some more information about that

24

topic.

25

Certainly it -- to consider it, you have to

30

1

have a very focus sed lesion, you have to have something

2

where we know that we have confirmed the patient's

3

clinical spells are due to discharge -- you know, the

4

seizure discharge in a particular area and we've seen

5

that that area is recurrently involved so that we

6

believe removing that area or fixing it would be

7

useful.

8
9

Q

How do you find that focused area?

EEGs are

more generalized, aren't they?

10

A

Well, to an extent, yes.

There are various

11

EEGs and they have multielectrode EEGs and they have

12

other kinds of techniques.

13

other kinds of things.

14
15
16

You can use *SPEC scans and

Q

Would the MEGs be specific enough to locate

A

Well, if they're out of the lab, yes.

a -The MEG

17

is apparently a good test from what I've heard,

18

although as I said, it did not make it out of the lab

19

to clinical practice in this valley at least, so we

20

cannot order them as a routine clinical study, and even

21

the word routine may have to be taken with caution

22

here.

23

patient because it's very expensive and difficult to

24

obtain, but we cannot order them as a way of analyzing

25

patients on a routine basis.

It's not something you would use on every
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1

So you would have to talk with the guys at the

2

Department of Neurology at the university, the

3

epileptologists to see what they say and what they say

4

is the role of that test and whether or not they send

5

patients over there and how they choose who they send

6

over there to see what they have to say.

7

know what they would say at this point.

8

you may even get difference of opinions between the two

9

of them.

And I don't
I also know

These are not easy issues and there are

10

patients who, you know, can get differing opinion even

11

from very good sources.

12

would say in regard to Nicholas, but you can certainly

13

check to see what they would say.

14
15
16
17

So I don't know what they

The other way of looking at it is -Q

Before you move into the other etiology -- I

assume that's where you were headed?
A

Actually, I was going to go the other way, so

18

looking -- for seizures, you can actually do cortical

19

recordings.

20

well enough, they can actually record off the cortex of

21

the brain.

22

have to open a person's head, but -- and so they would

23

not go there with Nicholas, I don't think.

24

point is, there are other techniques that can be used

25

and certainly the guys at the university are going to

If they think they are down to the problem

That's rarely done because that means you

But the
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1

be the ones who are best qualified to tell you what the

2

current state of the art on all of that.

3

Q

Out of all of those procedures, you would

4

recommend, as you presently understand the situation,

5

the U of U studies as you have described, and if not

6

consider and explore the EMGs?

7

A

The MEGs.

8

Q

Sorry MEGs, I misstated.

9

A

Yes, yes.

10

Q

Now, on the vagus nerve stimulator, tell me

11

what that is -- what that involves and the nature of

12

that treatment.

13

A

In interesting curiosity, it has been found

14

that stimulating the vagus nerve may abort some kinds

15

of seizures.

16

implantable stimulator which is -- the stimulator

17

itself is put in the upper chest and wires are run to

18

the neck where the electrodes are placed around the

19

vagus nerve in the neck and the patient then receives

20

intermittent stimulation of the vagus nerve over the

21

course of the day.

22

That has been pursued and there now is an

With that stimulation, you may produce control

23

of some kinds of seizure disorders.

Vagal nerve

24

stimulation should be reserved for only a very selected

25

subpopulation because it's got risks and it's very
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1

expensive and you can have infection problems and other

2

kinds of things.

3

that a patient has a definite seizure disorder which is

4

refractory to medical management of the usual medicine,

5

then it is something to consider.

6

But, again, if you have confirmed

I would only consider that from the

7

university, and the reason is that there are some

8

places in this state where I think their criteria for

9

inserting the stimulator is perhaps much lesser than

10

the university would use and I think there's sometimes

11

a question of whether there are economic issues

12

playing.

13

look at that, you take the university's opinion on that

14

subject.

15

Q

So I would personally suggest that if you

Now, since I understand you to say that the

16

jury's still out in your mind as to the source of these

17

seizures --

18

A

Or spells.

19

Q

Spells or seizures, whichever they may be —

I

20

guess let me back up and say, regarding the nature of

21

this particular kind of brain injury and its residuary

22

effect on the frontal lobes, this kind of seizure

23

activity is certainly consistent with such injury, is

24

it not?

25

A

Oh, yes.

34

1

Q

And it isn't a remote stretch to reach the

2

conclusion, as you did, that they are related to the

3

brain injury?

4

A

Not at all.

5

Q

All right.

6

have?

7

A

I also --

8

Q

Let me back up.

9

Now, what other opinion do you

Assuming that this is an

organically caused seizure, what has been your

10

experience in terms of this type of history, that is

11

that there were some perhaps more significant seizures

12

and now these spells that continue to occur, what type

13

of prognosis or future is someone with this kind of

14

condition looking at?

15

A

Well, that's a very good question and it gets

16

down to the point of which specific pathophysiology

17

accounts for the continuing spells.

18

referenced the other day when we talked, it's possible

19

that he has more than one pathophysiology.

20

example, it's possible that he has seizures and he also

21

has psychiatric induced spells.

22

that pseudo seizures, which are psychiatrically induced

23

seeming seizure events, are most common in patients who

24

actually have seizures.

25

subject, but the importance of it in this patient who

Even as you

So, for

We know, for example,

That's a very complicated
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has an underlying depressive disorder is that for him

2

to do well with treatment, we have to try to be

3

accurate about the actual mechanism.

4

So he could have more than one mechanism, he

5

could have some seizures and some pseudo seizures, or

6

he could have some seizures and some other kind of

7

spell, but if that is true, then the prognosis for the

8

different spells depends upon what each of the spells

9

is due to and depends upon how each of the spells is

10

behaving.

11

Q

Well, that's why I was asking to assume that

12

these are physical in origin as opposed to pseudo.

13

by the way, why don't you just quickly define what

14

pseudo means to you as you're using it?

15

A

And

Well, pseudo seizures as people use it in the

16

literature means that it's something that may casually

17

or even to an expert appear to be a seizure, but is, in

18

fact, not a formal seizure process, and the seizure

19

process is that group of physical or behavioral

20

symptoms which may derive from brief bursts of abnormal

21

electrical brain activity.

22

Q

All right.

Still appearing to be a seizure

23

because of an abnormal electrical brain abnormality,

24

but its cause is not physical in origin, or am I

25

understanding you right?
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A

Not quite.

In other words, the word seizure

2

encompasses all those manifestations which derive from

3

a singular type of process.

4

brain electrical activity.

5

focus out to the symptoms, then there are patients who

6

have symptoms that may look like seizures, but they

7

don't have that abnormal brain electrical activity,

8

they are not -- the symptoms don't stem from that

9

process.

10

The process is abnormal
Now, if you change the

So the simplistic example there is what is

11

hysterical seizures or what are routinely in

12

neurological parlance called pseudo seizures, which

13

means they look like seizures, but they aren't and

14

they're usually psychiatrically generated events.

15

not -- even that differential diagnosis is not entirely

16

complete.

17

technically could have a pseudo seizure due to a

18

cardiac arrhythmia, that would be technically a pseudo

19

seizure, meaning it looks like a seizure, but it isn't;

20

however, people don't generally use the term in that

21

way, they generally use the term pseudo seizure to

22

imply a psychiatric mechanism.

It's

In other words, a person could have --

23

Q

All right.

Now, going back to my original

24

question.

25

are physical in origin, you've seen how they've been

I was having you assume that these spells
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1

described in the records.

2

origin, that is, originating from the brain injury,

3

what prognosis does someone like that have?

4

A

5

so...

6

Q

Assuming they are physical

It depends upon how well we can control them,

So the medications thus far don't appear to

7

have affected them significantly, they would at least

8

at times -- well, you know the record, go ahead and

9

explain.

10

A

So from what I can tell in the records, it

11

sounds like the medicines have not been effective in

12

controlling the spells.

13

the medicines are not -- well, actually, one of three

14

things.

15

effective because we have not found the right

16

medication or medications.

17

that the medication was not effective because

18

medications as a strategy are not sufficient for the

19

problem.

20

your current hypothesis, is that the medication is not

21

effective because it's not really a seizure disorder.

22

That means one of two things,

First, it could mean the medicines are not

Secondly, it could mean

Thirdly, and you're excluding this one in

But now if we consider that there are patients

23

who have seizures who will fail medications because

24

medications are not able to control the underlying

25

process, then we look at the other alternative
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1

treatments, such as the vagal nerve stimulator or

2

epilepsy surgery as I mentioned.

3
4
5

Q

Otherwise these spells or seizures continue on

indefinitely, is that the bottom line?
A

The usual prognosis for an established post

6

traumatic seizure disorder is that it's permanent, the

7

usual prognosis.

8

usually true.

That's not always true, but that's

9

Q

With age do they progressively worsen?

10

A

Usually not.

11

Q

Now, go ahead with the rest of your opinions.

12

A

So one issue, then, is the seizure.

They can, but usually not.

Second

13

issue is behavioral consequences of brain injury.

So

14

then you get into this very elaborate area of what kind

15

of behavioral changes may you reasonably expect as a

16

biological derivative of brain injury, and that's a

17

complicated area to talk about.

18

interesting and often referenced examples of that

19

discussion is the *Fenius Gage argument.

20

familiar with that?

One of the most

Are you

21

Q

I am.

22

A

So that whole one is very interesting because

23

it represents the observation of marked behavioral

24

changes due to frontal lobe dysfunction due to

25

anatomical severing of some of the frontal lobe
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pathways.

2

So we know without question that if you injure

3

somebody badly enough you can produce behavior changes.

4

Now, in this man, then, who has had underlying behavior

5

disorders, what do you then do if he has continued

6

behavior disorders, to which element do you attribute

7

that?

8

do you attribute it to his injury problem?

Do you attribute it to his underlying problem or

9

Q

Or a combination?

10

A

Or a combination, exactly.

And that's going

11

to be difficult, but it is a reasonable place for us

12

all to struggle because it is reasonable to wonder what

13

his behaviors may have done or what may have been done

14

to his behaviors by his injury.

15

Q

Certainly the literature is replete with

16

examples and research of how if someone had some

17

depressive disorder, a brain injury to the frontal lobe

18

often aggravates that.

19

you not?

20

A

You're familiar with that, are

Well, that's an interesting question.

First

21

of all, can it aggravate it, yes.

Does it often

22

aggravate it and how does it aggravate it, that becomes

23

much more difficult.

24

that.

25

things, you have to recognize that very commonly we are

Let me tell you what I mean by

First of all, when we're discussing these
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1

talking in terms of reported symptoms rather than

2

path -- than observable quantifiable pathophysiologic

3

mechanisms.

4

So if you were to go to Africa where people do

5

not have all of these kind of social context such as

6

we're currently involved in and somebody had a head

7

injury and previously had a head -- had a depressive

8

disorder and their behaviors changed afterward, you

9

could reasonably assume this is probably going to be

10

somehow biologically interlinked and the Fenius Gage

11

discussion is a very great example of that.

12

However, when you get into societies where

13

there are these other social issues, then the problem

14

you struggle with is how do you know that the patient

15

was biologically changed versus the patient was

16

sociologically changed, that is to say their underlying

17

disorder, which was *self-quailing because it was their

18

own responsibility now suddenly becomes

19

self-reinforcing because it becomes somebody else's

20

responsibility.

21

they changing because of the change in sociologically

22

*milieu or are they changing because they actually had

23

a biological change in their brain structure.

24

a tough area.

25

Q

So then if the patient changes, are

So it's

I understand that the etiology or the actual
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1

cause of change can be difficult to determine, that's

2

not my point.

3

is the literature recognizes, does it not, that there's

4

a correlation between frontal lobe injuries and

5

aggravation of any preexisting mental disorders?

6

A

That was not my question.

Yes, there is some correlation.

My question

Does that

7

mean it's true in every patient, no, but there is

8

correlation.

9

Q

In the high percentage, correct?

10

A

Well, show me the articles you're referencing,

11
12
13
14

let's look at the population base that they drew from.
Q

I'm just asking you based on your knowledge of

the literature.
A

If you don't know, that's fine?

Well, it's not that I don't know.

It's rather

15

that when you say high percentage, which specific

16

references are you talking about and what do you mean

17

by high percentage.

18

this way.

19

brain injury where there is no secondary gain

20

involvement, that group of people infrequently argues

21

that their underlying state was changed permanently.

22

Now, not zero --

So let's back it up and look at it

If you look at people who are involved in

23

Q

What's the foundation for that opinion?

24

A

My foundation for that opinion is my

25

experience over the years of seeing patients with those
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1

kinds of situations, that's where I get that

2

perspective.

3
4
5

If -- so, now, does that mean that no one ever
claims -- ever -- let me rephrase this.
Does that mean that there are no patients who

6

assert there is a worsening?

No, that does not mean

7

that there are no patients who assert a worsening --

8

there's a bunch of negatives in there, but what it

9

means is that when there's no ax to grind, usually from

10

a standard brain injury, people do not assert their

11

behaviors change.

12

When there's secondary gain issues, they may

13

and much more often do.

14

secondary gain perspective, then there's a very high

15

percentage who report that they're worse.

16

in that secondary gain population, it is not what we

17

see in the nonsecondary gain population.

18

In fact, when there's

But that's

Also -- and Nicholas, for example, he went on

19

to become suicidal.

Suicidal behavior is a very

20

interesting discussion, but it is not what derives from

21

normal brain injury.

22

suicidal behavior is a derivative of people who are

23

emotionally isolated, they are not well connected, they

24

are not well interrelated to other people so that the

25

idea of escaping the world on that basis is more

And the reason for that is
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1

acceptable to them.

2

it's not going to apply to everybody, but it's a

3

generalization.

4

That's a very broad statement and

It works fairly well.

There are certainly people who enter

5

situations which are so abhorrent to them that they may

6

become suicidal, such as a person who loses their

7

entire, you know, personal fortune or something.

8

suicidal behavior occurs in certain types of

9

individuals and there are certainly people who -- lots

But

10

of people who have terrible injuries and terrible

11

problems who don't become suicidal, they may become

12

depressed, but they don't become suicidal.

13

So this is a difficult area, and I don't want

14

to paint it as if we can polarize it to all or nothing

15

discussions.

16

and possibilities, therefore, if you looked at

17

Mr. Sorensen's later suicidal behavior and said

18

statistically what's most likely, is this most likely

19

to derive from his underlying depression or is it most

20

likely to derive from his brain injury?

21

it's most likely to derive from his underlying

22

depression.

23

Q

We're talking about shifting potentials

I would argue

That's my opinion.

Have you reached an opinion whether or not his

24

underlying depression presently has been aggravated or

25

enhanced by his brain injury?
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1

A

Well, again, I have not seen him in a long

2

time, so I don't know what he looks like or what he

3

says.

4

the records seem to shift over time to quite a focus on

5

his psychiatric state and seem to focus to, for

6

example, his suicidal levels of depression.

7

question then comes up where does that come from, is

8

that a derivative of injury or is it a derivative of,

9

you know, psychology and sociology.

All I can tell you is in the records it does --

And the

And in treating

10

this man, that has a big and huge impact because if

11

you're going to try to treat him, you have to

12

understand which mechanism is promoting the current

13

state.

14

So my view at this time is that while there's

15

no question Nick had very, significant injury, no

16

question about that, I think most of his depressive

17

behavior is probably derived from his underlying

18

illness rather than from the consequences of injury.

19

Q

Maybe this would be a good time to start.

20

You've mentioned a number of times that he's had a

21

depressive disorder.

22

you're referring to as a historical depressive

23

disorder?

24

A

25

Can you tell me specifically what

Let's see where that came from.

It was way

back at the beginning when that all came out, and I
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1

believe he told me about it, but let me look back and

2

see.

3

Yes, he told me about it.

When I first saw

4

him in August of 1999, he reported that he had been

5

depressed and that he had been on Effexor, and he also

6

made reference to having been jumped a year prior by

7

some gang members or somebody or other and that the

8

problem had gotten worse at that time.

9
10
11

Q

Let me see what you're referring to.

Is that

your history questionnaire?
A

Yes.

And that's -- this is my writing here.

12

This is whoever filled in the form, him or whoever,

13

that's their writing.

14

told me at that time.

15
16
17
18

This is my writing of what he

Also -Q

Now, let me -- go ahead.

Anything else you

recall about -- other than being jumped?
A

Well, here's what he had told me and what I

19

wrote in my August 4th letter.

20

depression in the years past which became worse a year

21

ago when he was jumped by some gang members.

22

recently, he has been tried on Effexor, and we do not

23

know exactly how this is going to work as he has just

24

recently started it."

25

Q

"He apparently had

Quite

That is your understanding of what was
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1

reported to you, that he was on Effexor at the time of

2

the accident or at the time you saw him?

3

A

At the time I saw him, yes.

4

Q

And that this -- that for what period of time

5

had he had any depressive episode prior to being jumped

6

by this gang?

7

A

Well, he told me years.

8

Q

Where is that said?

9

A

On the bottom of the first page from the

10
11

August 4th, 1999 letter.
Q

But I'm saying, is there any reference in your

12

notes that he either wrote or that you wrote down while

13

interviewing him where he said he had been depressed

14

for years?

15

A

Well, let's see.

16

Q

There's a difference between being depressed

17

for years and then what you put he apparently had

18

depression in the years past.

19

something very different.

20

A

That seems to mean

Well, now we're into semantics, and at the

21

time that I'm seeing him I'm just taking care of him,

22

so I'm not writing a letter that's going to stand up to

23

legal scrutiny of every word.

24
25

Q

But I'm trying to understand what you know

regarding any depressive history, because there is not
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1
2

a record of such history.
A

Okay.

All right.

So if there is no record of

3

such history, then I would simply go -- and by the way,

4

you have to go back to whoever gave him the Effexor

5

probably, but that's all that I know and that's what he

6

told me.

7

understood him to tell me.

8
9
10
11

Q

I'm just simply writing down what I

That's what I'm trying to understand.

Where

is it that you wrote down that he had had depression
for years?
A

Again, I made the note that - - o f what he told

12

me there and what -- the way I wrote it, the way I

13

wrote my note -- I mean -- let me back up.

14

When I'm seeing a patient, we are - - I ' m

15

writing down handwritten notes of things that people

16

are saying to jog my memory for the dictation.

17

not write down every word they say, nor do I write it

18

down in such a way as to try to answer every possible

19

question about it.

20

that I can then refer to.

21

Q

I do

So I'm trying to make some notes

But do you have notes that talk about any

22

years of depression, that's what I'm asking?

23

this something you remembered and then put it in your

24

letter of August 4th?

25

A

Or is

It's what I wrote down in my letter to
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1

Dr. Vogeler from what he told me, and exactly what

2

words he used, I cannot tell you.

3
4

Q

Is there anything in the history questionnaire

that refers to being depressed for years?

5

A

No.

6

Q

I can't read your writing, I'm just asking you

7

if there is anything in there?

8

A

No.

9

Q

Are you asking me to answer the question?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

I think I do, but go ahead.

12

A

What I would suggest is that you look at the

13

records of whoever gave him the Effexor --

14

Q

15

A

16

Q

17
18
19
20

Do you know him gave him the Effexor?

We have.
and see what they say.
That's why I say there's not a history of what

you're describing.
A

Then the other possibility is that I

misunderstood him.
Q

All right.

But, anyway, you have reached your

21

conclusion that most of his behavioral problems are a

22

result of a history of depressive disorders; is that

23

right?

24
25

A

Well, again, I'm going on the fact that he had

the underlying problems and then I'm going on the way
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1

the problem played out over time and observations

2

regarding this issue of depression in the setting of

3

head injury.

4

Now, having said all of that, a few things.

5

First, I would not advocate that everyone who has head

6

injury is free of depression.

7

Certainly people may get depression after a head

8

injury.

9

that head injury could not produce mechanisms which set

10

I would not say that.

I would not advocate any hypothesis that said

in motion a depression, they can.

11

In this man, my understanding of the problem

12

at the time was that he had background depression, if

13

that understanding is incorrect, then I'm sorry, that

14

was my understanding, okay.

15

Q

I'm not saying he didn't have a situational

16

depression.

17

anything?

18

A

19

records.

20

I'm asking you what you know about it if

No, that's all I know is what I have in those

So if he had -- if he had a brief or

21

situational depression and if that was not, then, an

22

underlying tendency, then you would make a stronger

23

argument for this problem being related to head injury;

24

however, as I've said, if you look at the behavior of

25

suicidal depression, it is not a common result of

50

088

1

natural head injury syndrome, and there's lots of

2

places to look for that kind of perspective, but it is

3

not a common thing.

4

common.

5
6

Q

Now, have we covered all of the information

which you know about --

7

A

8

Q

9

It's not impossible, it's just not

No.
from which you have drawn a conclusion that

there is a history of depression?

10

A

Oh, yes, I believe we have.

11

Q

And you're conceding that without additional

12

information the more situational the depressive episode

13

may have been, the more that that would indicate that

14

the component causation of the seizures may be --

15

pardon me, of the depression may be head injury of

16

origin?

17

A

Correct.

18

Q

Go ahead with the rest.

19

A

Just to set a couple of issues aside because

20

you asked me a long time ago what other issues were in

21

my report --

22
23
24
25

Q

Have we covered all the seizure disorder

issues?
A

I think we have,

I think we've talked about

that topic as far as we can really go with it.
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1
2

We -- and then so now we've talked about
cognitive issues.

3

Q

Behavioral issue?

4

A

We haven't talked about dementia.

In other

5

words, is there evidence that he is demented?

6

I can tell you about that is simply that apparently

7

Dr. Bigler and Weight thought his intellect was

8

basically normal, so they did not find evidence of

9

dementia as I understand it.

10

Q

And what

What is the perspective risk of developing

11

dementia or onset of dementia earlier because of a head

12

injury of this kind?

13

A

Well, that's a very good question.

And,

14

again, I think it depends upon where you look.

Again,

15

if you look at injury clinics, you've got -- American

16

injury clinics you have to be a little careful because

17

they have a selective subpopulation and some other

18

kinds of issues.

19

think there is some literature supporting the idea that

20

with enough injury you certainly can develop a

21

dementing process.

22

discussed was in the punch drunk syndrome or the boxer

23

syndrome or the pugilist syndrome which basically was

24

the context of multiple small head injuries resulting

25

in multiple disconnections and eventually in some

But if you look sort of broadly, I

The place where that was originally
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1
2

people a dementing process.
Interestingly, that's certainly not everybody,

3

it is only some.

4

no question that that can occur.

5

head injury to predispose to dementia, but how much a

6

single head injury, even a single sizeable head injury

7

predisposes to dementia is a much more complicated

8

discussion and has much more tenuous footing.

9

But it is in the literature, there's
So it is possible for

One of the places you can look at that

10

question is the issue of stroke.

11

very clear head injury.

12

and that's important, so we're not talking about the

13

mechanical force type, we're talking about vascular

14

type, so it's a different type, but there's no question

15

there's a big injury in stroke, and so then the

16

question comes up how many patients with stroke end up

17

with dementia?

18

they don't generally from a single stroke.

19

In stroke we have

Now, it's a different type,

And they can from multiple strokes, but

Dementia is a term which may be used in

20

various ways.

If you use the term very broadly and you

21

have a person who has stroke who has a speech problem,

22

you could call that dementia, because you could call

23

that a decrease in function that relates to

24

intellectual function, but generally the term dementia

25

is a more broader view of the ability to integrate and

53

1

process information, and that concept, that broader

2

functionality concept, we don't see a lot of dementia

3

following single strokes.

4

generally.

5

occur in somebody who has cardiac emboli and that sort

6

of thing.

7

much more like a punch drunk syndrome, which

8

interestingly is another example of multiple smaller

9

injuries.

10

We could, but we don't

We may after multiple strokes, such as

So the multiple stroke thing begins to look

So, is it possible for Nicholas to get

11

dementia from his event?

12

I think my own opinion is that dementia from this event

13

would not be highly probable.

14

impossible, but it's not highly probable, and I think

15

when we look at patients who had head injury and there

16

is no secondary gain setting, late development of

17

dementia doesn't seem to come out of that discussion.

18

So I'm not excluding it, I'm simply saying it would be

19

my opinion that this is probably not a likely outcome.

20

I think that's a discussion.

I don't think it's

Now, you mentioned earlier cerebral atrophy.

21

I don't know what scans you may be referencing in

22

bringing out that concept.

23

demonstrating that he has cerebral atrophy, given his

24

youth and given the fact that he had objective injury,

25

I would then need to give more credence to the

If we actually have data
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1

possibility of him developing dementia from that event.

2

So I've told you statistically a perspective,

3

but if you actually could show me scans that have

4

argued he has diffuse cerebral atrophy, I would

5

certainly be willing to reconsider that point in his

6

particular case.

7

Q

Fair enough.

8

MR. ALDERMAN:

9

Should we give a court a call?

10
11

Rich, can I interject here?

MR. HUMPHERYS:
break?

12

THE WITNESS:

13

(Break taken.)

14

Do you mind if we take a

Q

Sure.

As I remember, we were talking about dementia

15

and concluding our discussions about dementia.

16

have opinions as to other parts of what Nicholas is

17

complaining of, either behaviorally or cognitively or

18

whatever?

19

A

20

Do you

I think the disc problem that he had is

related to the accident.

21

Q

You mentioned that.

22

A

Right, and do you want to talk about that any

23
24
25

more or not?
Q

Well, let me just focus on the brain injury,

if I could.

Is there anything else about his
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1

behavioral problems.

2

he has a flat affect, that's consistent with a frontal

3

lobe injury, isn't it?

4

A

You may have seen in the records

That can be a frontal lobe injury, right.

It

5

can also be depression.

As all of these things are,

6

you have to try to see if you can determine what's the

7

mechanism that generates the response.

8

the mechanism that generates the flat affect is frontal

9

lobe and the Fenius Gage discussion, okay, then there's

So if you think

10

that.

11

depression, then there's a different set of mechanisms

12

and a different set of treatment options.

13

Q

And if you think the flat affect is due to

If the mechanism of the depression is -- has

14

its origin in the brain injury, is the treatment any

15

different than if the flat affect were simply a direct

16

result of the injury to the frontal lobes?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

In what way?

19

A

Several.

First, if the mechanism of

20

depression is due to brain injury, then counselling is

21

worthless because you're not talking about this being

22

based in belief systems or value systems or experience.

23

It's not going to get you anywhere.

24

foundation of the problem.

25

you just approach pharmacologically.

That's not the

It's basically something
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1

You know, some degree of minor counselling

2

could be useful simply at an adaptive level.

3

words, how does a person get along in their life given

4

that they've got a brain injury, but any kind of

5

Freudian or behaviorist approach to going back to, you

6

know, what you think might generate the depression is

7

going to be a waste of time.

8

biochemistry, it's not an experientially based

9

phenomenon.

10

In other

This would be a

On the other hand, if you think the depression

11

is based on the anguish discussion and has an

12

experiential foundation, then, as we know, we can help

13

people by trying to re-orient the way they approach the

14

world and the way they may be processing old

15

information, and so the treatments are quit different

16

at that level.

17

Also, medication wise, if we think that the

18

disorder is purely structural and frontal lobe

19

generated, then medications that activate frontal lobe

20

functions may be more beneficial, Effexor, for example,

21

being one example or possibly Wellbutrin might be more

22

useful whereas *serotonergic drugs that have more to do

23

with downward descending pathways and limbic system may

24

be less useful, so the pharmacology changes some.

25

Also, in regard to prognosis, if you believe
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1

that the mechanism of the depression is a residual of

2

old brain injury, then the prognosis is the patient

3

will have a permanent disorder to whatever extent that

4

nature does not fix the injury, and by this time nature

5

will have done what it can with regard to his injury.

6

Q

As good as it's going to get.

7

A

As good as it's going to get, yes.

So if you

8

believe that the mechanism of the depression is

9

structural from his injury, then you're talking about a

10

permanent problem and the whole treatment strategy

11

becomes living with permanent residuals.

12

believe that the mechanism of his depression has a lot

13

to do with experience and behaviorally based

14

depression, then he may be much more curable because it

15

may be that he could get, you know, change in view of

16

early experiences or prior experiences or value systems

17

or belief systems and those could lead to, then, much

18

better outcome in his overall function and capacities.

19

Q

Ifitisa

If you

combination of the two, which it

20

very well may likely b e , then I guess you have that

21

problem of the structural part never resolving, but the

22

behavioral or experiential part improving or not

23

improving depending upon how the structural part

24

effects them?

25

A

Or depending upon how a person can modify
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1

their --

2

Q

Adapt?

3

A

Adapt in their foundations for behavior.

You

4

know, this is difficult stuff and we don't have crystal

5

balls so we can't delineate entirely how it's

6

segregated, but the importance for this young man is

7

here he is in the early part of his life and you want

8

to give him his life back as much as you can.

9

best we can, we want to try and figure this out because

10
11

So as

then we can determine what we possibly are able to do.
Q

And therapy, at least to the extent that it's

12

behavioral or experiential, as well as adaptive in

13

nature, can help him give back as much life as

14

possible, if I understand what you're saying?

15

A

Well, no.

I think cognitive therapy is going

16

to be fairly useless if you believe it to be a

17

structurally based disorder.

18

things.

19

okay, here you are, you have this permanent problem,

20

how are you going to manage your life with it?

21

can do some fairly simple things only.

22

outside the brain for a second.

23

dysfunction, a leg paralysis and it was due to a

24

stroke, you might give that person some brief

25

counselling to say, Well, your leg is permanently

You can do some simple

You can do some things like saying, Well,

But you

Let me jump

If a person had a leg
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1

paralyzed, but here's -- let me help you a little bit

2

with the emotions, but mostly you are not going to

3

spend a lot of time on counselling for that sort of

4

thing, that's simply adapt and move on.

5

On the other hand, if the person's paralysis

6

was hysterical, then counselling may do a lot for the

7

underlying mechanism of the problem, possibly even to

8

the point of returning the person to function.

9

So I think if you believe that his disorder is

10

mostly structural injury, then counselling is going to

11

be more or less a waste of money, more or less.

12

counselling, to the extent of simply giving him some

13

adaptive skills, here's how you move on with your life

14

given these residuals could be useful, but it's going

15

to be fairly brief.

16

probably not only going to be not helpful, but may

17

actually entrench him in endless behavior and may

18

encourage propagation of the problem.

19

believe that most of this is due to structural injury,

20

I would not suggest a long-term counselling session.

21

think most of it you're going to do is going to be

22

pharmacological.

23

Q

Brief

And long-term counselling is

So if you really

I

Now, before we leave the head injury side, I

24

would like to ask you, you've raised a lot of issues

25

which are certainly appropriate issues to query, but
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1

what I want to know is, have you reached any opinions

2

about Nicholas Sorensen, in your judgment, has the

3

traumatic brain injury resulted in an aggravation of or

4

cause of any of these behavioral or emotional problems

5

you've referred to?

6

A

My opinion at this time based on the data that

7

I have is that his behavioral state is probably more to

8

do with underlying, you know, depression and issues

9

than it is with injury, that's my opinion at this time.

10

And we've talked about the various ways that opinion

11

could shift based on data, and we've talked about

12

variations, but that's my bottom line.

13

My opinion is that I'm not sure whether he has

14

a seizure disorder or not because subsequent EEGs have

15

failed to reveal it and his response to therapy

16

apparently has been poor.

17

My opinion is that he clearly did have an

18

injury and that there probably are some residuals, but

19

I think other issues are compounding those residuals as

20

I just mentioned.

21

And then we have not spent time on the disc

22

problem, I'll just leave those, but that's also in

23

there.

24
25

Q

Now, you mentioned it two or three times about

the disc being related to the accident.

Is there
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1

anything more that we need to talk about?

2

A

No.

I mean --

3

Q

You're report's fairly clear on that.

4

A

I think it is.

I think we don't know of any

5

underlying problem where he had that.

6

this injury was big enough that certainly we could

7

expect he could have had a disc injury and, you know,

8

he was young enough that you would not expect this to

9

be incidental, so I think it's related.

10
11
12

Q

We know that

Any other opinions you have relating to

Nicholas Sorensen?
A

Yes, I have the opinion that we should

13

struggle hard to try to determine some of these areas

14

that are vague to us for him because it's his life and,

15

you know, we've got to try to figure this out as best

16

we can.

17

and if they can give us further information, that may

18

be very helpful.

So if you can get the stuff at the university

19

Q

Okay.

Anything else?

20

A

No.

21

Q

All right.

I would like to ask you about some

22

additional questions now that we have your opinions,

23

hopefully, described in great detail.

24

I reassemble these exhibits properly.

25

Let me make sure

On Exhibit 2 -- do you have that in front of
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1

you?

2
3

MR. ALDERMAN:
Q

Right here.

There are two Post-its that appear on this,

4

and for whatever reason, I don't know, we didn't get

5

those Post-its at the beginning when we had requested

6

the records.

7

from, these Post-its, whose they were?

8
9

A

This -- or do you know where this came

Yes. Those were, I think, his.

I mean I don't

know who came to the window, but what I think happened

10

with this is that I sent the letter of 9/15 to him, I

11

think, I think that's where he got it.

12

think what happened is he or somebody came to the

13

window and said he wanted one of the sentences removed,

14

which was the sentence about the depression and that

15

being present prior to the accident and the -- this was

16

written by the secretary, these two little Post-it

17

notes.

18

Nick and then it gives a phone number, which I'm

19

gathering is his phone number.

20

And then I

The -- there's a phone number there that says

So I would presume he came to the window and

21

said I would like that sentence removed.

I don't know

22

if he came to the window, but that's what I'm

23

presuming.

24

Q

And help me find that sentence.

25

A

It's in the copy that you have -- well, you

I'm not --
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1

may have two copies.

2

Post-it notes, it's underneath the Post-it notes, so

3

it's --

4

Q

But in the copy that shows the

There it is, "Nick has done generally well

5

although he has had continuing depression, which is a

6

problem present prior to the accident."

7

saying that he had depression in 10th grade.

8

know what that surrounded, what situation that was

9

relating to?

10
11
12

A

And he's
Do you

No, and I don't know if that was the gang

thing or not.
Q

But in any event, we have his note to you that

13

he had a depressive episode in 10th grade or sometime

14

prior --

15

A

Right.

16

Q

- - a year or more, a year or two prior, and

17
18
19

you recall the issue regarding the gang jumping him?
A

That's in the -- my original report.

Again,

it's something he told me.

20

Q

Yes.

21

A

But, again, now, was that gang jumping event

22

the event that's referenced here in the 10th grade, I

23

don't know.

24
25

Q

Now, let me see if I can clarify a few things.

In Exhibit 2, it appears that your first contact with
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1

Dunn & Dunn was a letter in May -- I believe May 14 --

2

wherein a subpoena was enclosed ot appear at trial

3

together with a check of $18.50 as an appearance fee.

4

Do you see that in Exhibit 2?

5
6

A

Yes, I think so.

I've seen the letter of

May 14th, and then I'm seeing that $18.50 check, yes.

7

Q

And the subpoena just behind it?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

Prior to this time, had you had any direct

10
11
12
13
14
15

contact with Dunn & Dunn to your knowledge?
A

If there's no other letters, then the answer

would be no.
Q

I don't know of any, but I don't know of any

oral communication either, so I'm inquiring -A

I don't think there was any.

16

anybody called.

17

that's when it started.

18

Q

I don't know if

I don't think anybody called.

I think

Then we have a letter which is closer to the

19

top of Exhibit 2 dated May 23, again from Dunn & Dunn,

20

and it's in response to your letter of May 23rd where

21

you indicate that you normally charge $315 an hour and

22

that you didn't want to presume anything but assumed

23

that they would pay and you wanted that confirmed.

24

that kind of a fair synopsis?

25

A

Is

Yes.
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1

Q

The May 23rd response back, which is the same

2

day, I assume these were faxed back and forth, it

3

indicates -- Ms. Hanson indicates, "Of course we plan

4

to pay you at your rate of $315 per hour for your

5

appearance."

6

you would be willing to spend several hours,

7

approximately five, and review all of Nicholas Sorensen

8

records.

9

treating physician early on in his injury, about his

And then it says, "In fact, we wonder if

We would like to know what you think, as his

10

current condition.

11

client will authorize something like that."

12
13
14

Let us know and we will see if our

Now, at this point in time you understood that
Dunn & Dunn was representing Marcelises, correct?
A

Yes, I don't know that -- yes, I presume that

15

is the case.

16

so with regard to somebody, if you would have asked or

17

if they would have asked, I was more interested in

18

somebody simply asking for my opinion.

19

that that is correct, that that is who they represent,

20

yes.

21

Q

I'm not interested in that particularly,

But I believe

Then in the page immediately before on

22

Exhibit 2 is another letter or a memo dated 5/23/03

23

where you are responding apparently and saying that you

24

would be happy to review the rest of his records and

25

include this in your overall assessment of his illness.
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1

And then you indicated, "It's always a pleasure to see

2

the rest of the story."

3

What was your understanding -- was there any

4

information provided to you orally in conversations

5

during this period of time?

6

A

I don't know.

I certainly have no

7

recollection if there was some sort of discussion on

8

the phone or not, I don't know.

9

their office contacted my office with these things as

So all I know is that

10

you see here to basically ask me to evaluate this

11

patient•s records and then talk about my opinion

12

regarding him.

13

conversation, I don't know if there was a phone

14

conversation.

15

With regard to -- was there some phone

With regard to the rest of the story, that's

16

probably a reference to the letter of May 23rd where

17

it's asked if I would look through the rest of the

18

records, and I put that in there because, you know, we

19

get these snippets of people's lives when we get to see

20

them, and part of the thing that's very revealing is

21

what happens later, how does it play out.

22

finding out what happens afterward is very interesting

23

and useful, so I probably was going, yes, I would be

24

happy to know what happened.

25

Q

And so

So the fact that that was said doesn't mean
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1

that there was conversations between the two of you or

2

someone else at Dunn & Dunn?

3
4
5

A

No.

That was probably a reference to them

asking me to review the records.
Q

Then next we have is Exhibit 3.

That is a

6

letter from Dunn & Dunn dated August 1st, 2003

7

addressed to you and it starts out by saying, "Enclosed

8

please find copies of Nicholas Sorensen's medical

9

records in the above referenced matter.

You treated

10

Mr. Sorensen following an automobile accident on

11

July 24, 1999.

12

records and give us your opinions about a couple of

13

things.

14

has been going on with Mr. Sorensen since you last saw

15

him," and she then provides some additional information

16

there.

17

We would like you to review his medical

The following is some information about what

On your copy it has highlighted the words "we

18

would like you to review his medical records and give

19

us your opinion."

20

you know?

21

A

Tell me why that was highlighted, do

I don't know who did that.

I don't know if

22

the secretary did it or what.

I don't really know

23

where that came from, whether that was there when we

24

got it or whether it was something that my secretary

25

added, it could be either.
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1

Q

Was this the only communication you had had

2

prior to those correspondences which we just reviewed

3

in May up until this time?

4

A

Well, again, I don't recall if there were any

5

phone calls or discussions.

6

know about is simply what it talks about in these

7

letters.

8

overview that I had seen this patient, he then had gone

9

on to other people, you guys have this litigation, they

10

had, then, looked at my opinions, they had, then, asked

11

me to review the rest of his records and tell them what

12

my opinion was based on the original stuff and also my

13

subsequent review of the records.

14

understanding of the situation.

15

Q

I don't know.

So what I

My understanding of it was -- and basic

That's my basic

In the fourth full paragraph she asks you --

16

well, let's see.

17

presenting the issues she wants you to address; is that

18

correct?

19

current issues are as a result of the injury and what

20

those issues might be as a result of problems

21

Mr. Sorensen had prior to the accident."

22
23

A

"The question we have is to what degree his

Yes, I think that was the basic overview of

the question they had.

24
25

She's asking you I guess - - o r she's

Q
up.

Now, the last paragraph -- well, let me back

This is fairly consistent with when you were
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1

retained to do IMEs on a cold file review except you've

2

had a little history in treatment years before.

3

Let me rephrase that.

What she•s asking you

4

to do is fairly consistent with a cold file review,

5

correct, that is, she's sending you records, look at

6

this and --

7

A

Tell us what you think.

8

Q

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Now, in the last - - o n page 2 of Exhibit 3,

tell us the issues?

11

the first paragraph says, "After you have a chance to

12

review his records, give me a call so we can discuss

13

your opinions about Mr. Sorensen's progress over the

14

last several years.

15

like you to address but we can talk about those when

16

you call. "

17
18

There are several issues we would

Did you respond to that request?
A

Probably did.

Yes, I did call, and that's why

19

I didn't send this report that I have here, is I did

20

call and talk to them.

21

Q

In your discussion with them - - d o you know

22

who it was you talked with when you made the call?

23

it an attorney, was it Ms. Hanson, was it a group of

24

people or do you remember?

25

THE WITNESS:

Was

I think we talked, didn't we
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1

talk?

2

Did we talk?
I don't know for sure whether I talked to Kay

3

at that point or whether -- who I talked to at that

4

time.

5

Q

Anyway, it was someone from Dunn & Dunn?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

And had you prepared your report at that time?

8

A

Let's see, what's the date?

9

Q

August 11?

10

A

No, because this was -- well, actually, let's

I don't know for sure.

No.

11

see, I probably did.

12

because this, as I said, I did concurrently when going

13

through the records.

14

have gone through the records, made all of my notes,

15

made my conclusions so I understood what I was

16

thinking, and then I would have called up and said

17

here's what I'm thinking.

18

Q

All right.

Yes, I probably had done that

So what would happened is I would

And then talking with someone at

19

Dunn & Dunn's office you went through the various

20

opinions in your report, correct?

21

A

Correct.

22

Q

And then were you going to send that to Dunn &

23

Dunn?

24

A

I think they asked me not to at the time.

25

Q

Do you know why?
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1

A

No.

2

Q

Did they ever suggest that they did not want

3

Some sort of legal issue I guess.

to refer to you as an expert or a defense expert?

4

A

I don't know.

They may have, I don't know.

5

Q

And then after preparing that report,

6

reviewing it with Dunn & Dunn, what was your next

7

involvement in this case, if you remember?

8
9

A

Well, look at that billing thing.

Let's see

what the billing thing says.

10

Q

That's Exhibit 4.

11

A

So let me see the date here - - s o the next

12

thing was, then, the meeting that Mr. Alderman and I

13

had on the 16th.

14

Q

Of?

15

A

Of September, where he came to talk about my

16

opinions.

17

Q

18

Is this the first face-to-face meeting you had

had with anyone from Dunn & Dunn?

19

A

I believe it was.

20

Q

And are we talking about a half an hour to an

21

hour?

22

A

That was two hours, it looks like.

It would

23

have been -- well, it's whatever $351 into $787 is,

24

that's probably like two and a half hours or something

25

like that, and it probably would have included the time
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1

I prepared for the thing, which is probably, I don't

2

know, an hour, 45 minutes, something or other and

3

whatever time we met.

4

time break down is, but it would have been something

5

like that.

6

Q

7
8
9

So I don't know exactly what the

Any further communications until our office

contacted you to meet last Thursday?
A

No, I don't think so -- well, wait a minute.

That's not true probably.

I probably called him to

10

tell him that you were coming because you guys have all

11

of your legal stuff and I'm trying to be very delicate

12

with that stuff, so...

13

Q

So the record's clear, the pronouns you're

14

using, when we contacted you to meet with you, you

15

called Mr. Alderman to tell him that I was going to

16

meet with you?

17

A

That you were coming, yes.

18

Q

I see.

19
20
21
22

Was there any further discussion

regarding that?
A

No, I think I just told him that you were

coming and that was it.
Q

In your meeting of September 16, did you

23

provide Mr. Alderman with a copy of the report or did

24

you show it to him, allow him to read it?

25

A

I don't know if I did that.

I actually may
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1

not have because I think I gave -- I know I didn't give

2

him a copy of it because I think I gave him a copy

3

today when I gave you a copy.

4

I think he f s seen a copy?

5
6

THE WITNESS:

So that's the first time

Is that correct?

I think that's

correct.

7

MR. ALDERMAN:

Yes.

8

Q

In any event, you discussed the substance of

9

that?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Now, when I met with you last week, I believe

12

that you indicated -- and when I asked if you had

13

prepared anything, you said you had prepared a report,

14

you referred to it, but when I asked to see it, I think

15

you indicated you thought it would be attorney work

16

product or something such as that.

17

A

Well, it could be.

I didn't know how you guys

18

would handle that issue.

In other words, you have your

19

own sets of terminology and your own sets of rules and

20

I'm not familiar with all of those rules, and I have

21

had one very unfortunate experience, which you probably

22

know about, that has to do with one of these things

23

where there was some nuance I did not understand and

24

that created problems.

25

with that, therefore, I was not sure if I could give

So I try to be very careful
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1

you that copy or not.

2

you that I would wait for you guys to talk to each

3

other to determine whether I could give it to you or

4

not.

5

Q

Right.

And since I was not sure, I told

I think you indicated I needed

6

permission - - o r that you needed permission from

7

Mr. Dunn's office to produce it to me?

8

A

Right.

9

Q

Now, at any time, Dr. Barbuto, did you have a

10

release signed by Mr. Sorensen that would allow you to

11

talk with anyone other than Mr. Sorensen or his

12

representatives?

13
14
15
16
17

A

I believe we had this - - w e had all of those

things when they come, the -- whatever that is.
Q

I've seen some releases, but I didn't see

anything that would release information to Dunn & Dunn.
A

They -- I think they said they subpoenaed me

18

to testify at trial and talk with them -- yes, that was

19

back in May.

20
21
22

Q

But was -- are you referring only to the

subpoena to appear at trial?
A

Well, my understanding was that will -- that

23

allows me to talk to him, that's my understanding.

You

24

know, whether it actually says you can have a meeting

25

or not, I don't know about that.

But my understanding
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1

was I was told that I was going to -- the court was

2

defining that I should participate in this and that,

3

therefore, I can talk with them.

4
5
6

Q

Is that what Dunn & Dunn indicated to you or

is that something you assumed on your own?
A

Well, other times when we've had these --

7

we've had these, you know, subpoenas, they basically

8

mean that I am now expected to talk with people

9

involved in the situation, and it then means that the

10

situation's outside of the normal, you know, patient

11

confidentiality stuff because it's now a legal

12

proceeding and I'm involved in that, so, therefore, I'm

13

to talk to the involved people, so that's my

14

understanding.

15

Q

Now, the first subpoena I found in your record

16

had you to appear on June 5th.

Now, you had

17

communicated through correspondence otherwise regarding

18

Ms. Hanson's request and then furthermore in August and

19

in September.

Are you familiar with the *HIPPA law?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Do you find anywhere in your file a HIPPA

22

release that was signed by Mr. Sorensen or his legal

23

representative?

24

to see if you might have it and I just haven't seen it.

25

A

I have not seen it, but I would love

Well, I'm not seeing something that says
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1

specifically the HIPPA thing.

2

to testify at trial, which as I'm understanding, once

3

you get into that, you're outside the HIPPA situation

4

anyway.

5

situation and consequently -- as I understand it, that

6

takes you outside of that.

7
8
9

Q

I am seeing the subpoena

It's not -- because you're now in a trial

Even for ex parte contacts with opposing

counsel with no notice given to plaintiffs?
A

I don't know the nuances of your rules.

My

10

understanding of it is that when we are involved in

11

legal work, when somebody says to us that you are

12

involve in this, that that's now outside of the HIPPA

13

restrictions.

14

patient and say, Can I talk to this person?

15

the way it works as I understand it.

16

Q

In other words, you don't go to the
That isn't

Is it your understanding, then, that if a

17

member of the media came and asked you about

18

Mr. Sorensen that once receiving a subpoena that you

19

could talk to the media about his personal life?

20

A

Well, I think the media is much different.

21

The legal world involves us, just as you guys have, in

22

these proceedings and it's my understanding that when

23

we are involved in this, when we are demanded to

24

participate in it or asked to participate in it and we

25

have been, you know, duly asked to participate in it,
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1

that that's not in the legal -- that's not the HIPPA --

2

it's not in the HIPPA realm, it's outside of HIPPA

3

which has to do with normal patient care and that sort

4

of thing.

5

Now, if you go to the media, the media is not

6

a legal entity and it's not a legal -- it's not the

7

lawyers and the legal setting, so it's a different

8

situation as far as I understand it.

9

Q

And as far as you understand that you can talk

10

once a subpoena has been issued, you can talk - - d o you

11

know what ex parte means?

12

A

No.

13

Q

Ex parte means that you can talk with someone

14

without giving anyone else that's interested notice or

15

knowledge that this conversation is taking place.

16
17
18

A

Okay.

I don't know about that.

I mean that's

your -Q

Is it your understanding, then, that once a

19

subpoena has been issued to testify at trial, such as

20

here, that you appear and give testimony on June 5th,

21

that that would give you a carte blanche justification

22

to talk with opposing counsel about your patient with

23

no notice given at all to your patient?

24

A

Yes, that's my understanding.

25

Q

Have you done this before in the past where
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1

you have gone ahead and had ex parte communications, as

2

I've defined ex parte, with defense counsel when you

3

have had patients either treating -- well, I guess it

4

would have to be in a treating situation?

5

A

Well, there are certainly patients where we

6

get -- I mean, I see patients in my practice where we

7

get involved in some aspect like this, you have a legal

8

confrontation and it has to do with that patient.

9

get subpoenas for records all the time, that's almost a

We

10

daily thing.

11

have -- when you guys in

12

that we have to give this stuff, then that's - - w e are

13

supposed to do.that.

14

sort of nuances where you can do it this way but not

15

that way.

16

So as I'm understanding it, when you
the legal community define

I'm not aware that there are some

I'm not aware of that.
So in patients who have been clinical

17

patients, there have been times when I have been asked

18

by attorneys or somebody to talk about the patient as

19

part of a legal process.

As I understand it --

20

Q

Even if it's the opposed attorneys?

21

A

As I understand it, when you guys do your

22

legal work and you put these issues at issue in the

23

legal arena, you then, by that process, take the

24

patient's privacy issue out of the privacy issue.

25

other words, you are now saying this is a discussion

In
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1

which will take place in court and it is a discussion

2

or in the legal arena and information now goes outside

3

of the normal doctor-patient relationship.

4

So my understanding of it is that when you

5

guys get involved and do this, it now no longer is

6

restrained in the normal doctor-patient relationship

7

and normal, you know, communication limitations.

8

as I understand it, it just -- just the patient's

9

choice to be involved in the legal process and to do

And

10

this is what basically then opens them up for this.

11

other words, the patient chooses to make this a social

12

issue where information is being -- going to be handled

13

by legal authorities, courts, attorneys, other kinds of

14

things.

15

that, they, then, have basically defined that they're

16

allowing their information to be processed by this

17

system and it is not -- it is not in the normal patient

18

confidentiality realm any longer.

And as I understand it, when the patient does

19

Q

Bu that's --

20

A

And I think you do have to be -- in other

21

words, when you have information like this, it's not

22

something where that suddenly gives you the right to

23

talk to everybody on the planet, but the involved

24

people, I understand, you can talk to.

25

Q

In

With no notice to your patient?
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7

A

Yes, t h a t i s my u n d e r s t a n d i n g , y e s .

That i s

correct.
Q

Do you recall being involved in a case

involving Balyura?
A

Yes, that's the case that I've referenced that

was so ugly.
Q

Where you were involved on behalf of the

8

patient and then had an ex parte discussion with

9

defense counsel, Joe Joyce.

10
11
12
13

A

I recall that case very well and very

unfortunately, yes.
Q

You know the details of that one.

And do you recall being -- meeting with Piero

Ruffinengo?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

And that —

did you not understand after that

16

that it is inappropriate to talk to opposing counsel

17

without proper notice?

18

A

No, I didn't understand that.

What I

19

understood was this:

First of all, as I understood the

20

case with that particular case, as you know, this was a

21

very unpleasant and very unfortunate situation.

22

basically the situation where my brother-in-law, Joe

23

Steele had asked me to see this patient, but then asked

24

me to treat the patient and become a treating doctor,

25

not an expert, but rather a treating doctor.

It was

So as I
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1

understood it, I was a treating doctor not Joe's

2

expert, and as I understood that, when Mr. Joyce became

3

involved as the other attorney and told me that as the

4

other attorney he had right to the information and

5

right to talk to me --

6

Q

Without notice?

7

A

Of the patient?

8

Q

To the patient, without notice to the patient,

9
10

he had a right to talk to you?
A

Yes, that was my understanding, is that he had

11

a right -- because of your legal arena, that he had a

12

right to talk to me about this patient because it was a

13

legal confrontation and he was involved in it, and so

14

when he came and actually was talking about another

15

case where I was seeing the -- for which I was an

16

expert in that case, he said, you know, Can I talk with

17

you about this case?

18

appropriate, are you the attorney involved and is that

19

appropriate to do that?

20

y e s , he told me that that was appropriate and I could

21

talk with him.

22

And I said, Well, is that

A n d as I understand, he said

So my understanding was in that situation that

23

this was a discussion of being involved with attorneys

24

who are trying to work out the case and who -- and

25

because it's a legal arena, you can talk with them.
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1

Now, the -- that particular case, I think Joe felt that

2

I was his expert, I think was the issue, but the

3

trouble is he didn't define it as such and I had

4

actually been treating the patient.

5

So as far as I knew, I could not wear both

6

hats, I could not be treating patient at the time --

7

actively treating the patient and at the same time wear

8

the other hat.

9

time, you know, I wasn't -- I was the treating doctor

So as I understood it, that at that

10

and this attorney was involved in the case and the case

11

was before the courts, and consequently because it was

12

before the courts, I was allowed to talk with the

13

involved people and so, therefore, I was doing that,

14

that was my understanding of how it worked.

15

MR. HUMPHERYS:

16

MR. ALDERMAN:

17

20

I just have one quick follow-up

question.

18
19

I have no further questions.

EXAMINATION
BY MR. ALDERMAN:
Q

Mr. Humpherys stated earlier -- and I believe

21

he was trying to -- or he was quoting from your meeting

22

that you had with him last Thursday, and he said that

23

you had told him that you needed permission from Dunn &

24

Dunn to give him this report dated 8/11/03.

25

remember that testimony?

Do you
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1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Did anyone from Dunn & Dunn tell you that you

3
4

needed permission to give that report to Mr. Humpherys?
A

No, I am simply trying to be sure that what I

5

am doing is appropriate because of that Balyura case.

6

That was a very, very ugly situation and, you know, I'm

7

trying to ever avoid having that kind of thing

8

repeated.

9

what are your rules and how do we participate with

So consequently, I'm trying to determine

10

these rules and, therefore, since I was not sure what

11

the rules were and how it could be done, I said I

12

needed to find out from you guys or have the two of you

13

talk so that I could know what was appropriate to do.

14

MR. ALDERMAN:

I have no further questions.

15

THE WITNESS:

16

MR. HUMPHERYS:

17

(Deposition concluded at 5:42 p.m.)

Can I ask a question?
We can go off the record.

18
19

-ooOoo-

20
21

(Right to read and sign above deposition not

22

reserved by deponent or attorney as required under new

23

Rules of Civil Procedure for cases filed after November

24

1999.)

25
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